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  ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis addresses the following questions, among others.  Can two people take the 
exact same precautions yet face different liabilities for identical accidents?  Can two people 
exercise the same overall care yet face different liabilities?  Can a person take more precautions 
than the efficient level of care requires at the time of the accident, yet justifiably be found liable 
in negligence?  More generally, is the Hand Formula economically misguided or inapplicable, 
at least in many real-world scenarios?  Is the Restatement (Third) of Torts equally misguided or 
imprecise?  Is orthodox economic analysis of negligence law predicated and contingent upon 
over-constrained and unrealistic assumptions?  What are the prerequisites for the application of 
the conventional model of negligence adjudication?  
The principle issues examined include (i) Interacting precautions and multidimensional 
frameworks; (ii) Short-run versus long-run optimization of negligence puzzles; (iii) Path-
dependencies and dynamic analysis of care measures; (iv) Non-strictly convex and 
discontinuous social costs functions; (v) Fluctuating and discontinuous social cost functions; 
(vi) Threshold effects in costs and efficiency functions; (vii) An expansive methodology to 
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Economists and legal theorists have long coalesced around “the most important question 
that an economic theory of negligence should answer”1—how to interpret and apply Judge 
Hand’s famous B < PL formula.2  A marginal approach emerged as the decisive victor of this 
debate, and for the last three decades was enshrined as the golden standard of negligence law. 
This dissertation claims that this golden standard is often wrong, must be refined in order to 
achieve efficiency and is better understood as a special case within a broader framework.  It 
then suggests an alternative view of negligence as optimization puzzles, and an expansive 
understanding of the Hand Formula.  The outcome is a full-scale critical account of the “supply 
side” of negligence law.  
In order to adjudicate even the most basic negligence case, the court must engage in a 
straightforward cost-benefit analysis, aimed at minimizing the costs of accidents.  This analysis 
is illustrated by the Hand Formula, which calls for the balancing of precaution costs (B) on one 
side, and the costs of expected outcomes (PL) on the other.  The formula, however, entails 
some well-known shortcomings.  Primarily, it seems to call for the rather insurmountable task 
of conclusively ascertaining the socially optimal behavior for all settings by measuring the 
aggregated costs and benefits of all possible sets of precautions.  This hurdle impeded many 
attempts to earnestly apply the Hand Formula, and could have limited its application and 
reduced it to a mere theoretical principle or ideal.  
                                                
1 Mark F. Grady, Book Review: Discontinuities and Information Burdens: A review of the Economic Structure of 
Tort Law by William Landes and Richard Posner, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 658, 667 (1988) (hereinafter: “Discontinuities 
and Information Burdens”).  







In an effort to make negligence adjudication manageable, economic scholarship has 
endorsed the application of a highly narrow and short-run variant of the Hand Formula.  This 
variant, known as the marginal approach, focuses solely upon untaken marginal precautions, 
and confines negligence inquiry to a single question: “could the defendant have taken a single 
additional cost-justified precaution?”  If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, the 
defendant should be found negligent.  Otherwise, he or she should be deemed to have acted 
reasonably.  Using this technique, the marginal approach attempts to perform a true feat—
determine whether the duty of care was breached without actually identifying what the efficient 
duty of care ought to be.  Instead of having the court articulate the required duty in the abstract, 
the marginal approach provides it with a tool to easily determine whether such duty was in fact 
breached. 
Almost every economic scholar of torts has since embraced the marginal approach, 
practically without reservation, and affirmed it as the “correct”3 interpretation of the Hand 
Formula.  From Landes and Posner to Cooter and Ulen, and from Shavell to Grady, the 
marginal approach was adopted as the golden standard of negligence in both a normative and 
descriptive sense, and endorsed by the drafters of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS.4  
Indeed, “a good economist”5 follows the marginal approach, or so prevailing torts scholarship 
would have us believe.  
This dissertation demonstrates that the marginal approach suffers from a number of fatal 
flaws, and despite its best intentions, often does more harm than good.  Our prime contention is 
                                                
3 William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 87 (1987) (hereinafter: 
“The Economic Structure of Tort Law”).  
4 See, Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, LAW AND ECONOMICS 215 (2011) (hereinafter: “Law and Economics”) 
and the discussion of this point in Part I.F hereinafter. 






that orthodox economic analysis of negligence law is entirely contingent and predicated upon 
narrowly tailored prerequisites and over-constrained underlying assumptions, and that these 
assumptions are often unrealistic, exceedingly simplified or plainly misguided.  More 
specifically, the marginal approach quixotically assumes that all precautions are single-
dimensional and orthogonal, and overlooks efficiency functions that do not follow the rule of 
diminishing marginal returns6 or present with discontinuities, threshold effects and path-
dependencies.  Rather than accepting the assumptions of the conventional model as given, this 
thesis systematically relaxes them, and carefully models the impact of doing so on tortfeasors’ 
ex-ante and ex-post incentives, and on the possibilities of achieving first-best social outcomes. 
In most real-world settings, the risk of any detrimental outcome is a product of multiple 
correlated or interacting actions and omissions.7  Once a particular precaution is taken, it 
inevitably affects the efficiency, desirability and normative necessity of taking an additional 
(marginal) precaution.  As a result, the optimal short-run (marginal) outcome is usually path-
dependent, contingent on past constraints, susceptible to strategic manipulations and 
fundamentally diverged from the long-run set of optimal precautions.  Additionally, the 
possibility of taking substitutable sets of different precautions within a multidimensional 
framework also brings assorted normative difficulties to light, decouples the conventionally 
                                                
6 Under orthodox assumptions, (i) the marginal return on investment in precaution strictly diminishes, so that the 
expected harm is a monotonically decreasing convex function of investment in precaution; and (ii) the marginal cost of 
precautions is constant or monotonically increasing.  Under these assumptions, the overall cost of accidents is a convex 
function of investment in precaution.  Concurrently, the social benefit or utility of investment in precaution is a concave 
function.  In this dissertation, the term utility function usually refers to social benefit, rather than reduction of harm, and 
is therefore described under orthodox assumptions as concave rather than convex.  We discuss these assumptions in detail 
in Part II, hereinafter.  
7 In much the same way, multiple correlated risks and beneficial outcomes might result from certain actions and 






assumed link between overall investment in precautions and overall care, and substantially 
limits the prescriptive value of judicial precedent.  
To illustrate the normative difficulties presented by multidimensional and interacting 
precautions in the context of negligence adjudication, the dissertation views precautionary 
measures as inputs, and applies classic economic production theory to model their workings.  It 
then constructs a systematic taxonomy of possible relationships between precautions, and 
classifies them to include: (i) independent (orthogonal) precautions; (ii) complementary 
precautions; (iii) mutually exclusive precautions; and (iv) interacting precautions, which are 
further divided between: (a) negatively synergetic precautions; (b) overlapping precautions; and 
(c) positively synergic precautions.  For each type of interaction category, assorted suboptimal 
equilibria, foreseeable strategic behaviors and inefficiencies are uncovered and discussed.  To 
emphasize the limits of the orthodox analysis, each category is explained by exploring the fact 
patterns of Hendricks v. Peabody Co.,8 a seminal case originally used to defend the marginal 
approach in leading economic scholarship. 
Furthermore, unlike the assumptions of the conventional model, there is little reason to 
think that precautions always, or even predominantly, yield continuous and strictly diminishing 
marginal returns.  As this dissertation shows, fluctuating and discontinuous marginal costs and 
benefit functions, threshold effects and tipping points are actually extremely common in 
modern negligence settings.  When the monotone convexity and continuity assumptions are 
relaxed, even within a single-dimensional framework, additional normative and practical 
concerns arise with regards to the application of the Hand Formula.  As we shall discuss, this is 
particularly true when the overall cost of accident function presents with multiple local minima 
                                                






and equilibria.  When the world is seen in this manner—a convoluted tapestry of interactions, 
path-dependencies and threshold effects—negligence law presents new and unanticipated 
challenges.  For most of these challenges, defaulting to a memoryless and myopic marginal 
analysis (defined infra) is unwarranted, ill advised and frequently harmful.  
While showing that the marginal approach is ineffective in ensuring efficient outcomes 
even under some mundane conditions, the dissertation also discusses the alternative approach 
to negligence adjudication, known as the aggregated or in-toto approach.  This approach strives 
to determine the socially desired level of care based on the accumulated costs and benefits of 
all possible precautions and foreseeable risks.  In other words, it sets out to conclusively find 
the optimal set of precautions that would yield the minimal social costs for every particular 
scenario.  Using a dynamic model, the thesis establishes that the aggregated approach may also 
lead to stark inefficiencies resulting from path-dependencies and sunk costs, and is 
unadministrable by any measure.  Specifically, it demonstrates that the aggregated approach 
may create inefficient short-run incentives when certain past actions are not viewed as 
constraints, regardless of whether the defendant has previously overinvested or underinvested 
in precautions.  It therefore concludes with finding that the aggregated approach is—in most 
cases—unfit as a theoretical concept, unsuitable as a normative ideal and inapplicable in 
practice. 
The thesis’s aim, however, is broader than deconstructing the foundations of the 
marginal approach or discarding the underpinnings of the aggregated analysis.  It is also to shed 
light on an important and commonly ignored feature of cost-benefit analysis in torts—an innate 
and irresoluble tension between short-run and long-run incentives, and between constrained and 






incentivize ex-ante strategic manipulations, and hinder long-run optimal results.  Long-run 
considerations are likely to induce other detrimental strategic behaviors, and hinder short-run 
efficient investments.  This tension underlies many of the critical models developed throughout 
the thesis, and the normative dilemmas they present.  
Faced with the inadequacies of both the marginal and aggregated analyses, a novel 
theoretical approach to negligence adjudication is suggested.  Rather than being confined to a 
choice between the aggregated or marginal approach, this thesis proposes considering 
additional variants of the Hand Formula.  In other words, it claims that the aggregated and 
marginal approach merely represent two extreme ends of a broad spectrum, with a multitude of 
other approaches or variants lying between them.  These variants, referred to as “mixed 
approaches,” operate as hybrids of marginal and aggregated analyses, and vary with respect to 
such scales as the length of past timespan considered, the number of conjunctive alternative 
hypotheticals considered and the nature of the variables reviewed.  By applying mixed 
approaches, lawmakers can perform cost-benefit analyses in torts using varying degrees of 
freedom, and tailor a specific optimization method to unique challenges, settings, needs and 
goals.  Put differently, the Hand Formula should be conceived as a general framework for 
minimizing accident costs in optimization puzzles, not a single catchall or “cookie cutter” 
algorithm. 
From this point, the thesis seeks to establish two fundamental principles:  
First, no one variant of the Hand Formula is perfectly suited to optimize all real-life 
scenarios, and all such variants might fail to achieve their goals as a result of interacting 
precautions, threshold effects, temporal changes and sunk costs.  For example, “long-run” (and 






strategic behavior, but are more prone to inefficiently consider sunk costs.  Short-run (and short 
memory) mixed approaches, on the other hand, are better equipped to ignore sunk costs when 
warranted, but are more susceptible to misjudgments resulting from interactions and non-
monotonically convex social costs functions.   
Second, the efficiency goals of tort law can only be achieved—if at all—by specifically 
tailoring an adjudication method to the unique characteristics of each case, market and 
technology.  As a central element, a court must be mindful of the type of interactions and 
efficiency functions prevalent in each case, and consider not only the various claims and 
valuations but also the balancing formula that should be applied.  When no such tailoring takes 
place, and only one variant of the Hand Formula is predictably applied, inefficient results and 
value destroying strategic behaviors are expected. 
Negligence law is therefore best conceived as an exercise in solving optimization 
puzzles.  As this dissertation claims, this is one of the most elusive yet helpful ways to truly 
understand the law of negligence from an economic perspective.  Negligence analysis entails a 
constant effort to untangle intricate multi-variable scenarios—to find efficient solutions to 
sometimes immensely complicated events.  Many of the problems facing negligence 
adjudication and theory are plainly or tacitly related to the challenges posed by 
multidimensional and dynamic optimization puzzles.  Surprisingly enough, these challenges 
have scarcely been considered by legal theory.  As a result, our most basic theoretical approach 
to negligence is theoretically impaired and practically unfitting. 






Part I presents the two competing approaches to the application of negligence cost-
benefit analysis—the marginal and the aggregated approach—and points to the key distinctions 
between them, such as aim, method, cost, efficiency, reflected timespan and considered 
evidence.  In comparing the two, we find that the marginal approach might lead to efficient yet 
socially suboptimal conclusions, at least what lumpy precautions are involved, and discuss the 
informational difficulties associated with applying the aggregated approach.  This part then 
moves to unravel a hidden temporal divergence between the two approaches, and concludes in 
demonstrating that the marginal approach was widely adopted as the golden standard of 
negligence adjudication.  
Part II reviews the underlying economic assumptions of the conventional model to 
negligence adjudication, and gives the abovementioned approaches concrete and rigorous 
economic meanings.  Specifically, this part technically defines the injurer’s cost-minimization 
problem under both approaches, and sheds additional light on the key characteristics, 
fundamental limitations, theoretical prerequisites and methodological processes required for the 
implementation each approach.  While some of the argumentation and proofs presented in this 
part are already well described in economic literature, the discussion here is novel in separately 
modeling the two approaches, and in explicating the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
their implementation.  Part II concludes with a table summarizing the economic differences 
between the marginal and aggregated approach.  
Parts III and IV are principally dedicated to relaxing the underlying assumptions of the 
conventional model, and to a critical exploration of the theoretical implications of doing so.  
They progress as follows: Part III focuses on relaxing the convexity, monotonicity and 






network effects on the theory of negligence, and exemplifies their influence using two real-
world examples: smoking addiction and epidemic dynamics.  This part then continues to 
discuss the normative implications of relaxing the above assumptions, and characterizes two 
unique types of cases: (i) local minima anteceding to the global optimum, and (ii) local minima 
postliminar to the global optimum (both cases defined infra).  For each type of case, distinctive 
normative difficulties to the application of the Hand Formula are uncovered, and possible 
realistic scenarios for their occurrence are hypothesized.  Part III concludes by pointing to 
additional impasses associated with short-run versus long-run optimization, and reflecting on 
the fragility of the conventional model in connection to the Anna Karenina Principle, discussed 
there.  
Part IV adds an additional layer of complexity and realism, and relaxes the single 
dimensionality and orthogonality and predetermincy assumptions.  This part begins by relaxing 
the single dimensionality assumption, and demonstrates the multidimensional nature of real-
world negligence settings.  In doing so, it shows that different precautions are often 
substitutable, and explores the ramifications that quality exerts upon negligence adjudication.  
This part then provides a systematic account of the precaution side of the Hand Formula, 
principally applying tools and terms developed in microeconomic production theory.  It then 
explores the normative difficulties brought about by multidimensional settings, and illustrates 
these difficulties in caselaw.  The first portion of Part IV concludes in reflecting upon variable 
selection, specific versus general regulation and short-run versus long-run optimization in the 
context of multidimensionality.  
Part IV then continues to relax the orthogonality assumption, and introduces the 






possible relationships between precautions, and models the potential adverse effects and 
challenges to negligence adjudication they present.  For each type of interaction, assorted 
suboptimal equilibria, foreseeable strategic behaviors and inefficiencies expected from a 
misguided application of the Hand Formula are uncovered and illustrated.  As a major focus, 
the second portion of Part IV attempts to provide a broad account of the effect of path-
dependencies on different forms of negligence analyses, and illustrates the implications of 
memoryless, semi-constrained and myopic algorithms on tortfeasors ex-ante and ex-post 
incentives.  Part IV concludes with a discussion of the conditions for commensurating 
multidimensional precautions.  
Part V presents a model of mixed approaches to the application of the Hand Formula, 
and suggests an expansive rubric for negligence adjudication, founded upon tailoring 
optimization processes to particular settings.  It then continues to substantiate an impossibility 
theorem, according to which no single variant of the Hand Formula is perfectly suited to 
optimize all settings.  Finally, it addresses optimization costs and the pleading systems, and 
posits that, in reality, different standards of negligence or scrutiny are applied to low-stake and 
high-stake litigants, and that such difference might be justified on efficiency grounds.  Part V 
concludes with a discussion of the relationship between activity level variables and mixed 
approaches, and the possibility of setting the standard of care assuming certain optimal prior 
precautions have been taken.  






PART I:  
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN NEGLIGENCE LAW  
 
A. THE ECONOMIC RATIONAL OF NEGLIGENCE LAW AND THE HAND FORMULA 
According to conventional wisdom in law and economics, the normative goal of 
negligence law is to maximize social welfare by reducing the overall cost of accidents, i.e. the 
sum costs of precautions and materialized harms.9  This principle requires parties to apply a 
rational cost-benefit analysis aimed at optimally investing in precautions: a burden often easier 
said than done.  The difficulties involved in performing this cost-benefit evaluation underlie 
some of the most difficult questions in the law of negligence.  
In its simplest form, negligence law mandates that a tortfeasor be liable for the harm 
caused to her victim, if that harm resulted from the tortfeasor’s failure to take due care. Due 
care, sometimes referred to as ordinary or reasonable care, is the legal standard stipulating the 
minimally required level of precaution.10  If an injurer exercises precaution at a level lower than 
that required by due care, and such failure was the proximate cause of harm, he or she will be 
found liable.11  
                                                
9 For a seminal analysis see Guido Calabresi, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS (1970) (hereinafter: “The Cost of 
Accidents”); Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 200-201; and Landes and Posner, The Economic 
Structure of Tort Law, supra note 3. 
10 For a classic definition see Brown v. Kendall, 60 MASS. 292 (1850) (hereinafter: “Brown v. Kendall”): 
“[Ordinary care] means that kind and degree of care, which prudent and cautious men would use, such as is required by 
the exigency of the case, and such as is necessary to guard against probably danger.” 
11 For simplicity, we ignore contributory negligence throughout this thesis and address, without loss of 
generality, unilateral precautions only, meaning scenarios where only one player can take precautionary measures.  We 
further limit our analysis to the “precaution side” of breach of duty element, and generally apply a neoclassical 
economics framework, rather than non-economic of behavioral approaches.  In this sense, our discussion focuses on the 






Setting the optimal level of due care is thus pivotal to law’s aim of maximizing social 
welfare.  If the bar is set too high, inefficient investments in precaution will occur, and parties 
might decide to refrain from a socially desirable activity or pull out of a market altogether.  If 
the bar is set too low, suboptimal investment in precautions is expected, and it is possible that 
socially inefficient or undesirable activities will persist.12  Conducting a negligence inquiry or 
judicially setting the optimal level of care is, however, far more complicated than it appears.  
Pursuant to United States v. Carroll Towing Co.,13 the reasonableness of a party’s 
behavior is judged by lawmakers according to the Hand Formula, which states that a party is in 
breach of duty if his or her burden of precaution (B) was lower than the probability of harm (P) 
times the gravity of resulting injury (L).14  This formula is incorporated in the definition of 
negligence offered by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS,15 and endorsed nearly without 
                                                
12 Assuming generally acceptable economic assumptions, such as that people are rational and adjust their 
behavior according to legal rules.  On miscalculations in setting the level of due care see, for instance, Richard Craswell, 
Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J. LAW, ECON & ORGANIZATION 279 (1986); and Steven Shavell, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 79-83 (1987) (hereinafter: “Economic Analysis of Accident Law”). 
13 Supra note 2. 
14 In Judge’s Hand words: “…[T]he owner’s duty, as in other similar situations, to provide against resulting 
injuries is a function of three variables: (1) the probability that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, 
if she does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions. Possibly it serves to bring this notion into relief to state it in algebraic 
terms: if the probability be called P; the injury L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B is less than L 
multiplied by P, i.e., whether B < PL…” (United States v. Carroll Towing Co., ibid, at p. 173. 
15 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (2010), stating: “A person acts negligently if the 
person does not exercise reasonable care under all the circumstances. Primary factors to consider in ascertaining whether 
the person’s conduct lacks reasonable care are the foreseeable likelihood that the person’s conduct will result in harm, the 
foreseeable severity of any harm that may ensue, and the burden of precautions to eliminate or reduce the risk of harm.”  
As Comment e states, “insofar as this Section identifies primary factors for ascertaining negligence, it can be said to 
suggest a ‘risk-benefit test’ for negligence… The test can also be called a ‘cost-benefit test’… Overall, this Section can 
be referred to as supporting a ‘balancing approach’ to negligence.”  Comment e continues to note that, “The actor’s 
conduct is hence negligent if the magnitude of the risk outweighs the burden of risk prevention.” The Reporters’ Notes to 
Comment d also makes clear that the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF Torts §291-296 (1965) also “explicitly adopt[s] a 
balancing approach by calling for weighing the magnitude of the risk against the utility of the actor’s conduct and the 
burden of avoiding the risk.”  
On the test prescribed by the restatement and its relation to the Hand Formula see Stephen G. Gilles, On 
Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 
813 (2001) (hereinafter: “On determining Negligence”); Michael D. Green, W. Page Keeton Symposium on Tort Law: 






reservation in law and economic scholarship as a “unifying perspective in which to view all of 
tort law.”16 Though the extent of its application by courts remains disputed,17 this “centerpiece 
of [] conventional economic theory”18 is widely considered an accurate exemplification of the 
economic theory of negligence—the crux of negligence law.19  To quote Feldman and Kim: 
“Judge Learned Hand’s opinion in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 
is canonized in the law-and-economics literature. It is like the opening measure 
of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony, or the third line of the Bible: ‘And God said, 
Let there be light.’”20  
 
Despite its simplicity and appeal, the application of the Hand Formula involves some 
well-known shortcomings.  Primarily, it fails to account for players’ activity level, as well as 
other behaviors that are non-observable, non-verifiable or simply too costly to be considered 
                                                                                                                                                              
Efficiency: Doubts >”); Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement Third of Torts: Encompassing 
Fairness As Well As Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901 (2001) (hereinafter: “The Hand Formula in the Draft 
Restatement Third of Torts”); and Steven Hetcher, The Jury’s Out: Social Norms’ Misunderstood Role in Negligence 
Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 633 (2003). 
16 Richard A. Posner, TORT LAW—CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 2 (1982) (hereinafter: “Cases and 
Economic Analysis”); See also William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
(1987); Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, supra note 12; and infra notes 85-97 in Section I.F.  
17 For a claim that the Hand Formula is inconsistent with the actual criteria applied by courts see Richard W. 
Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand Formula, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145 (2003) (hereinafter: 
“Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand Formula”).  See also  Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. 
L. REV. 1015 (1994), and the sources mentioned in footnotes 4-5 there.  
18  Mark F. Grady, Untaken Precautions, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 147 (1989) (hereinafter: “Untaken 
Precautions”).  
19 For doctrinal authority and reflection see, Dan B. Dobbs, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 144-146 (2000); John G. 
Fleming, THE LAW OF TORTS 114-119 (8th ed., 1992); Michael A. Jones, TEXTBOOK ON TORTS § 3.1.3.3 (7th ed., 2000); 
W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton and David G. Owen, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 
170-173 (5th ed., 1984); W.V.H. Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz ON TORT 201-202 (16th ed. 2002); and Patrick J. Kelley, 
Teaching Torts: The Carroll Towing Company Case and the Teaching of Tort Law, 45 ST. L. U. L.J. 731, 732-735 
(2001).  See also the Reporters’ Notes to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS summarizes, “[a] balancing approach to 
negligence has been accepted in judicial opinions in a large majority of jurisdictions” (RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (2010), Reporters’ Notes on Comment d).  For an historical perspective on the use and 
implementation of the Hand Formula see Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972) 
(hereinafter: “A Theory of Negligence”), but compare Henry T. Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915).  
20  Allan M. Feldman and Jeonghyun Kim, The Hand Rule and United States v. Carrol Towing Co. 






judicially.21  It also faces difficulties with variable selection,22 as well as functional and 
fundamental difficulties in assessing the value of each of its components.23  Additionally, it 
may also fail to take into account various secondary consequences, such as positive 
externalities derived from setting precedents.  Finally, as Cooter and Porat note,24 courts have 
persistently erred in the application of the Hand Formula, by ignoring the element of risk to the 
defendant or the full spectrum of risks to the plaintiff.25  
                                                
21 On the prolific writing regarding activity levels see Steven Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980) (hereinafter: “Strict Liability versus Negligence”); Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, 
supra note 12, at p. 25; Steven Shavell, Torts in Which Victim and Injurer Act Sequentially, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 589 
(1983); Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, supra note 9, at pp. 108-109, 259-261; Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, 
supra note 4, at p. 211; Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law, supra note 3, at p. 61, 66; William M. 
Landes and Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law, 15 GEO. L. REV. 851, 875-8 (1981); William 
M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980); 
Richard A. Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL. STUD. 250 (1973); Posner, Cases and Economic Analysis, 
supra note 16, at p. 5; Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels, 21 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 319 (1992) (hereinafter: “Rule-based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels”); Louis Kaplow and 
Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS (Alan J. Hawerbrack and Martin S. 
Feldstein eds., 2002); Howard Latin, Activity Levels, Due Care, and the Selective Realism in Economic Analysis of Tort 
Law, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 487 (1987); Shawn J. Bayern, The Limits of Formal Economics in Tort Law: The Puzzle of 
Negligence, 75 BROOKLYN L. REV. 707 (2010) (hereinafter: “The Limits of Formal Economics in Tort Law: The Puzzle of 
Negligence”); John J. Donohue, The Law and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1047 (1989); and Donald Wittman, Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages, 
and Related Doctrines in the Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1981).  For further discussion of activity level in the negligence 
context see Section V.F. hereinafter, and infra notes 339-350.  
22 On variable selection in the context of the Hand Formula see James M. Anderson, The Missing Theory of 
Variable Selection in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law, UTAH L. REV. 255 (2007) (hereinafter: “The Missing Theory of 
Variable Selection”); Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci, On the Optimal Scope of Negligence, 1 REV. L. ECON. 331 (2005) 
(Hereinafter: “On the Optimal Scope of Negligence); and our discussion in Section IV.B.g. hereinafter. 
23 For the fundamental difficulties in performing this evaluation see, for example, R. M. Dworkin, A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE 237-266 (Cambridge, Mass., 1985); G. Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 552 (1980); R. M. Dworkin, Why Efficiency? – A Response to Professors Calabresi and Posner, 8 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980); and Warren A. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 39 COLUM. L. REV. 20, 
34 (1939) (memorably noting, “[I]f you kidnap a child and, while driving carefully away with it, run down a pedestrian, 
you will not be liable in negligence for the pedestrian’s injury”). 
24 Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others?, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
19 (2000) (hereinafter: “Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others?”).  See also Kenneth W. Simons, The 
Puzzling Doctrine of Contributory Negligence, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1693, 1725-1728 (1995) and RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (2010), comment b and Reporters’ Note.  For further discussion on these 
points see, Ariel Porat, Misalignments in Tort Law, 121 YALE L.J. 82 (2011) (hereinafter: “Misalignments”) and our 
Section IV.B.f hereinafter.  
25 For additional difficulties associated with the application of the Hand Formula and its limitations see Section 






This thesis points to additional fundamental difficulties to the application of the Hand 
Formula, and in some respects to its basic configuration, which have generally eluded legal 
scholarship.  Ironically, the adverse effects of these difficulties are exacerbated when law and 
economics’ prescribed best practices are applied, and when lawmakers defer to the judgment 
and teachings of conventional wisdom.26 
 
B. TWO APPROACHES TO THE APPLICATION OF NEGLIGENCE COST-BENEFIT 
ANALYSIS 
In establishing the reasonable level of care and conducting cost-benefit inquiry in light of 
the Hand Formula, negligence law has grappled between two competing approaches: the 
aggregated (in-toto) approach on the one hand, and the marginal (“precaution not-taken”) 
approach on the other.27  This key divergence has been reflected in the common law from early 
on.  The two approaches differ on a variety of scales and perspectives, such as objective, 
method, application costs, evidence considered, efficiency of outcome and often the timespan 
reviewed.  With regards to most of these factors, law and economics scholarship has taken, I 
believe, an overly decisive stand in favor of the marginal approach.  
 
                                                
26 On this term see, John Kenneth Galbraith, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 6-18 (Mariner Books; 40 Anv. sub. ed., 
1958) (famously coining the phrase conventional wisdom, and arguing that when faced with the complexities of 
economic and social behavior, people adhere to what is convenient and simple, even if not necessarily true). 
27 For a different categorization, pertinent to strategic settings, see Feldman and Kim, The Hand Rule and United 






a. THE AGGREGATED APPROACH 
The aggregated (in-toto) approach, sometimes referred to as the conventional theory or 
the !∗-comparison approach,28 aims to find the optimal level of care for each type of activity, 
taking into account the overall costs of precautions and risks.  According to this method, the 
optimal level of care is determined based on the cost of all adequate precautions, taken or 
untaken, aggregated and weighed together against the expected costs of all foreseeable risks.29 
 What this means in practice is that courts must identify abstractly the “most technically 
efficient precautions for every accident”.30  In other words, courts must seek to identify the 
combination of care-measures that would yield the global minimum of social costs.  The 
product of this process is a conclusive level of care, denoted !∗or sometimes !∗, to which 
prospective tortfeasors must conform.31  When they do, the social costs of accidents should 
theoretically be minimized.  When they do not meet that care threshold, the costs of accidents 
will be higher than optimal, and the relevant tortfeasors will face liability.32 
                                                
28 Mark F. Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, 92 YALE L.J 101, 104 (1983) (hereinafter: 
“A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence”). 
29 Generally, some variables and elements are excluded from consideration even under an aggregated analysis. 
Excluded variables and elements are usually labeled “activity level”, though it is sometimes hard to substantiate this 
difference on ontological or intuitive grounds.  On this distinctions, which will be further addressed hereinafter, see Dari-
Mattiacci, On the Optimal Scope of Negligence, supra note 22; Peter A. Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 2 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 107 (1974); and our discussion in Section V.F. 
30 Grady, Discontinuities and Information Burdens, supra note 1, at p. 660. 
31 See, Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 196; and Landes and Posner, The Economic 
Structure of Tort Law, supra note 3.  ! usually denotes the legal standard, while !∗ denotes the socially optimal level of 
care.  Ideally, the legal aim is for ! to equal !∗. 
32 This approach coincides with certain aspects, though not all, of the traditional theory of common law 
negligence.  Holmes, for instance, noted that the role of judges is to find “the set of actual precautions that must be taken 
in different accident situations.”  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, JR., THE COMMON LAW 124 (1881) (hereinafter: “The 
Common Law”); Grady, Discontinuities and Information Burdens, supra note 1, at p. 662 (discussing Holmes); and 






In some ways, the aggregated approach results in placing courts in the shoes of 
regulators.  A good aggregated judgment, much like a good regulatory act, produces a specific 
list of necessary precautions and behaviors, or at least a minimally required investment level.33  
Based on this list, prospective players would ideally know how to conduct themselves in order 
to avoid liability, and what the law expects of them while engaging in specific activities.  From 
a broader viewpoint, a judicial body of detailed precedents should eventually have the same 
effect as regulation, and form a clear, comprehensive and well-established due care level for all 
types of recurring activities.34 
The aggregated approach envisions highly detailed judgments, and a constant striving by 
courts to give concrete meaning to the duty of care on a case-by-case basis.  It requires court to 
“establish the (external and objective) standard of care for the accident at hand, [and] then [] 
measure the actor’s conduct against it.”35  This form of measurement and comparison is deeply 
rooted in the Common Law.  As Holmes noted:  
“[T]he featureless generality, that the defendant was bound to use such 
care as a prudent man would do under the circumstances, ought to be 
continually giving place to the specific one, that he was bound to use this or 
that precaution under these or those circumstances.”36   
 
The obvious difficulty with the aggregated approach is that it necessitates ample and 
sometimes excessive information, technical expertise and deliberation by courts.37  It is also no 
                                                
33 On this distinction, and the conditions for commensurating multidimensional precautions along a single axis, 
see in Section IV.D. hereinafter.  
34 Compare, Samuel Issacharoff and John F. Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement: An institutional 
Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571 (2004) (hereinafter: “The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement”).  
35 Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 18, at p. 142.  
36 Holmes, The Common Law, supra note 32, at p. 111. See also Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and 
Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111 (1924) and Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubts >, supra note 15, at pp. 1625-
1626.  






always clear what information, behaviors and timespan are relevant and should be taken into 
account in performing an aggregated inquiry.38  These features make the aggregated approach 
almost unmanageable, and in any case extremely expensive to implement.  Courts do not 
possess the same knowledge, familiarity and scientific discovery processes as regulatory 
agencies.  By nature of the adversarial process, courts are also inherently limited to consider 
only information provided by the parties.  In reality, as noted by Guttel, “determining the 
optimal level of care in a particular case… demands data that courts are frequently unable to 
obtain.”39 
This “information problem” is well ingrained in tort theory.  Brown, a forerunner of 
economic modeling of negligence law, noted that even his simple-version equations of 
aggregated analysis would require courts to “ferret out complete information about the 
underlying technology of accident prevention.”40  He further commented that his aggregated 
model would require judges to be engineers.41  Grady similarly noted that “[i]t would often be 
Herculean for courts to determine what combination of different precautions minimizes a social 
cost that consists of a constellation of different foreseeable risks.  Frequently… courts would 
not have enough information for the task.”42   The information problem is, indeed, the 
fundamental weakness of the aggregated approach, and the reason for the development of an 
alternative solution to or theory of negligence adjudication—the marginal approach.43 
                                                
38 See hereinafter, in Part IV. 
39 Ehud Guttel, The (Hidden) Risk of Opportunistic Precautions, 93 VIRGINIA L. REV. 1389, 1395 (2007) 
(hereinafter: “The (Hidden) Risk of Opportunistic Precautions”).  As this thesis will soon demonstrate, the aggregated 
approach suffers from other fundamental flaws, associated amongst others with path dependencies and sunk costs. 
40 John P. Brown, Towards an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 333 (1973). 
41 Brown, ibid, at p. 333-334. 
42 Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 18, at p. 147.  







b. THE MARGINAL APPROACH 
The marginal approach, also known as the precaution not-taken approach,44 operates in a 
very different way than the aggregated approach.  It does not strive to set a comprehensive 
level of care in the abstract or stipulate an optimal or minimal set of precautions a prospective 
tortfeasor must take.  In fact, it is not interested in directly prescribing any highly specified 
duties.  Rather, the marginal approach merely examines whether a defendant was negligent in a 
particular case by comparing the cost of any precaution not-taken pleaded by the plaintiff to the 
costs that could have been avoided by taking that precaution.  If the plaintiff can point to an 
untaken cost-justified precaution, the defendant will be found negligent for not taking that 
precaution.45  Putting this difference of method figuratively, where an aggregated approach 
would ask for two sugars, a marginal approach would just “say when.”46 
 As a result, the marginal approach generally ignores all past actions and investments and 
all possible contingencies pertaining to the future, and considers only whether the defendant 
could have taken a single additional cost-justified precaution.  It takes no note of the 
defendant’s overall investment level and disregards her past actions and best efforts to avoid 
                                                                                                                                                              
form of specific precautions that must be taken.  The analytical divergence between the two and its significance will 
become clear in our discussion there. 
44 Grady distinguished between a precaution not-taken approach and a marginal approach.  This distinction goes 
mainly to the problem of discontinuous liability problem in negligence law, and is not directly related to the subject 
matter of this dissertation.  See, Grady, Discontinuities and Information Burdens, supra note 1, and Grady, A New 
Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, supra note 28.  See also Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive 
Damages, 56 S. CAL. REV. 100 (1982); and John E. Calfee and Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on 
Compliance with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984).  
45 Naturally, other elements of negligence, such as causation and harm, must also be met for liability to arise.  
46 For a related debate, within the broader context of property versus liability rules see Richard R.W. Brooks, 
The Relative Burden of Determining Property Rules and Liability Rules: Broken Elevators in the Cathedral, 97 NW. U.L. 
REV. 267 (2002).  See also Richard A. Posner ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 77-78 (2011) (hereinafter: “Economic 
Analysis of Law”) (arguing the merits of property rules by noting, “just as it is easier to determine whether one person is 






negligent behavior.  It maintains one simple rule: if the plaintiff can show the existence of a 
marginally efficient precaution that was not taken by the defendant, negligence should be 
inferred.47 
The economic principle underlying the marginal approach is one of diminishing 
marginal returns.  According to this principle, the benefit derived from any marginal 
investment in precaution continuously diminishes.  When that is the case, the overall utility 
function of the relevant precaution should have a single “tilting point”, beyond which 
additional investment would be inefficient.  Up to this tilting point, investment in precaution is 
warranted.  Beyond this point, the cost of any additional investment in precaution will not 
justify the derived benefit.  This tilting point reflects, according to classic theory, the socially 
optimal investment level, or due care.  As Guttel explains: 
 “Highlighting the economic reasoning underlying the [Hand] formula, 
legal theorists have argued that resolving questions of liability on the basis of 
the efficiency of the litigant’s untaken precautions induces optimal care. In 
order to avoid liability, rational parties will invest in precautions up to the point 
that no additional, cost-justified precaution exist.”48  
                                                
47 Cooter and Ulen elegantly summarized the gist of the marginal approach, noting: 
“The marginal Hand rule states that the injurer is negligent if the marginal cost of his or her 
precaution is less than the resulting marginal benefit. Thus, the injurer is liable under the Hand 
rule when further precaution is cost-justified” (Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra 
note 4, at p. 214). 
  It is worth noting that, generally speaking, the further the defendant is from the optimal level of care, the more 
options the plaintiff will typically have to claim negligence, and the higher the chances of harm.  On this point, see 
Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 18, at p. 144. 
48 Guttel, The (Hidden) Risk of Opportunistic Precautions, supra note 39, at p. 1391.  Cooter and Ulen provide a 
similar, though more technical, explanation:  
 “If precaution is less than the efficient amount, then the marginal social cost of precaution 
is less than the marginal social benefit: (! < !∗) → (! < (!! !∗ !). When the marginal social 
cost of precaution is less than the marginal social benefit, efficiency requires taking more 
precaution. In these circumstances, we say that more precaution is ‘cost-justified’. Similarly, if 
precaution exceeds the efficient amount, then the marginal social cost of precaution exceeds 
the marginal social benefit: (! > !∗) → (! > (!! !∗ !). In these circumstances, efficiency 








Based on this idea, the main advantage of the marginal approach becomes clear: it 
solves the information problem associated with the aggregated approach, or at least 
substantially relaxes it.49  By applying a marginal analysis, courts now seem to be able to 
perform the impossible—determine whether the defendant has met the efficient investment 
level without actually identifying or knowing what that level is.  Simply examining whether the 
defendant could have taken an additional cost-justified precaution is thought to be sufficient.50  
This is truly an exciting find, no less than a wonder.  If true, as assumed by prevailing 
scholarship, it would make the marginal approach adequate and satisfactory for negligence 
adjudication, and circumvent the need for excessive information and expansive judicial 
inquiries.  Grady, one of the chief advocates of the precaution not-taken approach, captured this 
strength by noting that:  
“The same untaken-precaution approach also reduces courts’ need for 
technical information because they no longer have to identify the precautions 
that produce the global minimum of social cost; they need only examine the 
costs and benefits of the precautions that the plaintiff has actually alleged that 
                                                                                                                                                              
See also, John P. Brown, Learned Hand Role, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE 
LAW 514, 514-516 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (hereinafter: “Learned Hand Rule”). 
49 For other advantages attributed to the marginal approach, specifically in the context of uncertainty see Grady, 
A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, supra note 28, at p. 123. 
50 In Grady’s words: 
 “Probably the best way for an injurer to assess whether he is at !∗ [the optimal level of 
care] would be for him to consider whether there are any further precautions—beyond those 
currently planned or taken—that would reduce expected harm by a greater amount than the 
cost that they would impose. This is also the most plausible way by which a court could 
determine whether an injurer was taking less than !∗.” (Grady, A New Positive Economic 
Theory of Negligence, ibid, at p. 111). 
Similarly, Brown notes:  
 “[i]t is not necessary to identify the standard of care; it is sufficient to determine whether 
or not the standard of was met. Of course, one way for a plaintiff to meet his responsibility and 
show that a duty was breached is to find a precaution untaken, which, if taken, would have had 
a greater marginal benefit than its marginal cost.” (Brown, Learned Hand Rule, supra note 48, 






the defendant failed to take. Untaken precautions beyond the efficient set 
appear cost-beneficial only when the injurer has used less precaution than due 
care. When the injurer has used the most efficient precautions, as he has an 
incentive to do, no further precaution will appear cost-beneficial.”51  
 
In this regard, it is worth noting three key features of the marginal approach.  First, it 
calls for an adjudication process by which “courts examine the desirability of each untaken 
precaution individually”,52 as opposed to untaken combinations of (multiple) precautions.  
Second, only additional precautions—“beyond those currently planned or taken” 53 —are 
considered.  Third, it assumes that precautions present with an overall continuous, 
monotonically decreasing and convex efficiency function, meaning that the marginal reduction 
of harm derived from additional investments in precautions strictly diminishes.  In other words, 
it assumes that the total utility function of investing in precautions is continuous and strictly 
concave.54 
These three features are central to the understanding, value and usefulness of the 
marginal approach, and set it apart from the aggregated approach.  Without these features, the 
marginal approach loses its edge over the aggregated analysis.  In order to avoid an endless 
odyssey of comparing the overall efficiency and costs of all possible combinations of 
precautions, taken or untaken at any time, the marginal approach focuses only on an individual 
(marginal, last) precaution not taken; and presupposes a concave overall utility function.  This 
                                                
51 Grady, Discontinuities and Information Burdens, supra note 1, at p. 661. 
52 Grady, ibid, at p. 660 (emphasis added).  We further discuss this feature in Part IV, within the context of 
myopic algorithms and forward-looking inefficiencies.  
53 Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, supra note 28, at p. 111.  We further discuss this 
feature in Part IV, within the context of memoryless algorithms and backward-looking inefficiencies.  
54 Not all three attributes are always explicit in literature, particularly with regards to viewing past actions as 
constraints; see, Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubt >, supra note 15, at pp. 1612-1614.  We discuss 







focus is what grants the marginal approach the ability to overcome the magnitude of the 
information problem.  As this research will soon show, it is also its Achilles Heel. 
Finally, while the marginal approach does not aim to set a comprehensive and 
prescriptive level of due care based on one particular judgment, a prevalent view in torts 
scholarship is that “[r]epeated application of the [marginal] Hand rule enables adjudicators to 
discover the efficient level of care.”55  This view is based on two assumptions: (i) that courts 
can correctly implement the marginal approach, and (ii) that the relevant market perfectly 
reacts to judicial rulings. 
When these two assumptions are met, repeated judicial application of the marginal 
approach over similar cases should incentivize players to continuously increase their 
investment in precautions to exceed any investment level previously adjudicated as insufficient.  
In a recursive process, potential tortfeasors should efficiently increase their investment in 
precaution until they reach the point where further expenditures will no longer be mandated by 
the courts, i.e. will not be cost-justified.56  Thus, at the end of this process—so the orthodox 
theory argues—an accumulated body of case law would reveal the optimal level of care for any 
particular market activity, sufficiently litigated, and yield a prescriptive list of minimally 
required precautions.57 
                                                
55 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 215. 
56 This is particularly true when a player is far from meeting the optimal level of care.  As Grady explains, “…as 
an injurer takes less precaution, he creates more opportunities for the victim to show a breach of duty. In this sense, the 
cost-benefit [marginal] approach permits proofs of breach of duty, and the levels of untaken precaution available for the 
victim’s proof increase as the injurer’s actual precaution decreases.”  Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 18, at p. 
120. 
57 See generally Guttel, The (Hidden) Risk of Opportunistic Precautions, supra note 39, at pp. 1398-1400; 
Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 215; and Hans-Bernd Schäfer and Andreas Schönenberger, 
Strict Liability Versus Negligence, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 602 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds., 2000). 







C. TWO SUGARS OR JUST “SAY WHEN”: THE TWO APPROACHES COMPARED 
To illustrate the difference between the two methods, consider the case of Hendricks v. 
Peabody Co.58  In this seminal case, a sixteen year old boy traveled to the defendant’s 
abandoned water-filled mine, which was often used for recreational purposes, and was severely 
injured when he dove into a hidden sand shelf. The court found that the defendant could have 
taken multiple precautions, such as posting signs, installing a fence, setting up road barricades 
and employing lifeguards, and eventually affirmed the jury verdict holding the defendant liable 
for not erecting a “six-foot high steel chain link fence with steel posts set in concrete 
surrounding the entire pit,”59 or taking other precautions.  
How would the two methods review this case?  An aggregated approach would have had 
to find the socially optimal set of precautions for this fact pattern.  In other words, it would 
have had to perfectly solve the optimization problem at hand, weighing all applicable 
precautions, behaviors, risks and combinations thereof.  For instance, the aggregated approach 
                                                                                                                                                              
settlements and historical development, see William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical 
and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. L. & ECON. 249, 271-72 (1976) (hereinafter: “Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and 
Empirical Analysis”); Robert D. Cooter, Lewis Kornhauser and David Lane, Liability Rules, Limited Information, and the 
Role of Precedent, 10 BELL J. ECON. 366, 366 (1979) (hereinafter: “Liability Rules, Limited Information, and the Role of 
Precedent”); Claus Ott and Hans-Bernd Schäfer, Negligence as Untaken Precautions, Limited Information and Efficient 
Standard Formation in the Civil Liability System, 17 INT’L. REV. LAW AND ECON. 15 (1997) (discussing negligence 
adjudication in repeated games); Issacharoff and Witt, The Inevitability of Aggregate Settlement, supra note 34; and 
Henry S. Smith, Modularity and Morality in the Law of Torts, 4(2) J. OF TORT LAW 1 (2011). 
58 Supra note 8.  This canonical case is routinely reviewed by leading scholarship in the context of the Hand 
Formula, particularly in light of its explicit use of numerical values, and is a cornerstone in the teaching of the economic 
approach of negligence.  See, for example, Posner and Landes, Economic Structure of Tort Law, supra note 3, at pp. 96-
97, 102-103; Posner, Cases and Economic Analysis, supra note 16, at p. 224; Grady, Discontinuities and Information 
Burdens, supra note 1; Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of Negligence, supra note 28, at p. 131; Stephen Marks, 
Discontinuities, Causation, and Grady's Uncertainty Theorem, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 287 (1994) (hereinafter: 
“Discontinuities, Causation, and Grady's Uncertainty Theorem“) (criticizing Grady’s analysis of and conclusions from 
the Case from other perspectives); Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the "Hand Formula, supra note 17; and 
Benjamin Lange Meeker, Is B Less Than Pl? Economic Tort Law Analysis and Our Public Schools: An Opportunity 
Forgone in Beshears v. Unified School District No. 305, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1413, 1430-1433 (1998). 






could have found that the duty of care in Hendricks consisted of posting signs and building an 
eight-foot steel fence, and conclude that such a combination is socially superior to employing 
lifeguards or setting up barricades and erecting a seven-foot fence.  Once a comprehensive duty 
of care has been established based on this single judgment, future owners of similar water-filled 
mines will constructively know exactly how to operate and what to do in order to avoid 
liability.  
In contrast, a marginal adjudication of the Hendricks Case need only have found that any 
of the possible precautions not-taken would have been cost-justified.  From the perspective of a 
marginal approach, it does not matter whether signs were preferable to barricades or whether a 
six-foot fence was socially superior to an eight-foot one.  In order to rule that the duty of care 
was breached, it is sufficient for the court to find that one of the precautions not-taken pleaded 
by the plaintiff was marginally cost-efficient at the time of the accident.60  
This difference raises the question whether the marginal and aggregated approach 
consistently lead to the same results.  More importantly, do the two necessarily arrive at the 
same optimal solutions?  Grady considered this “…the most important question that an 
economic theory of negligence should answer”,61 and with good reason: ensuring an optimal 
ruling based solely on a marginal analysis is crucial to establishing its sufficiency to negligence 
adjudication and superiority over an aggregated analysis.  
                                                
60 A careful reading of Hendricks indicates, I believe, that a marginal approach was indeed applied there.  See 
the Hendricks Case, ibid, at pp. 45-46; and Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 18, at pp. 131-132.  The choice 
between possible precautions not-taken might have implications on causation and harm, which are outside the scope of 
this dissertation.  






Unfortunately, as Grady himself demonstrated in a review of Landes and Posner’s 
milestone THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW,62 a marginal analysis might lead to 
suboptimal results, at least when lumpy variables are at play.63  Simply put, the fact that an 
untaken precaution is marginally cost-effective does not guarantee in and of itself that it is 
optimal.  Merely identifying “the relative positions of the marginal curve”64 of each precaution, 
i.e. performing a marginal analysis, does not necessarily yield optimal conclusions, however 
cost-justified.  
To illustrate this point, Grady skillfully utilized the Hendricks Case, and assigned cost 
and benefit values to each precaution mentioned by the court.  It is worth making a short detour 
here to review Grady’s analysis to this point with some detail, as this dissertation will soon 
utilize the same framework to demonstrate other shortcomings of the marginal approach, and in 
fact a fundamental weakness in Grady’s own theory. 
Grady’s cost-benefit values assigned to Hendricks v. Peabody are displayed in Table 1.  
He assumed, as did the court, that the defendant was already using some precautions.65  The 
cost of the base precautions level was set at $10,000, and the overall social cost that resulted, 
meaning the overall cost of expected harms and precautions, was set at $60,000.  Grady went 
on to assign values to the remaining four types of possible precautions: lifeguards, fence, 
barricades and signs.  Lifeguards were valued so they would not be incrementally cost-
                                                
62 Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law, supra note 3. 
63 Grady, Discontinuities and Information Burdens, supra note 1. 
64 As Landes and Posner advocate, see Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law, supra note 3, at 
p. 87. 
65 The Hendricks Case, supra note 8, at p. 46 (“[D]efendant undertook to police the area but did not do so 
effectively”); and at p. 38 (“[T]he only policing of the area was done by defendant’s employees on a part-time basis.  It 
was only a part-time activity, and all the employees did, when they found people there, was to take down one or two of 






efficient, evident from the fact that they reduce the expected harm by less than their cost                  
($45,000 < $40,000).  The other three precautions were set to be marginally cost-efficient, but 
of them, only placing warning signs was socially optimal, as it reduced the social costs of 
accidents to a minimum ($36,000).  
Table 1: Efficient Versus Optimal Precautions in Hendricks v. Peabody 
Precaution Level Cost Risk (PL) Risk Decrease  Social Cost 
Actual  10,000 50,000 -- 60,000 
Lifeguards  45,000 10,000 40,000 65,000 
Fence 14,000 20,000 30,000 44,000 
Barricades  10,000 30,000 20,000 50,000 
Signs 1,000 25,000 25,000 36,000 
 
Based on the figures detailed in Table 1, the plaintiff in Hendricks v. Peabody could 
have successfully argued that the defendant breached the duty of care by failing to either erect a 
fence, set up barricades or place signs.  Although the court seems to have based its decision, to 
a large extent, on the defendant’s failure to erect a fence, Table 1 demonstrates that it is entirely 
possible that another precaution, in this instance signs, was preferable, whereas erecting a fence 
was simply marginally cost-justified.  Similarly, there is no guarantee that the “six-foot high 
steel chain link fence… set in concrete”66 discussed by the court was the optimal type of fence, 
rather than, for instance, a five-foot barbed wire enclosure or a seven-foot wooden wall.  The 
result, as Grady phrased it, is that the mere fact that a certain precaution “might have cost less 
                                                






than its benefit in the form of reduced risk does not mean that taking it would minimize social 
cost.”67   
Grady’s argument on this issue is obviously correct.  However, notice that the crux of 
his reasoning is not that a marginal analysis might lead courts to a wrong conclusion by finding 
negligence where it does not exist.  Rather, it is that courts might find negligence for not the 
best of reasons.  Put differently, a marginal judgment will be correctly decided, though it might 
rest upon less than perfect reasoning and justification.  A foreseeable disadvantage of such 
judicial decisions is that a behavior prescribed by the court will incentivize future suboptimal 
(yet marginally efficient) conduct.68  
Remember though that the marginal approach does not seek to set the overall required 
investment level or prescribe a conclusive list of mandatory precautions based on a single case.  
Rather, it only aspires to accurately recognize negligent behavior when it exists.  Therefore, 
Grady’s argument to this point does not “pull the rug” out from under the marginal analysis, 
nor was it ever intended to do so.  It simply points to its limits.  In contrast, this dissertation 
presents common situations in which the marginal approach might fail to achieve even its 
modest goal of correctly deciding whether or not the defendant was negligent.   
 
                                                
67 Grady, Discontinuities and Information Burdens, supra note 1, at p. 671. 
68 Another difference, meaningful in Grady’s analysis, is that the type of precaution not-taken stated by the court 
would also affect other legal elements required for liability.  For instance, damages that would not have been prevented 
by a particular untaken precaution will fail to meet the causation requirement.  Generally, in this dissertation, we assume 
that causation requirements are met, and do not address the important relationship between pleaded negligent action or 
omission and causation.  On this relationship see, for instance, Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution and 
Recurring Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD, 691 (1990); Grady, Discontinuities and Information Burdens, supra note 1; 
Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 18; and Marks, Discontinuities, Causation, and Grady's Uncertainty Theorem, 






D. TOTAL VALUES AND NEGLIGENCE INQUIRY 
It is perhaps worthwhile to pause at this point, and clarify that neither the marginal nor 
the aggregated approach call for the Hand Formula to be applied in “total values” or “total 
terms.”  The relevant question in negligence cost-benefit analysis is hardly ever narrowed to 
whether the total benefit derived from an action or product was higher or lower than the sum of 
its risks. Such an analysis would, rather obviously, be of limited value.  A product can generate 
a higher benefit than its cost yet be negligently designed, and an activity can be cost-efficient 
from an overall perspective and still be performed negligently.  As Green explains:  
“The fact that a kidney dialysis machine is responsible for 
saving the life of a person with nonfunctioning kidneys is irrelevant to a 
suit by a dialysis patient against the manufacturer of a machine because 
it has an electrical defect that caused a serious shock to the patient. The 
questions of the overall benefit of the kidney machine (or the 
defendant’s conduct) is irrelevant to the question of whether the costs 
of a safer design of the machine’s electrical system are less than the 
costs of electrical shocks to patients who use the machines.”69  
 
A “total terms” or “total values” interpretation of the Hand Formula is therefore clearly 
unjustified, and generally speaking is not applied by the marginal or aggregated approach.  The 
marginal approach focuses on additional cost-justified precautions, and disregards total values.  
The aggregated approach also does not require negligence inquiry to compare costs and 
benefits in total terms—it merely calls for the optimal precaution level, or combinations of 
precautions, to be comprehensively determined.  The theoretical debate between the aggregated 
and marginal approaches, therefore, has little to do with the (erroneous) “total values” 
interpretation of the Hand Formula, and both approaches would equally reject it.  
                                                






Nevertheless, economic scholarship sometimes advocates the application of the marginal 
approach by comparing it with the “total values” analysis.  For instance, Landes and Posner 
notes that “courts apply the [Hand] formula in marginal rather than total terms,”70 and 
elsewhere that “[t]he relevant cost of accident avoidance is not total cost, but marginal cost.”71  
Similarly, the Reporters’ Note to the Restatement states that “…the negligence standard adopts 
a marginal approach, recognizing that the relevant issue may be reasonable risk reduction, 
rather than complete risk elimination.”72 
The general argument capsulized in these statements is that, (i) since a “total values” 
analysis or interpretation of the Hand Formula is wrong, (ii) the marginal approach should be 
followed.  This argumentation, however, misstates one of the main dilemmas facing cost-
benefit analysis in negligence law.  First, it ignores the possibility of determining the optimal 
level of due care in the aggregate, rather than adjudicating negligence though a marginal 
process.  In other words, it creates the false impression that the marginal and “total values” 
forms of analysis are the only two possibilities to conduct cost-benefit optimization in torts.  
Second, and more importantly, this type of argumentations obscures critical underlying 
                                                
70  Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law, supra note 3, at p. 102.  
71 Posner, Cases and Economic Analysis, supra note 16, at p. 2.  
72 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (2010), comment i and the Reporters’ Note on 
comment i. Comment i states “In identifying a precaution that should have been adopted, the party alleging negligence 
need not prove that the precaution would have eliminated the risk of harm. The party can instead prove that the 
precaution, if implemented, would have reduced that risk”.  The reporters’ Note on comment i proceeds to state, however, 
that “In another sense, however, the negligence standard does not require marginalism.” 
A review of the illustrations provided in comment i and the corresponding Reporters’ Note make clear that the 
restatement refers to the marginal approach as defined in the above, rather than simply the opposite of a total values 
approach.  For one, the illustrations provided are entirely predicated upon the underlying assumptions of the marginal 
approach, further discussed in Part II hereinafter, principally that the efficiency function of taking precautions is 
continuous and convex.  Furthermore, and more telling, the illustration in the Reporters’ Note addresses the unique 
problems associates with taking suboptimal precautions, and cites to Grady, A New Positive Economic Theory of 
Negligence, supra note 28, which described these problems in detail in the context of the precaution not-taken (or 
marginal) approach as defined above.  We can therefore conclude that The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS generally 







assumptions the marginal approach is both predicated and contingent upon, and unduly forces 
negligence inquiry to operate under highly limited and often misguided assumptions.  Parts III 
and IV address these issues in detail. 
 
E. A HIDDEN TEMPORAL DIVERGENCE 
Scholars have largely overlooked another important distinction, which sets different 
forms of negligence inquiry apart.  Different approaches to negligence cost-benefit analysis 
often diverge on a temporal or quasi-temporal scale, evident especially in sequential settings.  
This divergence has to do with the relevant timespan, progression and evidence considered by 
the courts, as well as the stretch of memory that can be attributed to each form of negligence 
adjudication.73 
To illustrate this point, imagine first a lazy art critic who attempts to judge the value of a 
play by stepping into the theater during the last act.  This method might work, at least for plays 
that build up to a climatic finish where all is revealed.  The critic’s approach will certainly be 
less time and energy consuming.  However, the critic is also likely to overlook critical elements 
of most plays, as he or she will miss the development of the plot and characters.  In some 
disquieting cases, the critic will unknowingly misconstrue the entire play, fail to understand the 
poignancy of an action taken in the final scene, or even mistake the hero for villain.  Indeed, 
Goethe's Faust will have a very different meaning for a viewer who is unaware of Faust’s pact 
with Mephistopheles; the tragic ending of Sophocles’ Antigone will be hard to appreciate if one 
is ignorant of Creon’s initial decree not to bury Polyneices; and Shakespeare’s Hamlet would 
                                                
73 For a discussion on the temporal aspects in negligence adjudication and the short-run application of the Hand 







simply not be the same without witnessing Hamlet’s early encounter with the ghost of his 
father. 
The prevailing view among scholars—the marginal approach—risks following the lazy 
critic’s footsteps.  It usually applies a highly short-run review, and in its strict version does not 
require any knowledge or memory of the past.  Actions previously taken by the defendant at 
any point are inconsequential from the perspective of the marginal approach; only whether the 
defendant could have taken an additional cost-justified precaution is relevant.  The marginal 
approach therefore typically evaluates, adjudicates and lives in the (marginal) moment, or 
perhaps better phrased, searches for a marginal omission while assuming past actions as given 
constraints.74  
The aggregated approach, on the other hand, sometimes operates like an overzealous and 
tiresome critic, who is unable to ignore pieces of information and meticulously watches plays 
in full length, weighing all former and recent actions and inactions of all actors.  He would 
view Shakespeare’s Cymbeline over and over, and refuse to give a review before comparing the 
play to Othello and The Winter’s Tale, contrasting its latest performance to past adaptations and 
pondering its influence on the works of T. S. Eliot and Virginia Woolf.  In the midst of 
watching any new play, he would feverishly attempt to speculate all possible developments, 
picture every conceivable ending and foretell even the most unlikely deus ex-machina. 
                                                
74 From a narrow analytical perspective, a precaution not-taken review is not always synonymous to a short-term 
temporal review.  It is theoretically possible for the marginal omission to originate in the far past and for multiple 
omissions to occur in the present.  However, from a realistic and practical perspective, the terms “marginal” and “short-
termed” are usually highly correlated.  A marginal omission is usually made in the present or near past.  That is also 
where the court is likely to find such omission, should it exist, and where the plaintiff is likely to focus her claims.  In 
real-life, an age-old omission is rarely the marginal omission, and will usually be considered exogenous to negligence 






The aggregated approach, therefore, often delves deeply into the past and far future, 
considers the full length and breadth of possibilities the defendants had at their disposal, and 
diligently contemplates former actions and omissions and future possibilities.  In its strict 
version, it applies a cost-benefit analysis that requires full knowledge of alternatives and 
cumulative possibilities, and necessitates a review of all actions and omissions that arose at any 
point in the past.  As this thesis will soon show, this persistent delving in the past and in first 
best solutions of the aggregated approach might negate efficient short-run incentives and 
conceal obvious conclusions from sight.  It might also make it difficult for the court to focus on 
relevant information and allow past impressions to obscure present needs.  
The difference between the two approaches is particularly stark in sequential frameworks 
and when temporal changes occur, best portrayed through another illustration—the 2000 
Christopher Nolan movie-classic Memento.75  This film is unique in that it tells a story 
simultaneously from beginning to end, and in reverse order.  From end to beginning, certain 
deductions and assumptions made by the viewer early on in the film are exposed as problematic 
or untrue as previous events unfold.  From beginning to end, it is easy to become fixated on 
certain past-events, frame an unsupported narrative and arrive at prejudgment that would not be 
discarded even as new information to the contrary is revealed or new options become 
available.76 
                                                
75 MEMENTO (Network Films and Team Todd 2000).  This film presents a hero with retrograde amnesia and his 
quest for revenge and justice.  The basic storyline is told from two different perspectives: a progression in black-and-
white, shown from beginning to end, and a sequence in color, shown in reverse order.  The two perspectives “meet” in 
the middle, reaching the same moment in time at the end of the film.  At that point, it becomes apparent that watching the 
storyline from either flow would leave the viewer with very different impressions, and perhaps even tells a different 
story.  It also becomes evident that the way the story is told, organized and cut into segments inevitably changes the way 
actions, omissions and events are perceived and judged. 
76 From the hero’s perspective, his amnesia and inability to create a time-progression and new memories makes 
him vulnerable to manipulation by others.  On the other hand, his inability to make judgments based on recent events, 






Different approaches to negligence adjudication operate somewhat like the two 
perspectives in Memento.  The marginal approach looks only at the last episode of sequential 
events or omissions, and at most takes a few steps back into the past or attempt to project a 
splinter into the future.77  In that, it remembers too little, or suffers from “retrograde amnesia,” 
and cannot see further than a stone’s throw away.  In economic terms, it applies a memoryless 
and myopic function or algorithm that is easily manipulated by past actions and further-
removed options, and assumes all past behaviors as constraints.  
In contrast, the aggregated approach can sometimes be said to look at a storyline from 
beginning to end, in so far as there actually is a “beginning”.  In that, it remembers too much 
and extrapolates too far, and much like an ancient blood feud refuses to forgo the mistakes of 
the past in order to impose a cost-beneficial solution needed in the present.  In more technical 
terms, it grants inefficient and unwarranted weight to past contingencies, and has difficulty 
with variable selection, curtailing future hypotheticals and creating short-run efficient 
incentives.  The different inefficiencies resulting from the limitations of both approaches, as 
well as further hurdles imposed by temporal changes, are reviewed throughout the next parts of 
this dissertation. 
 
F. THE GOLDEN STANDARD OF NEGLIGENCE 
In orthodox scholarship, the debate between the competing approaches to negligence 
cost-benefit analysis ends with a decisive victory for the marginal approach.  So much so, that 
it would be accurate to refer to the marginal approach as the golden standard of negligence 
                                                                                                                                                              
susceptible to manipulation. 
77 In continuous frameworks, it might be difficult to decide what timespans and events are “marginal”.  We 
address these issues in detail in Parts III and IV.  For a short review of the relationship between past timespans and 






adjudication, at least in legal economic literature.  “[T]he untaken precaution is the central 
concept of negligence law”, stated Grady.78  As Landes and Posner simply put it, the marginal 
approach is—“correct”.79 
The marginal approach’s triumph is both normative and descriptive.  From a normative 
perspective, economic scholarship asserts that the marginal approach is superior to setting the 
level of due care in the abstract, and will produce efficient results at substantially lower costs.  
From a descriptive standpoint, the scholarship consistently reads Judge Hand’s formulation in 
Carrol Towing as adhering to a marginal view,80 and similarly appreciates that “the Hand 
negligence test… is normally performed at a fairly short-run level of analysis”81 and that “the 
key question that courts ask is what particular precautions the defendant could have taken but 
did not.”82  Grady summarized this claim, noting: 
                                                
78 Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 18, at p. 156. 
79 Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law, supra note 3, at p. 87 (1987) (discussing a 
comparison between a marginal and total values interpretation of the Hand Formula).  Landes and Posner are clear in 
stating, “The courts ask, ‘What additional care inputs should the defendant have used to avoid this accident, given his 
existing level of care?’ The focus on the particular accident and on the particular inputs that could have prevented it 
invites a marginal analysis.” (ibid).  They also abide by the general underlying economic assumptions of the marginal 
approach, particularly the assumptions of convexity (ibid, at pp. 57-62). 
Posner similarly states that: “…to be a correct economic test, the Hand formula must be applied at the margin: 
the court must examine the incremental benefit in accident avoidance of an incremental expenditure on safety.” 
(Referring to the conventional economic analysis of negligence if footnote) (Posner, Cases and Economic Analysis, supra 
note 16, at p. 3).   
80 See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 214 (“[J]udge Hand’s statement of his rule is 
unclear as to whether the variables refer to marginal values or total values. If we assume that he was a good economist 
who had marginal values in mind, then we can translate his notion into our notation…”); and Grady, Untaken 
Precautions, supra note 18, at p. 145.  
81 Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable Selection, supra note 22, at p. 270.  See also Richard A. Epstein, 
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 154-155 (2000) (“the skillful lawyer typically [pleads his case] by pointing to some 
specific ‘untaken precaution’ that, if taken, could have prevented the accident that actually occurred.”); Philip G. Peters, 
Jr., The Role of the Jury in Modern Malpractice Law, 87 IOWA L. REV. 909, 948 (2002) (“Plaintiffs typically narrow the 
scope of the jury’s inquiry by focusing upon an ‘untaken precaution’ and alleging that a reasonable person would have 
undertaken it. With the task so confined, the jury need not determine the precise combination of safety precautions that 
would optimize social welfare. Instead, jurors examine the defendant’s failure to take the specific precaution 
recommended by the plaintiff.”); and Stephen G. Gilles, United States v. Carroll Towing Co.: The Hand Formula’s 
Home Port, TORTS STORIES 11 (Robert L. Rabin and Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). 






“Contrary to the [aggregated or Holmesian] theory, courts are 
not embarked on a quest to make the standard of care ever more clear 
so that individual conduct can be compared to it. Instead, the courts 
seem to be pursuing a more modest endeavor: they take the plaintiff’s 
allegations of the untaken precautions of the defendant and ask, in light 
of the precautions that had been taken, whether some particular 
precaution’s promised benefits (in accident reduction) is greater than its 
associated costs.”83 
 
Almost every scholar of the law and economics of torts has embraced a similar view and 
affirmed the marginal approach as a “good economist[’s]” 84  interpretation of the Hand 
Formula.  Landes and Posner,85 Cooter and Ulen,86 Shavell,87 Grady,88 Polinsky,89 Porat,90 
Miceli, 91  Green, 92  Craswell, 93  Harrison and Theeuwes 94  and many others adhere to this 
                                                
83 Grady, ibid, at p. 143. 
84 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 214. 
85 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, supra note 46, at p. 214; Posner, A Theory of Negligence, supra note 19; 
Posner, Cases and Economic Analysis, supra note 16, at p. 3; and William Landes and Richard A. Posner THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 87 (1987) (claiming that courts need only to identify the relative positions of the marginal 
curve).  
86 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 351. 
87 Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, supra note 12, at pp. 32-46 (1987) (discussing different 
negligence regimes under orthodox economic assumptions), but see pp. 77-79 and 91-93 (applying different 
considerations in cases of possible prior precautions, as discussed hereinafter, in Part V.G.).  
88 Grady, Discontinuities and Information Burdens, supra note 1, at pp. 658, 661; and Grady, Untaken 
Precautions, supra note 18.  
89 A. Mitchell Polinsky, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 43-56 (2003). 
90 Ariel Porat, The Many Faces of Negligence, 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 105, 144 n1 (2003) (hereinafter: 
“The Many Faces of Negligence”) (“Under the best interpretation, these variables [of the Hand Formula] refer to 
marginal values. Consequently, the injurer is considered negligent when his marginal costs of precaution fall short of the 
marginal reduction in the expected damages” (citing to Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4)).  See also 
Cooter and Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others?, supra note 24 (applying a highly short-run 
constrained analysis, viewing past actions and conditions, such as a malfunctioning seatbelt, constraints).  
91 Thomas Miceli, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 26 (2004) (hereinafter: “The Economic Approach To 
Law”) (“If we interpret B as the marginal cost of care and PL as the marginal reduction in accident costs from that last 
unit of care, then the injurer will be found negligent under the Hand rule if and only if B < PL, which is exactly the range 
over which ! < !!∗ in the economic model”). 
92 Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubt >, supra note 15, at pp. 1612-1614 (“The burden, or cost of 
precaution, must be understood as the marginal additional care required to prevent some marginal additional accident 
avoidance… This means that to employ a risk-benefit test in a tort case, some identified, untaken precaution must exist 
that, had it been employed by the defendant, would have prevented the plaintiff’s injury.”)  Green also notes, however, 
that the marginal approach may be applied in a wide or narrow manner, that past-taken precautions should be compared 






interpretation. Alternative or curbing views are uncommon in contemporary scholarship.95  The 
marginal approach has become a fundamental normative attribute of the law of negligence, 
thought to represent “an old[] conceptual unity” of tort theory,96 and incorporated into the 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS.97  As the following pages show, this status is not always 
warranted; certainly not in the unqualified manner it was rendered.  
  
                                                                                                                                                              
understood, described and modeled in conventional scholarship.  See hereinafter, in Part V.  
93 Richard Crasswell, Offer, Acceptance, and Efficient Reliance, 48 STAN. L. REV. 481, 503 (1996) (“rather than 
trying to assess the entire range of possible precautions… [one should] consider the efficiency of untaken precaution”). 
94 Jeffrey Harrison and Jules Theeuwes, LAW AND ECONOMICS 260 (2008) (“In more technical economic terms 
introduced earlier, B would be the marginal cost of prevention (MCP) and PL would be the marginal harm (MH).” 
95 One contemporary exception is found in Guttel, The (Hidden) Risk of Opportunistic Precautions, supra note 
39.  Guttel’s article envisions very different concerns and scenarios than our analysis, and focuses on bilateral 
precautions.  Specifically, he focuses on strategic scenarios between two players, and cases in which “the investment of 
one litigant strategically affects the ‘burden of precaution’ (B) of another litigant” or cases in which “similar strategic 
behavior… may also involve investments intended to impact the effectiveness of—rather than the cost—of litigants’ 
possible precautions.” (ibid, at p. 1405).  For a discussion of interrelated bilateral precautions see Alan J. Mese, The 
Externality of Victim Care, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1201, 1229 (2001) (discussing the innate limitations of the marginal 
approach in the contexts of joint care settings); Dhammika Dharmapala and Sandra A. Hoffman, Bilateral Accidents with 
Intrinsically interdependent Costs of Precaution, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 239, 241 (2005) (discussing certain types of 
interactions between bilateral precautions); Feldman and Kim, The Hand Rule and United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 
Reconsidered, supra note 20, at p. 530; Gary T. Schwartz, Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal, 87 
YALE L.J. 697 (1978); Mark F. Grady, Multiple Tortfeasors and the Economy of Prevention, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 653, 665 
(1990) (hereinafter: “Multiple Tortfeasors and the Economy of Prevention”); and Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 
supra note 46, at p. 60 (discussing limitations on a contributory negligence defense in the context of reckless conduct). 
96 Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 18, at p. 156. 
97 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (2010), comment i and the Reporters’ Note on 
comment i.  The reporters’ Note on comment i states, “…the negligence standard adopts a marginal approach, 
recognizing that the relevant issue may be reasonable risk reduction, rather than complete risk elimination” and proceeds 
to state, “in another sense, however, the negligence standard does not require marginalism.” (Emphasis added).   
Comment i states, “In identifying a precaution that should have been adopted, the party alleging negligence need not 
prove that the precaution would have eliminated the risk of harm.  The party can instead prove that the precaution, if 
implemented, would have reduced that risk”.  The illustrations provided in comment i and the corresponding Reporters’ 
Note are entirely predicated upon the underlying assumptions of the marginal approach, namely that the utility functions 
of taking precautions are continuous and concave.  More specifically, the illustration in the Reporters’ Note addresses the 
unique problems associates with taking suboptimal precautions, and accordingly cites to Grady, A New Positive 
Economic Theory of Negligence, supra note 28, which described these problems while endorsing the precaution not-
taken approach.  
We can therefore conclude that the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS embraces the marginal approach, and as 
we shall soon explicate does not address to the issues presented in this dissertation.  See also in this regard, Cooter and 
Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 215; Gilles, On Determining Negligence, supra note 15; and Simons, The 







THE CONVENTIONAL ECONOMIC MODEL OF NEGLIGENCE: FORMAL 
CONSTRUCTION, UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
 
A. THE PROUD TOWER: THE CONVENTIONAL ECONOMIC MODEL OF NEGLIGENCE 
a. INTRODUCTION:  
For over thirty years, law and economic theory has constantly strived to perfect a 
general model of negligence.  Rigorously crafted, this model has by now captured the hearts 
and minds of legal economic scholars, and reshaped the modern understanding and teaching of 
negligence law.  Viewed from the perspective of the 21st century, the conventional economic 
model of negligence is an axiomatic idea; a proud tower98 of notions, assumptions, views and 
analyses soaring (nearly) beyond contestation.  As Cooter and Ulen state, the law of accidents 
has been, “successfully analyzed.”99 
At its core, the rule of negligence requires a plaintiff to prove three elements: (i) breach 
of duty; (ii) causation; and (iii) harm.  Unlike strict liability, negligence law does not limit itself 
to asking whether the defendant caused a particular harm, but also asks a further question—
“[w]as the act blameworthy?”100  In other words, negligence is centered on the idea of fault, or 
                                                
98 Taken from Edgar Allan Poe, The City in the Sea (1831), in COMPLETE STORIES AND POEMS OF EDGAR 
ALLAN POE 744 (Doubleday, 1966) (“So blend the turrets and shadows there; That all seem pendulous in air; While from 
a proud tower in the town; Death looks gigantically down.”). 
99 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 189. 
100 James Barr Adams, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 99 (1908) (“The early law asked simply, ‘Did the 
defendant do the physical act which damaged the plaintiff?’ The law of today… asks a further question, ‘Was the act 
blameworthy?’ The ethical standard of reasonable conduct has replaced the unmoral standard of acting at one’s peril”). 
See also Holmes, The Common Law, supra note 32, at p. 94-96: 
 “The general principle of our law is that loss from accident lie where it 
falls, and this principle is not affected by the fact that a human being is the instrument 
of misfortune… In the language of the late Chief Justice Nelson of New York: ‘No 
case or principle can be found, or if found can be maintained, subjecting an individual 






blame, and does not place liability on a defendant who has satisfied the applicable standard of 
care.  Building a systematic model describing the adequate level of care, or reasonableness, is 
therefore the cornerstone of any economic theory of negligence.  
In the next subchapters, we will first review the key elements of the conventional or 
orthodox model of negligence and its underlying assumptions.  We will than revisit our above 
discussion on the two approaches to negligence adjudication, and using the model, give the two 
approaches new, concrete and rigorous economic meanings.  Lastly, in Parts III and IV, we will 
relax some of the assumptions the conventional model is predicated upon, and examine the 
ramifications of doing so on the efficiency of expected outcomes.  
 
b. THE CONVENTIONAL MODEL: A SOCIAL PLANNER’S PERSPECTIVE  
The conventional economic model aims “to optimize… the number [costs] of 
accidents.”101  In reviewing this model, we will first derive at the socially optimal level of 
precaution, as would be chosen a social planner.  This outcome will then serve as a benchmark 
for examining whether different applications of negligence law best “internalize externalities 
                                                                                                                                                              
injury arising from inevitable accident, or, which in law or reason is the same thing, 
from an act that ordinary human care and foresight are unable to guard against, is but 
the misfortune of the sufferer, and lays no foundation for legal responsibility.’… 
…The undertaking to redistribute losses on the ground that they resulted 
from the defendants act would… offend[] the sense of justice. Unless my act is of the 
nature to threaten others, unless under the circumstances a prudent man would have 
foreseen the possibility of harm, it is no more justifiable to make me indemnify my 
neighbor against the consequences, than to make me do the same thing if I had fallen 
upon him in a fit, or to compel me to insure him against lightning.” 






created by high transaction costs;”102 or, in other words, ideally incentivize players to reach the 
social welfare optimum.  
The main elements and notations of the orthodox model are as follows:103  
(i) ! = The level of precaution taken by the defendant.  We assume ! is a continuous 
variable and that ! ≥ 0.  We also assume that ! is a single dimensional variable, 
representing a single continuous precaution (such as the speed of a car or the 
frequency of safety inspections) or an overall investment level in precaution.104  
(ii) ω = The marginal cost of precaution, so that ω represents the cost per unit of 
precaution in dollar amounts.  For the sake of simplicity, we assume at this point 
that ω is constant and positive.105 
(iii) ! = The probability of accidents.  We assume ! = ! !  decreases with any 
increase in precaution, and further assume that ! !  decreases at a decreasing 
rate.  Thus, ! !  is a continuous and decreasing convex function of x; ! ! ≥ 0; 
!! < 0 and !!! > 0. 
(iv) ! = The monetary value of harm from accidents, when they occur.  We can 
assume that ! = !(!) is either constant or a decreasing function of x, in which 
case we further assume that !(!)  decreases at a deceasing rate.  Thus, 
! ! !(! > 0) is a decreasing convex function of x; !! < 0 and !!! > 0 where 
                                                
102 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 190. 
103 For a general review see Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 199-206; Shavell, 
Economic Analysis of Accident Law, supra note 12, at pp. 33-36; Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort 
Law, supra note 3; and Miceli, The Economic Approach To Law, supra note 91, at pp. 15-30.  The following model is 
principally based on these sources.  
104 For the later, the traditional model must also assume that precautions are assigned and chosen based on their 
relative efficiency, so that the most efficient precautions are selected first; as well as other assumptions.  For a discussion 
on the possibility of and conditions to commensurating precautions, see hereinafter, in Part IV.D.  






! is positive.  For simplicity, we will assume hereinafter that ! is constant for 
every !.106 
We assume players are of two types, injurers and victims, and are strangers to one 
another.  Injurers are all identical, as are all victims, and only victims suffer losses if accidents 
occur.107   Parties are all assumed to be risk neutral and rational, and to make decisions based 
on expected costs and benefits.  Social welfare is defined as the sum of the parties’ expected 
utilities, and equivalently, the sum of their goods or assets. 108 We also assume that adjudicators 
do not err in applying the negligence rule or in assessing damages, that players possess 
complete knowledge as to expected costs and benefits of their actions and that cost and benefit 
functions are static and do not change over time.  Finally, we assume that precautions are 
unilateral, meaning that only side (in this case injurers) can affect the risks and expected harms 
of accidents.109 
                                                
106 The analysis does not fundamentally change when ! is constant (meaning accident losses are of fixed 
severity, conditional on !  being positive) or a decreasing function of x.  Notice that, in the classic model, !  is 
predetermined, in the sense that if an accident occurs (based on !(!)), the corresponding harm is fixed for every x.  It is 
obviously possible to describe! (!) as a stochastic function, where the materialized harm is not predetermined for every 
!.  Notice also that !(!) and !(!) are correlated, in the sense that an increase in precaution level (!) reduces both the 
probability of an accident and its expected harm.  On that point, and its implication on the first order condition, see also 
Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, supra note 12, at 33 n.49 (“Because ! !  is expected losses, that is, 
! ! ! !, ! !", where ! !  is the probability of an accident and !(!, !) is the probability density of losses of ! given ! 
conditional on the occurrence of an accident, the model implicitly allows for accident losses to be of different severity. In 
the examples of the text losses were of fixed severity”).  
107 For literature relaxing this assumption, resulting in additional insights, see Avon Leong, Liability Rules When 
Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses, 9 INTER. REV. OF L. AND ECON. 105 (1989); and Jennifer Arlen, Re-examining 
Liability Rules When Injurers as Well as Victims Suffer Losses, 10 INTER. REV. OF L. AND ECON. 233 (1990). 
108 Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, supra note 12, at p. 33; and Posner, Cases and Economic 
Analysis, supra note 16, at p. 3.  See also Hal R. Varian INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS – A MODERN APPROACH 57-
58, 234-246, and 614-624 (7th ed., 2006) (hereinafter: “Intermediate Microeconomics – A Modern Approach”) (discussing 
the definitions of risk neutrality, expected utility and social welfare functions).  
109 The prolific discussion in economic literature regarding bilateral precautions, in which two or more parties 
influence the costs of accidents, is generally beyond the scope of the model reviewed in this thesis.  As will soon become 
obvious, while bilateral precautions add an additional layer of complexity to negligence analysis, they do not change the 
fundamental normative contentions argued here.  In fact, I believe that the tendency in tort economic scholarship to focus 
on strategic bilateral scenarios is one of the main reasons why many limitations of the orthodox model regarding 






The social costs of accidents are, in the basic model, comprised of only two elements: 
the costs of harm and the costs of avoiding harm (precaution).  The administrative costs of the 
court system are assumed to be zero or inconsequential.  Thus, the expected social cost of 
accidents (!") can be represented by the formula !" + ! ! !, and the social cost can be 
minimized by finding x!that satisfies:  
(1) min![!" + ! ! !] 
The solution to this problem is best illustrated graphically, as can be seen in Figure II.1. 
The graph ω!  represents the total costs of taking precaution, and based on our above 
assumptions is a straight line through the origin whose slope equals ω.  The negatively sloped 
curve ! ! ! represents the expected harm from accidents.  The expected social costs can be 
obtained by vertically adding the line !" and the curve ! ! ! for every level of precaution !. 









!" + !(!)! 
$ 
0 !!!∗!
Figure II.1: The Expected Social Costs of Accidents in the Basic Model 
As !" = !" + ! ! ! is a U-shaped convex curve, there exists a unique !-value that 
would minimize the expected costs of accidents.  That value, donated !∗, is the socially optimal 
level of precaution.  At all levels of care below !∗, taking additional precaution will reduce the 
victim’s expected damage by more than its cost, so that the total costs of accidents will be 
reduced.110  At all levels of care beyond !∗, taking additional precaution is assumed to reduce 
the victim’s expected damage by less that the cost of that precaution, so that the total costs of 
accidents will rise.  
                                                
110 For this to be true in multidimensional frameworks, the model must also assume that injurers take optimal 






!∗ can be characterized mathematically, by setting the first derivative of Equation 1 
with respect to ! to equal zero.  Thus, !∗ is determined by the first order condition:  
(2) ! + !! !∗ ! = 0111 
So that: 
(3) ! = −!! !∗ ! 
Equation 3 tells a simple story, according to which !∗ is found where the slope of the 
!" line equals the (negative) of the slope of the ! ! ! curve.  In other words, !∗ is found 
where the marginal cost of precaution equals the marginal benefit from taking precaution.112  
 
B. THE TWO APPROACHES TO NEGLIGENCE ADJUDICATION REVISITED  
a. GENERAL 
The above discussion established that !∗ represents the socially optimal level of care, 
and reviewed its key features under conventional assumptions.  The next step is to prove that 
the negligence rule efficiently incentivizes injurers to actually take precaution at !∗.  While this 
proof is well known in economic literature, the following discussion entails some novelty in 
separately discussing the two approaches to negligence adjudication: the marginal and 
aggregated approach.  As our analysis demonstrates, both methods efficiently incentivize 
prospective tortfeasors to invest in precautions, subject to the assumptions of the conventional 
model.  
                                                
111 Where the first derivative (or first partial derivatives) of ! !  is !!. 
112 Notice that !∗ is not necessarily found at the intersection of the curves in Figure II.1, as they reflect total 






While discussing the two approaches, we also revisit their principal characteristics, 
definitions and rationalizations, and give them new, concrete and rigorous economic meanings.  
As Parts III and IV will demonstrate, these meanings offer new insight into negligence law, and 
reveal previously unnoticed challenges to negligence adjudication 
 
b. THE AGGREGATED APPROACH  
i. THE INJURER’S INCENTIVES  
Negligence is often described as a hybrid between strict liability and no liability 
regimes; with the point of “due care” as the dividing line between the two regimes.  The 
aggregated approach stems, to a large extent, from this portrayal.  Under the aggregated 
approach, courts are assumed to conclusively set “a definite standard requiring a fixed amount 
of precaution,”113 and measure the reasonableness of the defendant’s behavior against it.  Put 
differently, courts are called to conclusively determine the point of due care as a prerequisite to 
negligence review.  
Let ! donate the legal standard of due care set by the court.  ! therefore partitions the 
range of possible precautions into two zones: a permitted (no liability) zone and a forbidden 
(strict liability) zone.  Precautions below ! breach the duty of care, and precautions equal to or 
exceeding ! satisfy the duty of care.  Thus, ! < ! implies that the injurer-defendant was at 
fault, while ! ≥ ! implies that the injurer-defendant was not at fault.  
Based on the above, the injurer’s cost function in the permitted zone will be limited to 
the costs of precaution (!"), and will not include the victim’s harm.  In the forbidden zone, 
                                                






however, the injurer’s cost function will consist of the cost of precaution (!") and the expected 
harm to the victim (! ! !).  Thus, we can write the injurer’s cost minimization problem under 
the aggregated approach as follows:  
!"#!!!
!"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!! ≥ !!
!" + ! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!! < !!
 
If courts accurately set the legal standard to equal the socially optimal level of care  
(! = !∗), then !∗ will mark the point of transition between strict and no liability, or between 
the permitted and forbidden zones.  When that is the case, we can alternatively write the 
injurer’s cost minimization problem under the aggregated approach as: 
!"#!!!
!"!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!! ≥ !!∗
!" + ! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"!! < !!∗
 
Viewed graphically, the injurer’s costs in the permitted zone (! ≥ !!) are indicated by 
the straight-line !" in Figure II.2, while the injurer’s costs in the forbidden zone (! < !!) are 






Figure II.2: The Injurer’s Costs Function under the Basic Model 
The lowest point, or minimum, in the injurer’s cost function (the discontinuous dark 
line) occurs exactly when the injurer’s precaution equals the legal standard (! = ! = !∗).  In 
the forbidden zone, the injurer’s cost function is minimized as !  approaches !∗ .  In the 
permitted zone, the injurer’s cost function is also minimized as ! approaches !∗.  Therefore, 
when the legal standard equals the socially optimal level of care, and perfect compensation is 
provided to the victim, the negligence rule efficiently incentivizes injurers to take optimal 
precautions.  
To further review the incentive effects of the negligence rule under the aggregated 
approach, consider how the injurer would set her preferred level of care.  It is trivial to 
!" 
 
!" + !(!)! 
$ 






demonstrate that ! = ! is a unique Nash equilibrium, where neither injurer nor victim can 
increase their respective payoffs by taking a different strategy.114  To see this, assume at first 
that the injurer sets her precaution level at !!, so that !! < !.  The injurer’s costs in this case 
would be the costs of precaution (!!!) plus her expected liability from accidents ! !! !.   
Under the model’s assumptions, primarily the convexity assumption, taking additional 
precaution between !! and ! would yield a higher return (in reducing expected liability) than 
its cost.  Therefore, a rational injurer will continue taking precaution until she reaches !, at 
which point her overall costs would fall to !! (!! < (!!! + ! !! ! (!! < !)).115 
If, on the other hand, the injurer sets her precaution level at !!, so that !! > !, she will 
be able to increase her payoffs by reducing her precaution level until she reaches !.  To see 
this, recall that the injurer’s cost function above ! consists only of the costs of precautions 
(!"), and she is not held liable for the victim’s harms.  As under our above assumptions the 
total costs of precautions increases as a function of !, it must be that !! < !!! (! < !!).  A 
rational injurer will consequently reduce her precaution level until she reaches !, and !! cannot 
be an equilibrium precaution level. ! = !  is therefore the only solution to the injurer’s 
minimization problem, and a unique equilibrium.  
 
                                                
114 This is straightforward since, in the basic unilateral precautions model, the victim cannot take alternative 
actions, and the injurer is the only player who can chose between different strategies.   
115 This is trivial as under our assumptions (! > !), (! > 0) and ((! ! ! > 0),!so that the cost of precaution 






ii. ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC FEATURES 
The above discussion also sheds additional light on the methodological process and key 
characteristics of the aggregated approach.  In this regard, it is worth pointing to the following 
four fundamental features: 
First, and importantly, the aggregated approach seeks to find the global optimum to 
every tort puzzle.  Generally speaking, general optimization is often a more ambitious goal than 
improving efficiency or performing constrained minimization, and often sets a particularly high 
set of demands on adjudication.  For instance, efficiency and the absence of possible marginal 
improvements are necessary but insufficient requirements for a global optimum to be 
established.  When, as we shall soon witness, negligence puzzles present with multiple local 
minima and maxima, and with multiple perfect and imperfect equilibria, the aggregated 
standard is only satisfied when the defendant’s actions—however efficient—corresponded with 
or exceed the globally optimal set of precautions.  
Once the global optimum !∗ is found (or assumed to be found), it becomes the legal 
benchmark (!) against which the defendant’s actions are judged.  Practically speaking, an 
“aggregated judgment”, therefore, does not investigate whether the defendant could have taken 
additional marginally cost-justified precautions or even whether some alternative precaution 
would have been preferable to a precaution actually taken by the defendant.  Rather, the focus 
of the aggregated approach is simply on whether the defendant has taken or exceeded the 
prescribed set of precautions constituting due care. 
Second, the aggregated approach applies an unconstrained optimization process, and 






every tort optimization puzzle has a particular and predetermined global optimum, which the 
defendant must meet to the letter (or exceed it).  Therefore, the question before a court applying 
the aggregated approach is not “what is the optimal solution contingent on certain past actions 
taken by the defendant,” but rather “what is the optimal solution conceptually,” irrespective of 
the defendant’s past actions and sunk costs.  As the aggregated approach sets a global optimum 
for each type of activity in the abstract, the defendant’s past actions or omissions rarely bear 
weight on the extent of duties and requirements prescribed by the court. 
As this thesis will demonstrate, this unique feature of the aggregated approach operates 
as a double-edged sword.  On the one hand, an unconstrained analysis is extremely effective in 
preventing certain detrimental behaviors by prospective tortfeasors.  This is particularly true for 
attempts by prospective tortfeasors to strategically limit or otherwise influence the available 
scope of their future precautions.  On the other hand, the same unconstrained analysis might 
lead to inefficient short-run incentives, and generate over-deterrence or under-deterrence when 
sunk costs are ignored.  Parts III and IV will model these effects in detail.  
Third, the aggregate approach is entirely contingent upon the courts’ ability to 
accurately and sensibly set the optimal standard of care for each type of behavior.  Therefore, it 
is extremely vulnerable to judicial mistakes in articulating the required level of care (!).  When 
the duty of care (!) is set at a higher or lower rate than the social optimum (!∗), the incentive 
scheme envisioned by the aggregated approach is distorted, and players might be driven to over 
or under invest in precaution.  Given the overarching prescriptive nature of an aggregated 






ramifications of judicial errors in applying the aggregated approach are particularly 
precarious.116   
Lastly, the aggregated approach does not provide lawmakers with a coherent roadmap 
to actually set the required level of care, other than generally striving to achieve economic 
efficiency and the necessary but insufficient notion that !∗ satisfies the (ex-ante) first order 
condition ! = −!!(!∗)!.  Amongst the possible sources from which a court may deduce this 
optimal standard are regulatory acts, social costumes, best practices, judicial experience and 
knowledge, long-term economic and empirical studies, marginal comparisons and case-by-case 
analyses.  In avoiding setting coherent guidelines on how to arrive at !∗, the aggregated 
approach arguably solves one problem by creating a larger one in its stead.  The innate 
difficulty in an aggregated analysis is, therefore, what Part I termed “the information problem.”  
At the end of the day, the processes, evidence, logics and methods courts are to employ in order 
to arrive at the social optimum remain an unknown mystery under the aggregated approach. 
 
c. THE MARGINAL APPROACH 
i. THE INJURER’S INCENTIVES  
As we have just witnessed, the aggregated approach stems from an endeavor to set an 
overall optimal level of care, and conclusively divide precaution levels to forbidden and 
permitted zones, with x representing the “switch point” between them.  The marginal approach, 
on the other hand, is predicated upon the underlying assumptions of the orthodox model.  
Primarily, it stems from the assumptions that the ! ! !  curve is continuous, strictly 
                                                
116 This is perhaps especially true when market uncertainty as to the judicial standard of care is coupled with 






diminishing and convex, and that the marginal cost of precautions (ω) is constant or strictly 
increasing. 
Under these assumptions, !∗ not only marks the social optimal level of care, but also the 
(single) point of intersection between the marginal cost of precautions and the marginal benefit 
from reducing accident harm.  As Equation 3 demonstrates, the marginal lines of precaution 
costs and benefits from accident reduction meet only when ! = !∗ , where the condition 
! = −!! ! ! is satisfied.  When the precaution level is lower than the social optimum 
(! < !∗), the marginal cost of additional precaution is lower than the marginal benefit from 
taking additional precaution.  When the precaution level is higher than the social optimum 
(! > !∗), the marginal cost of additional precaution is higher than the marginal benefit from 
taking additional precaution.  Figure II.3 illustrates this point by depicting the marginal costs 
and benefits of taking precaution under the orthodox model:  











The marginal approach utilizes this feature of the orthodox model, in a manner that 
allows it to avoid the information problem associated with setting ! under the aggregated 
approach.  Under a marginal analysis, courts are not assumed or required to prescribe a global 
optimal behavior, but rather “compare the relative positions of the marginal curves.”117  When 
the marginal cost of taking additional precaution is higher than the marginal benefit from taking 
such precaution, the injurer-defendant is assumed to be in the permitted zone, and would 
therefore be found not liable.  When the marginal cost of taking additional precaution is lower 
than the marginal benefit from taking such precaution, the injurer-defendant is assumed to be in 
the forbidden zone, and would be found liable.  
Recall that the injurer’s cost function in the permitted zone is limited to the cost of 
precaution (!"), while the injurer’s cost function in the forbidden zone consists of the costs of 
precaution (!") plus the costs of expected harm to the victim (! ! !).  Therefore, we can 




!" + ! ! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"! < !−!!(!)!
 
 
Alternatively, we can describe the injurer’s cost minimization problem using the 
accumulated social cost U-shaped function, !" + ! ! !.  Under conventional assumptions, the 
social costs function is strictly convex, with a minimum at !∗.  Therefore, when ! < !∗, the 
social costs function is downward sloping, and when ! > !∗ the social costs function is upward 
sloping.  Therefore, for a unilateral precautions model, the injurer’s minimization problem can 
also be characterized through a marginal perceptive by:  
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As with our above discussion of the aggregated approach, it is trivial to demonstrate 
that, subject to the underlying assumptions of the conventional model, the marginal approach 
efficiently incentivizes prospective injurers to take optimal precautions.  To see this, assume as 
before that the injurer takes fewer precautions than optimal, and sets her precaution level at !!, 
so that !! < !∗.  As Figure II.3 illustrates, the marginal cost of precaution at !! (!) would 
necessarily be lower than the marginal benefit in terms of harm reduction at !! (−!! !! !).  
Therefore, an injurer taking !! would be found to be in the forbidden zone, and her expected 
costs would be !!! + ! !! !.!  Since the prospective injurer can take additional units of 
precaution beyond !! for a lower cost than the resulting benefit, she will rationally continue 
taking precautions until she reaches the point where the marginal cost of precautions would 
equal their marginal benefit (! = −!! ! !).  At that point, the injurer’s expected liability 
would fall to !".118 
If, on the other hand, the injurer sets her precaution level at !!, so that !! > !∗, her 
marginal cost of precaution (!) would necessarily be higher than the marginal benefit in terms 
of harm reduction (−!! !! !).  An injurer taking !! would therefore be found to be in the 
permitted zone, where her expected liability (!"!) increases with !.  Since the prospective 
injurer would be able to increase her payoffs by reducing her precaution level so long as 
! > −!!(!)!, she will rationally continue reducing her precaution level until she reaches the 
point where ! = −!! ! ! .  Thus, !!  cannot be an equilibrium precaution level.  Only 
                                                






! = −!! ! !, or ! = !∗, is therefore the solution to the injurer’s minimization problem, and a 
unique equilibrium in this case. 
 
ii. ADDITIONAL ECONOMIC FEATURES 
The above discussion also sheds a different light on the methodological process and key 
characteristics of the marginal approach.  Specifically, it is worth pointing to the following 
features: 
First, unlike the aggregated approach, the marginal approach does not articulate a 
global minimum to tort puzzles, nor does it state any specific threshold a prospective injurer 
must meet.  Discovering !∗ or ascertaining ! is not part of the marginal framework or mindset.  
Rather, the marginal approach only endeavors to determine whether the defendant was 
negligent.  It is interested in exploring the desirability of the defendant’s untaken actions and 
adjudicating whether the duty of care was breached, not in stating what that duty entails or 
where it lies.  
The precedential value of a marginal judgment is, therefore, limited.  When a defendant 
is found liable, third parties may only derive that additional precautions were required, but will 
remain uncertain as to the extent of the additional investment required and the composition of 
the missing precautions.119  When a defendant is found not liable, third parties may only derive 
that fewer precautions might suffice, but again will remain uncertain as to the extent of the 
permitted reduction in precaution.  
                                                
119 This is particularly true in light of the nature of the adversarial process, and the common law’s civil 
procedure structure of claims, where even if a defendant believes that no additional cost-justified precautions are 






Second, the marginal approach studies marginal, rather than total, costs and benefit 
functions.  Practically speaking, the relevant question in conducting a marginal analysis can be 
framed in one of the following ways: (i) what is the relative position of the marginal curves at 
the precaution level taken by the defendant?; (ii) what is the slope of the social cost function at 
the precaution level taken by the defendant?; Or, (iii) could the defendant have taken a single 
additional cost-justified precaution.  In all these forms, the marginal change explored is 
infinitesimal (for continuous precautions) or minimal (for discontinuous precautions).  In other 
words, the marginal inquiry does not compare different social outcomes resulting from taking 
non-marginal or wide changes (“jumps”) in precaution levels. 
In that regard, it is worth stressing that a marginal comparison is generally less 
ambitious than global optimization.  For one, its scope of inquiry is limited to comparing two 
marginal cost functions at a particular precaution level, rather than solving an overall 
minimization problem.  This is especially evident, as this thesis will demonstrate, when 
negligence puzzles present with multiple local maxima and minima, or simply with non strictly 
convex social cost functions.  In such cases, and many others, a marginal inquiry might find a 
defendant not liable even though she fell short of meeting the optimal set of precautions, or 
alternatively place liability on a defendant who took precautions exceeding the socially optimal 
level of care.  
Third, the marginal approach applies a highly constrained optimization process, and 
largely takes an ex-post and myopic (short-sighted) perspective to negligence analysis.  
Through a marginal standpoint, the defendant must take additional precautions for as long as 
they are incrementally cost justified.  Therefore, the question before a court applying the 






“what would have been the optimal alternative precaution the defendant could have taken in the 
past.”  Instead, the marginal approach merely asks, “could the defendant have taken a single 
additional cost justified precaution,” beyond those already taken.  In other words, the marginal 
review is “one directional”, and considers past actions and sunk costs as given constraints, 
while severely limiting the scope of its forward-looking analysis to incremental changes.  
Alternative precautions, as opposed to additional precautions, fall outside the realm of the 
conventional marginal approach.  
As this thesis demonstrates, this unique feature of the marginal approach also operates 
as a double-edged sword, with advantages and limitations that mirror the aggregated approach.  
On the one hand, the constrained marginal analysis is extremely effective in creating efficient 
short-run incentives, and is able to give adequate weight to and consideration of sunk costs 
when warranted.  This is especially true when a prospective injurer has taken past actions that 
are not on the optimal set or has overinvested in suboptimal or inefficient precautions.  On the 
other hand, the same constrained analysis might lead to inefficient long-run incentives, and 
encourage value-destroying strategic behaviors by injurers.  This is especially true for attempts 
by prospective defendant to take actions intended to limit or otherwise alter the scope of their 
available future precautions.  Parts III and IV examine this feature in detail.  
Fourth, the marginal approach is heavily contingent upon the existence and veracity of 
the underlying assumptions of the conventional model.  Therefore, it is extremely vulnerable to 
any change in these assumptions.  For instance, when the social cost function is not continuous 
and U-shaped, a given segment may present with a positive slope (! + !! ! ! > 0) even 
though the socially optimal precaution level has not been reached.  Similarly, a defendant might 






and mislead a marginal analysis to assume the global optimum has been reached.  A marginal 
analysis therefore might lead to starkly erroneous results, and negate liability for a defendant 
who has taken fewer than optimal precautions.  
Lastly, the marginal approach does not provide adjudicators with a solid method to 
qualify the relative positions of the marginal curves or the expected added value of taking 
additional precautions.  While the focus of the marginal approach on slopes and marginal 
values limits the severity of the general quantification problem in law and economics, certainty 
when compared to its aggregated counterpart, measurement difficulties may still hinder 
attempts to its application.  As Judge Posner noted in U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. 
Plovidba:  
“Though mathematical in form, the Hand formula does not 
yield mathematically precise results in practice; that would require that 
B, P, and L all be quantified, which so far as we know has never been 
done in an actual lawsuit. Nevertheless, the formula is a valuable aid to 
clear thinking about the factors that are relevant to a judgment of 
negligence and about the relationship among those factors. It gives 
federal district courts […] a useful framework for evaluating proposed 
jury instructions, for deciding motions for directed verdict and for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and, in nonjury cases, for 
preparing Rule 52(a) findings. […]”120 
 
d. INTERIM SUMMARY  
Based on the above, we can summarize the differences between the different approaches 
in Figure II.4:  
 
  
                                                
120 Judge Posner, U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Plovidba, 683 F.2d 1022 (7th Cir. 1982) (reviewing the 







Figure II.4: The Aggregated and Marginal Approaches Compared  
 
 The Aggregated Approach The Marginal Approach 
Goal Conclusively set a required level 
of care (!) for each type of cases 
Determine whether the defendant was 
negligent in a particular case 
Values reviewed Total values Marginal (infinitesimal) values 
Outcome of ideal review Global optimum (!∗) Relative position of marginal curves at 
the precaution level taken by the 
defendant  
Precedential value Significant and general Limited and specific 
Optimization type Unconstrained Constrained and myopic 
Perspective taken Ex-ante Ex-post 
Decision benchmark ! ≥ !  ! ≥ !−!!(!)!  
Framing of the judicial 
question  
Has the defendant met (or 
exceeded) the socially required 
level of care? 
(i) What is the relative position of the 
marginal curves at the precaution level 
taken by the defendant? Or 
(ii) What is the slope of the social cost 
function at the precaution level taken 
by the defendant? Or 
(iii) Could the defendant have taken an 


















!" + ! ! !!!!!!!!!"! < −!!(!)!
 
Main weakness Limited ability by courts to 
accurately articulate the socially 
optimal level of care 
Strong contingency upon the 
underlying assumption of the 
conventional model 
Noted advantage in 
strategic settings 
Efficient long-run incentives 
Efficient deterrence against 
attempts by prospective injurers 
to alter their future scope of 
available precautions 
Efficient short-run incentives 
Ability to give adequate weight to 
sunk costs when warranted and 
incentivizes taking efficient 
precautions after suboptimal or 
inefficient precautions were taken.  
Noted disadvantage in 
strategic settings 
Inefficient short-run incentives 
Over or under deterrence resulting 
from sunk costs and past actions 
Inefficient long-run incentives 
Facilitates and exacerbates attempts by 
prospective injurers to alter the future 




















A physicist, a chemist and an economist are stranded on a 
deserted island. After a day of hunger, the three men suddenly come 
across a can of tomato juice floating ashore. Excited by their 
unexpected find, they put their heads together on how to open the can: 
The physicist says: “I think we can climb the nearest cliff and 
throw the can down from there. I can estimate exactly the right height 
from which to drop the can so that it would open upon impact.” The 
other two think for a while... “No! If you miscalculate the distance and 
release the can from too high up, it will crash on the rocks.” The 
chemist says: “Well, let’s light a fire under the can. I can estimate the 
right temperature and time needed for the can to open just right.” The 
other two think for a while… “No! If you miscalculate and overheat the 
can, it might explode all over.” 
The economist grabs his head and laughs: “Guys, you’re going 











THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CONVENTIONAL MODEL RELAXED  
AND THE FAILINGS OF THE MARGINAL APPROACH: 
 MONOTONE CONVEXITY AND CONTINUITY  
 
A. THE BLIND SPOT OF ORTHODOX ECONOMIC THEORY!
In Part I, our discussion demonstrated that the marginal approach has been widely 
accepted as the gold standard of negligence, and is now regarded as the paramount and only 
coherent interpretation of the Hand Formula.  Part II then explored in further depth the 
underlying assumptions of the conventional economic model of negligence, and described the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for its (marginal) implementation. 
Interestingly, while the marginal approach hinges entirely upon the existence of 
narrowly tailored prerequisites, legal economic literature has scarcely attempted to relax some 
of these assumptions.  As a result, possible repercussions of applying the marginal approach in 
myriad scenarios, where conventional assumptions are not met—remain unexamined.  As 
Anderson correctly notes: 
“[T]he economic analysis of tort law has been dominated by 
general models with comparatively little attention to the specific 
accident-reduction technologies, or the economic structure (the price 
elasticities and availability of substitutes) of particular recurring 
accident situations.”121 
 
By and large, empirical legal research has also turned a blind eye to the possibility that 
not all real world settings conform to the assumptions of the traditional model.  While torts 
                                                
121 Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable Selection, supra note 22, at p. 283 (discussing both normative-






scholarship routinely considers questions such as why do people behave recklessly;122 are 
particular precautions efficient; was a particular tort reform successful and what effect did case 
law have on human behavior; it seldom endeavors to empirically explore the true nature of cost 
functions in distinctive markets.123  Indeed, Calabresi’s call over forty years ago to “test our 
choices empirically”124 and examine the real structure of accident costs “as expressed in the 
market,”125 was scarcely answered, and often met with practical difficulties.  As Calabresi 
articulates in THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS:   
 “[T]he general deterrence rough guess must be made with 
special reference to the relative desirability and uniqueness of activities 
(as expressed in the market) and to their relation to the costs being 
allocated. 
[…] 
Needless to say, all collective judgments as to relative abilities 
of different activities to achieve primary cost reduction, and as to 
relative costs at which these could be achieved, are very hard to make 
and very tenuous.”126 
 
This somewhat sedulous adherence to orthodox assumptions is, I believe, a critical flaw 
in our understanding of negligence in torts, and a blind spot in current economic theory.  Such 
rigid perspective is especially perplexing when held against the following reflections:  First, the 
                                                
122 For a normative discussion see Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent? Technology, Nondurable 
Precautions, and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 293 (1988) (hereinafter: “Why are People 
Negligent?”). 
123 For examples and exceptions see Don Dewees, EXPLORING THE DOMAIN OF ACCIDENT LAW: TAKING THE 
FACTS SERIOUSLY (1996); Frank J. Chaloupka, Alcohol-Control Policies and Motor-Vehicle Fatalities, 22 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 161, 162 (1993); Elisabeth M. Landes, Insurance, Liability and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical 
Investigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents, 25 J.L. & ECON. 49, 49 (1982); Benjamin H. Barton, Tort Reform, 
Innovation, and Playground Design, 58 FLA. L. REV. 265 (2006); Michelle Mello and Troyen A. Brennan, Deterrence of 
Medical Errors: Theory and Evidence for Malpractice Reform, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1597-1598 (2002); and Frank A. 
Sloan, Tort Liability Versus Other Approaches for Deterring Careless Driving, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 53, 53 (1994).  
124 Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents, supra note 9, at p. 157. 
125 Ibid, at p. 141.  






underlying assumptions of the conventional model do not reflect reality in numerous common 
settings.  In fact, the gap between real world settings and the conventional model sometimes 
lies in plain sight.  As we shall demonstrate, life is filled with scenarios that do not conform to 
orthodox presuppositions, and with tort cases that do not abide by conventional presumptions.  
From pharmaceutical development to car accidents and from deep water drilling to a bridge 
faulty construction, torts in action present strikingly different features than those assumed by 
conventional model. 
Second, the conventional model is a cornerstone of law and economic theory.  It is not 
an obscure idea that has gone unexplored or concerns a trifling area of law—it is a gem of 
economic jurisprudential theory, and regarded as “the dominant standard of liability in accident 
law”.127  The orthodox model of negligence is a focal point of research and debate, and was the 
target of exhaustive scrutiny and prolific discussion by legal scholars.  Over the years, it has 
exerted tremendous influence well beyond the confines of tort law, and inspired economic 
modeling in such areas as criminal, corporate and constitutional law, as well as many other 
legal fields.  The Hand Formula is arguably the most renowned and celebrated economic 
formalization of a legal term.  An overwhelming majority of law students in America, and in 
other places around the world, study and reflect upon it.  Yet, for all its prominence, and the 
numerous contributions made to the economic understanding of negligence since United States 
v. Carroll Towing,128 key assumptions of the conventional model remain unquestioned. 
                                                
127 Posner, Cases and Economic Analysis, supra note 16, at p. 197.  






Third, economic theory generally evolves dialectically. 129   Economic frameworks 
naturally and commonly evolve from within, by relaxing their core suppositions and building 
upon existing models.  In the negligence case, however, the process has not matured.  While the 
conventional model surely grew over time in depth and complexity, multiple presuppositions 
necessary for its implementation have not been critically and systematically examined.  It 
remains a legal Beetlejuice—say its name and it appears, but few can answer where it comes 
from or what it stands for.130   
Fourth, and without addressing this issue in depth, certain negligence doctrines and 
rubrics are best understood and explained as means to meet real world challenges, and bridge 
the gap between reality and conventional theory.  This is the case, I believe, for such doctrines 
and common law tools as “industry standards” “community standards,” and “best practice”.  
This element will be further understood after our discussion in Parts III, IV and V.  
 
B. THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS RELAXED AND FUTURE ROADMAP !
The normative lapses surrounding the conventional model need mending.  Whether 
value is served by its limited scope, adhering to the assumptions of the conventional model 
imposes great social costs.  As this thesis illustrates, the reason the marginal approach often 
fails even in the simplest of settings principally derives from unrealistic, overly simplified and 
sometimes plainly misguided assumptions and beliefs. 
                                                
129 In the Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis sense; see Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
SPIRIT (A. V. Miller trans., Oxford, 1977).  But compare, in the context of scientific progress, Karl Popper, CONJECTURES 
AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE (New York, 1962); and Karl Popper, THE OPEN SOCIETY 
AND ITS ENEMIES (Princeton, 1966). 






In the following, we will gradually and systematically relax the classic assumptions of 
the conventional model, and review the theoretical implications of doing so within a unilateral 
precautions framework.  Specifically, we will relax and critically review the following 
assumptions:131 
 
(i) Convexity: The assumption that marginal benefit as a function of taking 
precaution is downward sloping, i.e. that precautions yield a diminishing 
marginal return; 132  that marginal costs are constant or increasing with 
precautions; and therefore the curve representing the social costs of accidents is 
convex and U-shaped;133 
(ii) Monotonicity: The assumption that marginal costs and benefit functions are 
monotone, so that in the conventional model the marginal benefit of taking 
precaution is strictly diminishing and the marginal cost of taking precaution is 
constant or strictly increasing; 
(iii) Continuity: The assumption that precaution measures and their associated cost 
and benefit functions are continuous;134 
(iv) Single Dimensionality: The assumption that precautions are one-dimensional, 
and can be fully and accurately represented along a single axis; 
                                                
131 On some of the standard assumptions of conventional literature regarding negligence law, see Giuseppe Dari-
Mattiacci and Francesco Parisi, THE ECONOMICS OF TORT LAW (2005), at notes 9-14; and Marks, Discontinuities, 
Causation, and Grady's Uncertainty Theorem, supra note 58, and especially at note 2.  For a discussion of similar 
theoretical questions and assumptions, within strategic settings, see Feldman and Kim, The Hand Rule and United States 
v. Carrol Towing Co. Reconsidered, supra note 20, at pp. 528-529.  
132 In other words, that the (aggregated) benefit curve of taking precaution is upward sloping and strictly 
concave.   
133 The shape of the total costs of accident curve is a reflection of our assumptions regarding the cost and benefit 
functions of taking precautions. For simplicity, we refer to all the above as the convexity assumption.  
134 Orthodox scholarship generally does not explicitly refer to or require costs and benefit functions to be 






(v) Orthogonality of Multidimensional Precautions, Predetermincy and Lack of 
Path-Dependencies: The assumption that precautions are uncorrelated, and that 
the scope of possible precautions and their expected marginal efficiency is not 
path-dependent.  This assumption entails that different (or multidimensional) 
precautions can be ranked, sorted and arranged in perfect order based on 
predetermined qualities.135  
(vi) Static Systems: The assumption that cost and benefit functions, as well as the 
scope of possible precautions, are static and do not change over time or as a 
result of exogenous intervention.136   
 
To these assumptions, we should add two additional implications, which will be further 
explored throughout this thesis: 
(vii) Sufficiency and Equivalency of a Short-run Analysis: The view that a short-run 
and incremental (or myopic) review is sufficient for optimal results to be 
reached in all negligence setting, and will produce equivalent results to long-run 
analysis;  
(viii) Sufficiency and Equivalency of a Constrained (Memoryless) Analysis: The view 
that a highly constrained and ex-post (or “memoryless”137) review is sufficient 
                                                
135 The orthogonality assumption is relevant to multidimensional frameworks.  Interactions between similar 
precautions, or different levels of similar precautions, will generally be characterized in this thesis using threshold 
models.  The orthogonality assumption is closely associated with the notion that when commensurated to a single axis, 
precautions are ranked with perfect order, as discussed in Part IV.D., and in Marks, Discontinuities, Causation, and 
Grady's Uncertainty Theorem, supra note 58.  
136 The static systems assumption is only generally discussed throughout this thesis.  It is perhaps worth while 
noting here in brief that when temporal changes occur in cost and efficiency functions, evermore disquieting implications 
can arise out of the application of a strict marginal or aggregated approach.  For instance, changes over time in                
(i) expected risks; (ii) technological opportunities and accident prevention possibilities; (iii) discovery of new 
information; (iv) costs of precautions; and (v) changes in the net present value (NPV) of future contingencies or their 
predictability, result in innate tensions within the negligence system, and an impossibility to simultaneously optimize 






for optimal results to be reached in all negligence settings, and will produce 
equivalent result to unconstrained analysis;!!! 
 
When the above assumptions and implications are not met, the general minimization 
problem expressed in Equation I, i.e. !"#![!" + ! ! !], cannot be solved by a short-run 
comparison of marginal costs and benefits, and is not synonymous to finding an ! value that 
satisfies the first order condition of Equations I, meaning that ! + !!! = 0.  Put differently, 
the fundamental criterion of the marginal approach, ! ⋛ !−!!(!)! , and the mainstream 
interpretation of the Hand Formula (as articulated also in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF 
TORTS),138 are inapplicable when the above assumptions are relaxed.  
Parts III and IV are principally dedicated to remodeling the negligence framework and 
to a critical exploration of the assumptions and conceptions of the orthodox model.  They 
progress as follows:  
Part III begins by relaxing the convexity, monotonicity and continuity assumptions.  As 
a main focus, it explores the theory of thresholds and tipping points, and reviews real world 
examples of their effect in the medical field, such as smoking addiction and epidemic 
dynamics.  The part then continues to discuss the possible consequences of conjointly relaxing 
these assumptions in two types of cases: (i) local minima appearing before, or antecedent to, 
the global optimum, and (ii) local minima appearing after, or postliminar to, the global 
optimum.  For each type of case, unique difficulties resulting from the application of the 
marginal Hand Formula are presented, and possible realistic scenarios and patterns enabling 
                                                                                                                                                              
137 By memoryless, we mean that the legal review treats all past actions as sunk, and makes its judgments 
assuming past-taken actions are given constraints.  






their occurrence are postulated.  Part III concludes by reflecting on the fragility and limitations 
of the conventional model, and its relation to the Anna Karenina Principle, discussed there.  
Part IV adds an additional layer of complexity and realism to our analysis, and relaxes 
the single dimensionality and orthogonality assumptions.  In doing so, we introduce the 
possibility of correlated and multidimensional precautions, systematically categorize possible 
relationships between them and model the potential adverse effects and challenges to 
negligence adjudication they present.  Specifically, we construct a taxonomy of possible 
relationships between precautions, and classify them to include: (i) independent (uncorrelated) 
precautions; (ii) mutually exclusive precautions; and (iii) interacting precautions, which in turn 
consists of: (a) negatively synergetic precautions; (b) overlapping precautions; and                    
(c) positively synergic precautions.  For each type of interaction, assorted suboptimal 
equilibria, foreseeable strategic behaviors and inefficiencies expected from a misguided 
application of the marginal approach are uncovered and illustrated.  This part ends with further 
exploring the notion of short-run and constrained optimization. 
 
C. THE MONOTONE CONVEXITY ASSUMPTION 
a. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
The conventional model is founded upon the assumption that the social cost of 
accidents curve is strictly convex and U-shaped. 139   This assumption implies that:                      
(i) precautions strictly yield a diminishing marginal return for the entire continuum of 
precautions, so that benefit derived from precaution decreases at a decreasing rate for any level 
of care, i.e. ∀! ! ≥ 0 ∶ !!!!! < 0! ∧  !!!! > 0; and that (ii) the marginal cost of precaution is 
                                                






positive and non-diminishing throughout the entire continuum of precautions, i.e.            
∀! ! ≥ 0 ∶ (! > 0) ∧ (!! > 0! ∨ !!! = 0).  
As Part II demonstrated, when these presuppositions are met, the social cost of 
accidents function has a single minimum point, reflecting the optimal level of precaution (!∗), 
or due care.  Any investment above this point would be socially excessive, and considered 
wasteful.  Any investment below this point would be socially insufficient, and therefore 
negligent.  Under such conditions, a court can easily adjudicate negligence by examining 
whether the defendant could have exerted additional cost-justified care, i.e. by applying the 
marginal approach.  Cooter and Ulen beautifully personified this presupposition and the 
judicial process it invites, noting that: 
“Just as a climber can reach the peak of a smooth mountain in a 
fog by always going up, so the court can discover the efficient level of 
care by holding defendants liable for failing to take cost-justified 
precautions.”140  
 
In reality, however, “always going up” is a bad strategy to navigate through the 
Himalayan range or the Appalachian trail.  It is probably not even a good approach to climb a 
mountain such as Everest or Kilimanjaro.  Most highlands and mountains are not 
mathematically smooth.  They are difficult terrains to traverse, scattered with unexpected 
elevations and sudden drops.  To reach the apex of any highland, or find the safest and most 
efficient trail to the top of a mountain, a hiker must look more than one step forward.  He or she 
must have a map of the surroundings, plan ahead and consider multiple alternatives and routes.  
                                                
140 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 215.  Recall, as Part II notes, that sequentially 
applying the marginal approach is assumed to eventually lead to socially efficient outcomes.  Our principal interest here, 






A misguided climber, applying a myopic “always go up” approach, is more likely to call for a 
rescue mission than conquer the top of the mountain.   
Economic analysis of torts encounters a similar challenge in assorted markets and 
settings.  Reality seldom conforms to, or is best described by, strictly convex accident cost 
functions.  Everyday tort problems, let alone complicated optimization puzzles, often present 
with multiple local maxima, minima and points of inflection.  This is especially true for the oh-
so-common stochastic, multidimensional and discontinuous frameworks, where path-
dependencies, alternating slope angles and switching costs are also commonly found.141 
 Stated differently, real-world negligence puzzles are rather noisy problems.  They 
occur in complex contexts, frequently lacking an easily obtainable optimal solution.  A 
marginal “always go up” algorithm is certainly unsatisfactory to many of these types of 
problems.  The conventional wisdom encapsulated in Cooter and Ulen’s mountain-climber 
metaphor fails, therefore, not because it provides bad advice to climb a smooth mountain, but 
because such a mountain does not exist to begin with. 
 
b. TIPPING POINTS, NETWORKS AND THRESHOLD EFFECTS 
Interactions between two or more precautions best explain why negligence puzzles do 
not abide by the strict convexity assumption.  As argued in Part IV hereinafter, when 
precautions of different types interact with one another, the resulting social cost function can be 
highly convoluted, and rarely presents with strictly convex and differentiable features.  The 
                                                
141 We discuss multidimensional and discontinuous frameworks hereinafter.  For now, it will suffice to note that 






process of solving such puzzles, to expand on Cotter and Ulen’s analogy, is similar or 
analogous to navigating through a treacherous terrain, rather than climbing a smooth mountain.  
However, even absent interactions between multiple precautions, there is no reason to 
think that continuous investments in a single precaution would always, or even predominantly, 
yield diminishing marginal returns.  Many precautions do not present with strictly decreasing 
marginal benefit functions.  In fact, the world is filled with phenomena and behaviors that are 
best characterized by tipping point or threshold effects.  The following chapter is dedicated to 
these effects.  
Thresholds and tipping points are omnipresent.  They pervade in the natural world and 
are a paramount characteristic of social behavior. Water temperature can change with little 
consequence until it reaches the freezing or boiling points; A medicinal drug can have no 
therapeutic value until it reaches a certain threshold, and may suddenly become lethal when it 
exceeds another; Competition in various markets might exhibit a “winner takes it all” effect; A 
shareholder might be subject to more stringent legal duties once she reaches a certain equity 
holding; A buyer might enjoy a bulk discount past a certain quantity; A fashion trend may 
“catch” and expand geometrically once it reaches a certain popularity; A nuclear reaction is 
contingent on achieving a certain critical mass; and so on. 
Countless technologies, products, systems, cost functions and collective human 
behaviors drastically change once they reach a defined point.  From that point, or threshold, 
things do not build steadily and slowly up or taper off and gently decline.  Some systems hit a 






functions and systems that otherwise display gradual or linear progressions may perhaps be 
counterintuitive and surprising, but are nonetheless common.142 
The terms tipping point and threshold effects came into common use in the 1970’s, in 
the context of the American housing market and racial divide.  As the common narrative goes, 
white population living in cities in the American Northwest would “flee” to the suburbs when 
the number of incoming African Americans in a particular neighborhood would reach a certain 
threshold.  At that point, the community would tip, and most remaining whites would leave 
almost immediately.143 
Tipping points have numerous examples in everyday life, as well as in negligence-prone 
settings.144  To further illustrate the dynamics and commonness of threshold effects, consider 
the following examples from the medical field: 
 
Example 1: Smoking Addiction 
Smoking and Nicotine addiction is a complicated phenomenon, with multiple 
contributing factors.  Much like any addiction, it results from and can be explained by various 
                                                
142 For classic descriptions of the tipping point model see Mark Granovetter, Threshold Models of Collective 
Behavior, 83 AM. J. OF SOCIOLOGY 1420 (1978); Mark Granovetter and Roland Soong, Threshold Models of Diffusion 
and Collective Behavior, 9 J. OF MATHEMATICAL SOCIOLOGY 165 (1983); and Thomas Schelling, MICROMOTIVES AND 
MACROBEHAVIOR (1978). 
143 See, for instance, in Malcolm Gladwell, THE TIPPING POINT 12 (2000) (hereinafter: “The Tipping Point”).  
144 When a new technology is introduced, its assimilation often presents with threshold patterns.  This is 
especially true in the media and communication markets, where network effects cause the utility of goods to increase 
with the number of users.  For instance, fax machines saw a sharp boost in sales past 1987, when they became common 
and potential users could assume that other potential users also have them.  Cell phones followed the same pattern once 
they crossed a technological threshold of size, price and reception.  Crime rates may also change in the same trajectory, 
with the sudden drop in nationwide crime in the early 1990’s (notable in New York) as the prime example.  The later 
example was recently discussed in popular economics literature, see Gladwell, The Tipping Point, ibid, at 5-7; and Steven 
D. Levitt and Stephen J. Dubner, FREAKONOMICS 3-6, 114-117 (2005).  See also Stephen D. Levitt, Understanding Why 
Crime Fell in The 1990’s: Four Factors That Explain The Decline and Six That Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERS. 163 (2004) 






physiological, psychological, sociological, environmental and economic means.145  What is 
fascinating about Nicotine addiction, however, is that it does not progress in a linear or 
monotonically convex fashion.  People who smoke ten cigarettes a day do not “need” cigarettes 
ten times as much as people who only smoke one cigarette a day.  Light smokers are not lightly 
addicted, while moderate smokers are moderately addicted and heavy smokers are hard 
addicts.146  Rather, there is considerable evidence that addiction or a hard-to-control-need for 
Nicotine only begins past a certain tipping point, so that light smokers are not addicted at all.  
Smoking addiction is, in fact, a threshold phenomenon. 
Benowitz and Henningfield (1994) estimate that the smoking addiction threshold for 
daily consumption is located at about the nicotine levels found in five regular cigarettes.147  
What this means is that, for most people, reducing daily smoking from 20 to 18 cigarettes or 
increasing daily smoking from 2 to 4 cigarettes would have little to no effect on their chances 
of nicotine addiction or withdrawal symptoms.  However, if a person increases his daily 
cigarette consumption from 4 to 6, her chances of addiction increase dramatically.148  As they 
explain: 
                                                
145 Interestingly, smoking also results in varied and correlated harms, such as addiction and increased risk of 
lung disease and cancer.  The various convoluted manners in which these types of harm interacted are also part of the 
negligence puzzle, and yet an additional reason for the failings of an over simplistic model. 
146  We can define addiction according to the Surgeon General's 1988 Report on Nicotine Addiction: “the 
compulsive use of a drug that has psychoactivity and that may be associated with tolerance and physical dependence”; 
see Department of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service. THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF  SMOKING: 
NICOTINE ADDICTION: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL. (1988) (DHHS publication no. (CDC) 88-8406).  
147 Neal L. Benowitz and Jack Henningfield, Establishing a Nicotine Threshold for Addiction, 331 NEW 
ENGLAND J. OF MEDICINE 123 (1994) (hereinafter: “Establishing a Nicotine Threshold for Addiction”); Jack 
Henningfield, Neal L. Benowitz and John Slade, REPORT TO THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION: REDUCING ILLNESS 
AND DEATH CAUSED BY CIGARETTES BY REDUCING THEIR NICOTINE CONTENT (1997); and Gladwell, The Tipping Point, 
supra note 143, at p. 249.  See also R. M. Davis, Moving tobacco control beyond "the tipping point", 321 BMJ 309 
(2000); and recently Neal L. Benowitz and Jack Henningfield, Reducing the Nicotine Content to Make Cigarettes Less 
Addictive, 22 TOB CONTROL. 14 (2013).  
148 These factual assessments are obviously a matter of expert opinion, which we accept here as true.  Benowitz 






“The daily intake of nicotine from tobacco can be estimated 
from the level of cotinine, the principal metabolite of nicotine, in blood 
or saliva. The average blood cotinine concentration in addicted smokers 
is about 300 ng per milliliter. Smokers of 5 or fewer cigarettes per day 
have average serum cotinine levels of 54 ng per milliliter and an 
average consumption of 3.9 cigarettes per day. The cotinine level 
normalized for cigarette consumption is 14 ng per milliliter per 
cigarette, or 70 ng per milliliter for a person who smokes five cigarettes 
per day. Thus, it is reasonable to estimate a level of 50 to 70 ng of 
cotinine per milliliter as a cutoff point for the addictive threshold... 
…A level of 50 to 70 ng of cotinine per milliliter corresponds 
to a daily intake of 4 to 6 mg of nicotine. Thus, 5 mg of nicotine per day 
is proposed as a threshold level that can readily establish and sustain 
addiction.”149 
 
Indeed, about 10 percent of smokers, sometimes referred to as “chippers”, commonly 
smoke 5 or fewer cigarettes per day and do not show apparent addiction patterns.  They smoke 
in particular settings and events, may skip smoking for a day or more and can quit with little 
difficulty and without showing withdrawal symptoms.150  Their ability to quit at will is a direct 
result of the nicotine addiction threshold.  Similarly, the same threshold puts them at risk of 
become addicts, should they increase their daily intake of cigarettes by even a small amount.  
These and similar findings may have substantial implications in the negligence context.  
For instance, they might affect the type of claims that should be brought against Tobacco 
                                                                                                                                                              
“A threshold level for nicotine addiction is a theoretical concept based on observations 
in current smokers and studies of the bioavailability of nicotine during smoking restriction. 
That restricting levels of nicotine would prevent addiction needs to be verified empirically.” 
(Benowitz and Henningfield, Establishing a Nicotine Threshold for Addiction, ibid). 
For our purposes, however, we can assume the contention regarding a 5-cigarette-threshold to be true and exact.  
149 Benowitz and Henningfield, Establishing a Nicotine Threshold for Addiction, ibid (emphasis added).  For 
more on the effects of cigarettes, Nicotine, Nicotine addiction and policy considerations, see Jeffrey Gray, Neal L. 
Benowitz, Jack Henningfield et al., Toward a Comprehensive Long Term Nicotine Policy, 14 TOB CONTROL 161 (2005); 
R. D. Hurt and C. R. Robertson, Prying Open the Door to the Tobacco Industry's Secrets About Nicotine: The Minnesota 
Tobacco Trial, 280 JAMA 1173 (1998); J. R. Hughes, A. Blum, N. L. Benowitz and J. Henningfield, Regulation of the 
Nicotine Content of Cigarettes, 331 NEW ENGLAND J. OF MEDICINE 1530 (1994); J. E. Henningfield, E. T. Moolchan and 
M. Zeller, Regulatory Strategies to Reduce Tobacco Addiction in Youth 12 TOB CONTROL 14 (2003); and recently Gray 
N. Jeffery, Nicotine Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: A Global Review, NICOTINE TOB RES. (2013). 






companies, class definitions and boundaries in class actions, adjudication standards applied by 
courts, FDA regulation policies and so forth.  From the perspective of the negligence standard, 
as we shall soon explore, tipping points may render the marginal approach utterly inapplicable 
or ineffective, and necessitate a profoundly different optimization scheme.  
Example 2: Epidemics  
More often than not, the spread of epidemics can be explicated through threshold 
models.  Some even go as far as to state that, “all epidemics have Tipping Points.”151 
Understanding epidemics is a lesson in the ways in which small changes in continuous 
variables might have enormous effects.  The 1995-1997 Baltimore Syphilis epidemic is perhaps 
an especially enlightening example.  
In 1995, a Syphilis epidemic erupted in Baltimore.  As a report by the Baltimore City 
Health Department (BCHD), the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene 
(DHMH) and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) indicates, “In 1996 and 
1997, Baltimore, Maryland, had the highest rate for primary and secondary syphilis among U.S. 
cities.  From 1993 to 1996, the rate for congenital syphilis (CS) in Baltimore increased from 62 
to 282 per 100,000 live-born infants… The increase among blacks was from 113 in 1993 to 564 
in 1996.”152  
This epidemic was distinctive to Baltimore, and occurred despite a dramatic decline in 
Syphilis incidents across the United States.  Nationally, congenital Syphilis rates “declined 
                                                
151 Gladwell, The Tipping Point, supra note 143, at p. 12.  For a short criticism, see Andrew Schultz, Book 
Review: The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference, 38(4) JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL TEACHER 
EDUCATION (2001). 
152 CDC, Epidemic of Congenital Syphilis -- Baltimore, 1996-1997, 47(42) MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 
WEEKLY REPORT 904 (1998) in URL: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00055498.htm (hereinafter: 






72% from a peak of 107 cases per 100,000 live-born infants in 1991 to 30 in 1996; in 
Baltimore, the rate was nearly 10-fold higher in 1996 than the national rate.  Among blacks, the 
national rate was 128 per 100,000 live-born infants in 1996 compared with 564 in 
Baltimore.”153 
But this particular Syphilis epidemic was more than just distinctive on a national scale.  
What is crucial for our purpose here is that Baltimore did not see a gradual increase in Syphilis 
rates over the span of a few years.  Rather, it was overwhelmed by the spread of the disease in a 
short timespan.  While Syphilis rates in Baltimore hardly changed between 1993 and 1995, and 
even subsided during some of these years, Baltimore Syphilis rates suddenly “tipped” or spiked 
in 1995.  Chart III.1, prepared by the BCHD, BHMH and CDC, displays the rates of Syphilis 
by race and year in Baltimore, compared with the national rates:  
Figure III.1: Syphilis Rates in Baltimore Between 1993 and 1996154 
                                                
153 Epidemic of Congenital Syphilis -- Baltimore, 1996-1997, ibid.  







The facts unambiguously show that 1995 was the tipping point of Syphilis rates for the 
Baltimore population in general, and for its African Americans community in particular.  
Various explanations have been suggested for this Syphilis eruption.  For instance, the outbreak 
was linked to changes in the operation of Baltimore’s public health system; increase 
consumption of Crack-Cocaine amongst the resident population; and housing dislocations 
affecting sociosexual networks.155  
It is highly probable that the actual reason for the Baltimore epidemic was comprised of 
multiple factors.  As with many real world events, the end result can likely be traced back to a 
number of root causes working with cumulative synergism.  At this point, however, let us 
assume that Syphilis rates in Baltimore responded to a single variable only, and limit ourselves 
to reviewing one of its possible explanations.  In other words, let us operate under the orthodox 
assumption of single-dimensionality, and postpone our discussion of multivariable interacting 
precautions to Part IV. 
Perhaps the most compelling single explanation for the Baltimore Syphilis epidemic 
links the outbreak to cutbacks in public health services provided to Baltimore residents, and the 
consequent breakdown of medical services in the city’s poorest neighborhoods.  As Zenilam, 
an expert on sexually transmitted diseases of John Hopkins University in Baltimore, explains:  
 “In 1990-91, we had thirty-six thousand patients visits at the 
city’s sexually transmitted diseases clinics… Then the city decided to 
gradually cut back because of budgetary problems. The number of 
clinicians went from seventeen to ten… patient visits dropped to 
                                                
155  See Gladwell, The Tipping Point, supra note 143, at pp. 15-19, 27.  See also CDC, Outbreak of Primary and 
Secondary Syphilis -- Baltimore City, Maryland, 1995, 45(08) MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REPORT 166 (1996) 






twenty-one thousand… It was the worst-case scenario of city 
bureaucracy not functioning…’”156 
 
The explanation suggested by Zenilman attributes the Syphilis epidemic to a gradual 
dilution of STD clinics in Baltimore, and to the corresponding reduction in yearly patient visits 
to these clinics.  In 1990, the number of yearly patient visits to Baltimore’s STD clinics was 
36,000.  This number was then gradually cut back from 36,000 to 21,000 over the span of five 
years.  Assume, for simplicity, that the number of visits in 1991 was about 33,000, the number 
of visits in 1992 was about 30,000, the number of visits in 1993 was about 27,000, the number 
of visits in 1994 was about 24,000 and the number of visits in 1995 was 21,000.  
As Figure III.1 illustrates, the gradual reduction in patient services between 1990 and 
1995 was not correlated with an increase in Syphilis rates.  In fact, the disease seems to have 
been kept at bay when the number of yearly visits was cut from 36,000 to 33,000, and from that 
point to 30,000 and again to 27,000 and 24,000.  According to Zenilman, only when the 
number of yearly visits hit about 21,000, did the city experience a sudden and dramatic Syphilis 
epidemic.  That would imply that 21,000 yearly patient visits was the Syphilis threshold in 
1995 Baltimore.157  
The Baltimore Syphilis epidemic, as a product of reduced levels of public health 
services, cannot be explained by the rule of diminishing marginal returns.  The data suggests 
that the marginal harm from Syphilis as a function of changes in the number of yearly patient 
visits above 21,000 was close to zero.  The “final straw” in 1995, however, had tremendous 
                                                
156 As quoted by Gladwell, The Tipping Point, ibid, at pp. 15-16 (emphasis added). 
157  We assume, for simplicity, a deterministic and single-dimensional model, with equivalent conditions over 
different years.  Naturally the actual events can be modeled using stochastic and multidimensional frameworks.  Note 
also that, based on this data, it could be that the cutoff point was somewhat higher than 21,000, for instance as a result of 






significance.  At that point, the average frequency of clinic visits and treatments could not keep 
up with the rate of infection, and the number of patients began to exponentially spiral out of 
control.  
 
c. INTERIM SUMMARY AND ALTERNATIVE METAPHOR 
Our object here was not to study epidemics, addiction patterns or consumer choices in 
the pharmaceutical market.  The above examples were brought for the limited purpose of 
demonstrating that thresholds effects are prevailing elements of the natural and social world, 
and that myriad settings present with convoluted non-orthodox social costs functions.  The 
normative implications of these finding are further illustrated and discussed hereinafter.  
However, two short conclusions can be derived from the above discussion at this point: 
First, courts and policy makers cannot blindly assume that all torts scenarios fully abide 
by the rule of diminishing marginal returns and the other suppositions of the conventional 
model.  Applying the marginal approach without first verifying the true nature of the relevant 
cost and benefit functions would be imprudent and ill-advised.  In that respect, the importance 
of studying actual cost and benefit functions in the real world cannot be overstated. 
Second, the “smooth mountain” metaphor is, rather obviously, unfitting for threshold 
and epidemic settings.  That representation is only applicable to the limited circumstances 
where all of the assumptions of the conventional assumptions are met.  A more persuasive 
metaphor for the progression, dynamics and phenomenology of epidemics and tipping points is 






A dam must be higher than the height of incoming water if it is to prevent floods.  More 
importantly, if water pressure rises above a certain point, a makeshift dam of sandbags would 
break and collapse.  The effectiveness of a dam therefore tips at a particular pressure point.  
Assume for simplicity that the threshold point is always found when the water is at height of 
the dam.158  Thus, if the dam is higher than the water level, adding sandbags or taking them 
away would have no effect on the final outcome.  Conversely, while the a dam is lower than the 
expected water level, changes in the number of sandbags would also bare no consequence on 
the final outcome.  At the water level, however, small alterations in the height of the dam can 
make all the difference between catastrophic or miraculous consequences.  
In reality, there are far more dams and unforeseen highlands than smooth mountains.   
 
D. THE CONTINUITY ASSUMPTION 
The conventional model is predicated upon the assumption that precautions are strictly 
continuous, and generally ignores lumpy settings and outcomes.  While this dissertation 
discusses ample discontinuous variables and functions, and predominantly deliberates lumpy 
settings, orthodox economic scholarship “prefer[s] to develop theory using continuous 
variables.”159  The RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS follows the same path in the sections 
dedicated to breach of duty, and provides illustrations principally characterized by continuous 
variables.160 
                                                
158 In reality, things are naturally more complicated, and are contingent on several correlated factors.  An 
analysis of such multidimensional frameworks is set in Part IV hereinafter.  
159 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 196. 
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (2010), in Comment f, Illustration 1 (addressing 
the height of uninsulated electric wire) and Illustration 2 (addressing inspection programs for tree hazards; where the 
time interval between inspections can be conceived as a continuous variable, while a choice between different annual 






This focus of orthodox economic scholarship on continuous settings is no coincidence.  
Continuity is an essential element of the conventional model, instigated by the idea that 
continuous models are more elegant, instructive and “clean”.  As Cooter and Ulen explain: 
 “In general, discontinuous variables and cost functions yield 
messy results about optima, whereas continuous variables and cost 
functions yield clean results. It is usually best to build theory from 
clean results and then handle any messy results as exceptions.”161 
 
Cooter and Ulen have it backwards—discontinuities are the norm, not the exception.  
What is true is that discontinuities may present distinct challenges.  For instance, as we have 
already noted in Part I when discussing Hendricks v. Peabody, applying the marginal approach 
when lumpy variables are at play might result in suboptimal (yet ex-post efficient) 
judgments.162  In such cases, a court might correctly find the defendant negligent, but do so 
based on a failure to take an efficient (yet suboptimal, i.e. not first best) precaution rather than a 
failure to take the optimal precaution.  With that said, I claim the orthodox rigid assumption of 
continuity is misguided.  The reasons for that are descriptive, practical and theoretical:  
From a descriptive perspective, the conventional model ignores the remarkable 
prevalence of discontinuities.  It does not give adequate weight, or any weight for that matter, 
to the fact that many if not most tort puzzles are predominantly represented by discontinuous 
variables and cost functions.  This is especially true from a short-run perspective, generally said 
to apply in negligence law.163  As Miceli notes, “[o]ne complication in applying the marginal 
                                                
161 Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at p. 210; but see Bayern, The Limits of Formal 
Economics in Tort Law: The Puzzle of Negligence, supra note 21, at pp. 738-740 (discussing possible advantages of 
exceptional desecrate precautions in bilateral-precaution settings). 
162 See Grady, Discontinuities and Information Burdens, supra note 1.  
163 See Mark F. Grady, Response, Another Theory of Insufficient Activity Levels, 108 MICH. L. REV. 30, 31 
(2009) (hereinafter: “Response, Another Theory of Insufficient Activity Levels”) (discussing lumpy and differential 






analysis to actual accident cases is that care usually does not vary continuously but comes in 
discrete bundles.”164  From seatbelts to warning signs and ultrasound tests, and from airbags to 
scaffoldings and plasmapheresis, the world we live in is pieced together with discontinuous 
causes and outcomes.  
Discontinuous variables and functions may very well lead to “messy” results, as Cooter 
and Ulen maintain, but that does not make them any less pivotal, widespread and worthy of 
attention.  A general theory of negligence that fails to address discrete variables and functions 
will not only poorly reflect reality, but also fall far short of offering sensible solutions to real 
world problems.  Formal tort models, therefore, must not view discontinuities as minor and rare 
exceptions. They should regard them as generally prevalent. 
From a practical perspective, continuous and discontinuous definitions are often 
interchangeable, and may result from alternative classifications rather than substantial 
differences.  For instance, a rearview mirror can be framed as a binary precaution (“was a 
rearview mirror used or installed?”), a lumpy precaution (“the number of glances at the 
rearview mirror made by the driver”), or a continuous precaution (“average frequency of 
looking at the rearview mirror” or “average time length of looking at the rearview mirror”).165  
Health inspection at a local restaurant, to use another example, can be described as a binary, 
lumpy, or continuous precaution in much the same way (“were health inspections performed?,” 
“the number of health inspections performed over the last year,” and “the average frequency of 
                                                                                                                                                              
because the entrepreneur has irrevocably invested in a factory (or other durable asset) of a particular quality and 
quantity… Economists usually deny that nondifferentiable costs and assets exist. If lumpy resources were common, 
production theory would be totally different.”). 
164 Miceli, The Economic Approach To Law, supra note 91, at p. 26. 
165 For a similar claim regarding the distinction between activity levels and care measures see Dari-Mattiacci, 






health inspection”).  Most precautions can be interchangeably defined as continuous or 
discontinuous, and rearticulated in alternative forms.    
Furthermore, continuous precautions can and often do manifest in lumpy quantities or 
bundles, yet again blurring the distinction between the two terms.  Nicotine levels are perhaps 
continuous in nature, but nicotine consumption is usually made through cigarettes (or Nicotine 
patches), which are generally thought of as discrete.166  The height of a wall is usually 
conceived as a continuous precaution, yet that may have little bearing if the wall can only be 
built using bricks of a set size.  Practically speaking, continuous variables and functions 
frequently present in discrete inputs. 
In a way, the conventional model can be said to envision a hypothetical state of nature or 
ex-ante world, where the realm of possible precautions is limitless and continuous.  In other 
words, the conventional model is entrenched in the “primal” state of the world, where the 
theoretical broad spectrum of continuous precaution has not yet been “chopped” into discrete 
(and concrete) bundles or units, and where investments are not already sunk.  In that sense, the 
conventional model’s continuity assumptions can be viewed as the application of ex-ante 
wisdom onto an ex-post world.  While precautions can indeed come in limitless and arbitrary 
sizes and shapes in an abstract world167—they usually must take some particular discrete form 
in the real one.  
Finally, from a theoretical perspective, the orthodox view is misguided in supposing 
that continuous precautions always, or even commonly, yield “clean” results, as Cooter and 
                                                
166 Cigarettes can also be construed in continuous terms, for instance by measuring the length of the cigarette 
smoked. This is yet another exemplification of the interchangeability principle. 







Ulen claim.  Many times, that is not the case.  Continuous variables can have discontinuous 
costs and benefit outcomes, and as we have already demonstrated are sometimes best 
characterized by threshold models.  In the presence of thresholds, not to mention non-monotone 
functions, the task of optimizing overall social costs can be as challenging, difficult and 
treacherous for continuous variables as it is for discontinuous variables.  
Moreover, even when a continuous precaution manifests in continuous and strictly 
convex outcomes when taken alone, it may interact with other variables (in multidimensional 
frameworks), and result in lumpy or non-monotone outcome functions for that reason.168  When 
such interactions occur, the results are likely to be unpredictable and highly convoluted.  
To summarize our discussion at this point, continuous precautions do not and cannot 
guarantee simple, elegant or “clean” results, and much like any negligence variable necessitate 
a case-by-case (or market-oriented) analysis coupled with a tailored optimization processes.  To 
illustrate just a few common complications prevalent to continuous precautions, consider the 
example of a hypothetical medical drug, consisting of the active ingredient, say QRS.  
 First, while QRS can theoretically be taken in continuous amounts, it is possible that it 
is only available in lumpy quantities.  This is the case, for instance, when QRS is marketed in 
pills of a set dose.  When QRS is only obtainable in discontinuous quantities, the theoretical 
continuous nature of its input and output functions would make little difference, and any 
realistic model for its use will have to take discontinuities into account.  
Second, the continuous nature of QRS does not assure that its effect on the human body 
will be continuous and positively or negatively monotone.  For example, the beneficial results 
                                                
168 As discussed in Part IV hereinafter, while it may be that discontinuous outcomes (in the strict mathematical 
sense) are—under some conventional assumptions—atypical or not possible in a plain of two continuous variables, non-






of administering QRS might only appear within a certain range.  Before a particular threshold is 
reached, QRS might have no effect on the human body.  Past another threshold, QRS might 
suddenly become toxic or harmful.  As a result, administering QRS in continuous levels can 
have discontinuous and non-strictly convex outcomes. 
Third, even if QRS abides by the rule of diminishing marginal returns when taken 
alone, it might interact with other drugs.  Such interactions can (and often do) alter the expected 
outcome in intricate manners.  Once QRS interacts with other substances, the aggregated result 
might display with fluctuating marginal benefits, be best characterized by threshold models, 
and under specific conditions even present with discontinuous outcome functions.  In all these 
cases, and many more, the marginal approach is inapplicable and likely inefficient.  
 
E. ILLUSTRATIONS AND NORMATIVE CHALLENGES  
So far, we began demonstrating that the conventional model is predicated upon overly 
simplified and sometimes plainly misguided assumptions, and examined the monotone 
convexity and continuity assumptions.  In the following pages, we will review the normative 
implications of applying the marginal approach to setting where these two assumptions are not 
met.  
As will soon become clearer, once the fragile assumptions of the conventional model 
are destabilized, the resulting costs and benefits functions might be extremely diverse and hard 
to predict.  Loosely phrased, “anything can happen” once the convexity and continuity 
assumptions are relaxed.  The following is therefore a limited illustration of possible models 
and conceptual difficulties that arise in realistic settings, rather than a comprehensive analysis 







a. CASE STUDY A: LOCAL MINIMA ANTECEDING THE GLOBAL OPTIMUM 
i. EXAMPLE AND ILLUSTRATION  
We begin by discussing a classic threshold model, where the marginal benefit from 
taking a single precaution is downward-sloping and upward-sloping interchangeably.  In this 
example, we will assume that both the precaution and the benefit resulting from taking it are 
continuous.169  As before, the marginal cost of precaution (!) is assumed to be continuous, 
positive and constant. 
To make things more concrete, consider a case of a pharmaceutical drug, XYZ.  This 
drug presents with two thresholds: it is extremely beneficial only after a particular dose is 
reached (range of Threshold !! ), and becomes toxic past another threshold (range of 
Threshold!!).  Thus, the marginal benefit from administering XYZ is positive and increasing at 
the range of Threshold !, and the benefit from administering XYZ is negative past the range of 
Threshold !.  
Figure III.2 roughly illustrates the marginal cost and benefit functions of administering 
XYZ (in blue and black) juxtaposed to the marginal benefit function of a drug the abides by the 
assumptions of the conventional model (in grey);  
Figure III.3 roughly illustrates the total benefit function of administering XYZ (in blue) 
juxtaposed to the total benefit function of a drug that follows the assumptions of the 
conventional model (in grey); 
                                                
169  Naturally, threshold effects can lead to discontinuous costs and benefit functions (at the tipping points), even 






Figure III.4 roughly illustrates the total expected harm function of administering XYZ 
(in blue) juxtaposed to the total expected harm function of a drug that follows the assumptions 
of the conventional model (in grey);170 and  
Figure III.5 roughly illustrate the social costs of harm and precaution as a function of 
administering XYZ (in blue) juxtaposed to the same functions of a drug that follows the 
assumptions of the conventional model (in grey).   
 










                                                
170 The aggregated expected harm function (Figure III.3) is, obviously, the inversion of the expected benefit 












Figure III.3: Total Benefit as a Function of Administering XYZ  
 































The total social costs function of XYZ, displayed in Figure III.5, is especially 
enlightening, and we can conduct our analysis on its basis.  Notice that unlike the conventional 
model, the social costs function of XYZ is not monotone, and displays a local minimum 
(donated !) anteceding a local maximum (at Threshold a) and the global minimum (!∗).  The 
two minima and local maximum partition the curve into four sections, donated α,#β,#γ and δ.  
Sections α and β represent XYZ’s social costs function before Threshold a, and not 
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convex cost function.171  Section#γ#depicts a sharp decline in social costs as a result of XYZ’s 
heighten positive effect past Threshold a, which more than compensates for the additional cost 
of the drug.  Section δ depicts a sharp increase in social costs, corresponding with the XYZ’s 
adverse effects past Threshold b.  
 
i. NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS  
How would the two approaches to negligence adjudication review this case?  For the 
aggregated approach, the answer is simple—It would conclusively set the judicially required 
level of care (!) at the global optimum !∗.  If the defendant does not administer XYZ at least at 
!∗, she would be found liable.  Notice also that, as a result of the adverse effect of the drug past 
Threshold b, a defendant might be considered negligent for administering too much of the drug, 
not only too little.  If the defendant administers XYZ at a level at which it is toxic, i.e. at some 
level after !∗ where XYZ has a negative marginal benefit, she would also be found liable.172  
It is perhaps worth reiterating this particular feature—a defendant can sometime be 
negligent for taking either too much or too little of the same precaution.  Ordinarily, the due 
care mark is one-sided, and taking additional precaution beyond the point of due care does not 
constitute a breach of duty.  In those cases, going beyond the call of duty is not actionable, as it 
conveys a positive (though socially inefficient) externality on the potential plaintiff.  Under the 
                                                
171 We assume that the first intersection of marginal costs and benefits occurs before Threshold !, as illustrated 
in Figure III.2. 
172 This is not a fundamental problem in and of itself, as we can always reverse the x-axis and consider taking 
less of the drug as additional precaution.  The interesting element in this example is that the two thresholds make it so 
that a defendant can be negligent for taking too much or too little of a particular precaution.  As will soon become clear, 







conventional model, going above !∗ does not create entitlement, liability or claims for the 
potential plaintiff.173  When the assumptions of the conventional model are not met, however, 
things radically change. In reality, there is such a thing as to “desire too much of a good 
thing.”174 
As for the marginal approach, it would review this case very differently.  To see this, 
recall that the marginal approach applies a forward-looking and highly short-run (“marginal”) 
review.  The deciding criterion under the marginal approach is simply the angel of the social 
costs slope (or the relative positions of the marginal curves) at the precaution level taken by the 
defendant.  When the slope of the social costs curve is negative (! + !! ! ! < 0), the 
defendant is deems negligent, and when it is not negative (! + !!(!)! ≥ 0), the defendant is 
deems not negligent.  
When applied to our example, the marginal approach would find the defendant liable 
when taking precautions that fall in sections α#and#γ, and not liable for precaution levels that 
fall in sections β and δ.  Thus, a defendant subject to the marginal approach would alternate 
between liability and no liability zones as she increases her precaution.  She would be found 
liable in section α (between 0 and !), not liable in section β#(between ! and Threshold#a), liable 
in section γ (between Threshold#a#and#!∗), and then again not liable in section#δ. 
 The notable difference between the aggregated and marginal approach therefore lies in 
section β.#  In section β, the aggregated approach would find the defendant liable, while the 
marginal approach would render a not liable judgment.  Stated differently, the marginal 
                                                
173 Things are slightly more complicated when a single precaution is beneficial to one third party and detrimental 
to another. That problem is beyond the scope of our discussion here.  






approach would not place liability on a defendant who has taken precaution at or past the local 
minimum (!), but has not reached or surpassed Threshold a; while the aggregated approach 
would place liability in such a case.  
Which is the preferable result here?  The answer in this case, I believe, is clearly in 
favor of the aggregated approach.  The aggregated approach creates efficient incentives for the 
defendant to invest at the socially optimal level (!∗).  The marginal approach, on the other 
hand, does not incentivize the defendant to go beyond the local minimum (!), and vindicates 
suboptimal behavior in section β.  Furthermore, the marginal approach’s avoidance of liability-
assignment in section β might lead to absurd results, whereby a defendant will become liable 
due to an increase in her precaution level from section β to section γ, even though that increase 
conveyed a benefit on the plaintiff.175  
To see this more clearly, consider two prospective defendants, Abby and Ben.  Abby 
takes precaution at section β, and Ben takes precaution at section γ.##If the marginal approach is 
applied, Ben would be found liable while Abby would be exempted from liability, even though 
Ben created a smaller risk to the plaintiff than Abby, and his actions might have even been 
socially superior.  The result is that the marginal approach would incentivize players not to take 
socially efficient precautions beyond a local minimum, and in some cases impose liability on 
them for doing so.  
The reason for this overt failing of the marginal approach goes back to its underlying 
assumptions.  The conventional model only envisions U-shaped social costs functions, and 
therefore does not address the implications of local suboptimal minima, or inconsistencies in 
                                                
175  Such a limited increase might be, in some cases, socially inefficient, but would nonetheless be beneficial to 






the slope of the social cost curve.  In this example, the marginal approach also fails due to its 
short-run view—it does not look beyond incremental slopes, and does not examine possible 
costs and benefits of non-marginal additions (or “jumps”) to precaution.  
It is perhaps possible to amend the marginal approach to consider non-incremental wide 
changes in precaution levels.  Such a modification, however, might in turn undercut some of 
the principle advantages of the marginal approach, such as reduced costs, and encounter similar 
practical problems to the ones facing the aggregated approach.  In any case, this adjustment 
would only be useful in limited circumstances, predominantly where local minima or 
discontinuities precede the global optimum.  When a local minimum is postliminar to the 
global optimum, the resulting normative challenges go deeper, as the following chapter 
demonstrates.  
 
b. CASE STUDY B: LOCAL MINIMA POSTLIMINAR TO THE GLOBAL OPTIMUM 
ii. EXAMPLES AND ILLUSTRATIONS  
Are there scenarios in which the above problem occure in reverse order?  Are there 
conceivable cases in which a local minimum occures after the global optimum?  The answer to 
that is, surely yes.  In the following, we will start with briefly illustrating three such examples, 
and then reflect on the normative difficulties they bring.  The first example will discuss 
continuous threshold effects in benefit functions; the second will discuss discontinuous 
threshold effects in benefit functions; and the third will illustrate discontinuous threshold 







Example III: Continuous Threshold Effects in Benefit Functions 
It is not difficult to envision examples of continuous threshold effects in benefit 
functions that result in a global optimum followed by a local minimum.  For an easy example, 
all that is required is to redefine our above example regarding the XYZ drug by limiting the 
positive effect of the drug past Threshold !.  Consider the following: 
A pharmaceutical drug, LRL, presents with a continuous saddle benefit function—it 
abides by the rule of diminishing marginal returns until it reaches a particular threshold 
(Threshold !), at which point the marginal benefit upturns for a limited range, and then 
continues to diminish.  The first intersection of marginal costs and benefits occurs prior to 
Threshold !.  Overall, the social optimum of administering LRL occurs before Threshold ! is 
reached, and the social cost of any additional precaution past the first intersection of marginal 
costs and benefit, including past Threshold !, is suboptimal.   
Figure III.6 illustrates the social costs function derived from such a case (in blue), 
juxtaposed to the social costs function of the conventional model (in grey).  The yellow curve 
illustrates the social costs of LRL had it presented with a second threshold (Threshold !) where 







Figure III.6: Social Costs as a Function of Administering LRL (Continuous Threshold 







Example IV: Discontinuous Threshold Effects in Benefit Functions 
Similar results can manifest when a precaution’s benefit function includes 
discontinuous thresholds.  This is especially prevalent, as Part IV will soon explicate, in 
multidimensional frameworks and when different precautions interact.  
Briefly, assume for the purpose of our discussion that !  represents the overall 
investment level in precautions, rather than the measure of a single type of precaution, and that 
the defendant takes the ex-ante optimal set of precautions for each investment level.176  Assume 
                                                
176  As discussed in Part IV, the optimal set of precautions for each investment level might vary when past 
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also that a particular precaution-device, Machine !, is only available once a certain investment 
level is reached.  Thus, Machine ! is a discrete precaution that is obtainable only past a specific 
cost threshold (Threshold !).  After Machine !  is purchased, additional investments can 
improve its performance. 
In this example, we assume that the total harm (! ! !  as a function of taking 
precaution is continuous, downward sloping and convex before Threshold ! is reached.  Thus, 
the marginal return on investment in precaution is diminishing.  Threshold !  inserts a 
discontinuity to the function, coupled with a sharp decline in expect harm.  The marginal return 
on investment in precaution also improves past Threshold !  (as a result of possible 
improvements in the performance of Machine !), but diminishes for any investment level past 
Threshold !.  Figure III.7 illustrates the total cost of precaution (in grey), total harm (in black) 
and social cost (in blue) functions for this example:  
 
Figure III.7: Total Precaution Costs, Harm and Social Cost as a Function of Precaution 














Example V: Discontinuous Threshold Effect in Costs Functions 
As a third example, consider a case where a discontinuous threshold presents at the 
precaution’s cost function, rather than the benefit or harm side.  Common examples of this 
scenario are quantity or bulk discounts, as well as other manifestations of economics of scale.  
When a price discount is granted past a certain investment or quantity, and affects the costs of 
all precautions (not only precautions past the discount mark), the overall social cost function 
will be somewhat similar to our above examples.  
For this example, !  will represent the number of precaution units taken by the 
defendant.  The marginal return on precautions is assumed to be continuous and diminishing 
for every !.  However, once the number of precaution units reaches a certain threshold 
(Threshold !), the price per unit of precaution drops for all units.  Threshold ! therefore creates 
a discontinuity in the cost of precautions function, and unlike our previous example we no 
longer assume that the marginal cost of precautions (!) is constant.  
The slope of the cost curve (! ! ), or the marginal cost of precautions, is steeper before 
Threshold ! than it is after it.  Figure III.8 illustrates the total cost of precaution (in grey), total 








Figure III.8: Total Precaution Costs, Harm and Social Cost as a Function of Precaution 
(Discontinuous Threshold Effects in Costs Functions 
 
iii. NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS  
What are the normative implications of scenarios where a local minimum presents after 
the global optimum?  Consider first, as before, how the two approaches to negligence 
adjudication would review these cases.  To facilitate a comparison with our analysis of Case 
Study A, we will discuss Example III regarding the LRL drug and continuous functions, 
illustrated by the blue curve in Figure III.6. 
In reviewing Example III, the aggregated approach would, as always, set the judicially 















lower level than !∗, she would be found liable.177  Thus, the defendant would be found liable if 
she takes precaution that fall in section α, and not liable for precaution levels that fall in 
sections β, γ and δ. 
The marginal approach, on the other hand, would only review the slope of the social 
cost function at the precaution level taken by the defendant, and find the defendant negligent if 
that slope is negative.  Therefore, the marginal approach would find the defendant liable if she 
takes precautions that fall in sections α and γ, and not liable if she takes precautions that fall in 
sections β and δ.  As before, a defendant subject to the marginal approach would alternate 
between liability zones as she increases her precaution.  She would be found liable in section α 
(between 0 and !∗), not liable in section β# (between !∗ and Threshold# a), liable in section γ 
(between Threshold#a#and !), and then again not liable in section#δ. 
The major difference between the two approaches now lies in section γ.  In this section, 
the aggregated approach would not place liability on the defendant (as precautions in section γ 
exceeds the optimal level of care !∗), while the marginal approach would place such liability 
(as the slope of the social cost curve in section γ is negative until ! is reached).  The marginal 
approach would therefore require a defendant who has taken precautions beyond the socially 
optimal point to, sometimes, “go the extra mile” and increase her investment in precaution up 
to the nearest local minimum.  
Which is the preferable approach here?  On one hand, a marginal analysis seems 
justified in this case, as it creates efficient short-run incentives for the defendant in section γ.  
To see this, notice that once a defendant’s investment in precaution goes beyond Threshold !, 
                                                
177  We assume here that LRL does not become toxic past a second threshold.  If that were the case, the 
defendant might also be considered negligent for administering the drug past !∗, when such addition would convey a 






additional investments become marginally and socially warranted.  Applying the aggregated 
standard would not incentivize defendants to take additional cost-justified precautions in 
section γ, and would therefore fail to bring about efficient outcomes from an ex-post 
perspective, i.e. assuming the defendant’s past investment.  
 Adhering to the aggregated approach in section γ would therefore go against 
conventional economic wisdom, which generally calls for the exclusion of sunk costs from 
cost-benefit analyses.  According to this argument, the only relevant consideration is whether—
existing conditions assumed—the defendant could have efficiently taken additional 
precautions.  By applying a constrained optimization process, and taking existing settings into 
account, the marginal approach creates efficient ex-post incentives in section γ, while the 
aggregated approach fails to do so.  
On the other hand, applying the marginal approach to these settings might lead to 
problematic and unjust results, at least through a common sense, long-run and doctrinal 
framework.  If the marginal analysis is applied, a defendant in section γ would be found liable 
as a de-facto result of taking precautions beyond !∗, i.e. as a result of going above and beyond 
her original duty.  If it were not for a defendant’s original overinvestment in precaution—which 
was beneficial to the plaintiff—additional cost-justified precautions would not have been 
possible.  Avoiding socially inefficient positive externalities, and keeping precaution levels at 
!∗ or in section β, are therefore ironically required by the marginal approach in order to avoid 
liability.  
To see this tension more clearly, consider two possible defendants, Abby and Ben.  
Abby sets her precaution level at the social optimum !∗, while Ben takes more precautions than 






Ben in breach of duty, but not Abby, even though Ben created a smaller risk to the plaintiff.  
Holding Ben liable in these circumstances would therefore go against accepted tort conventions 
and intuition.  Furthermore, from an dynamic perspective, holding Ben liable for his past 
miscalculation or overinvestment might alter his ex-ante incentives and decision making 
patterns, and create an unwarranted incentive against taking extra-precautions.  It is doubtful 
whether such deterrence against socially inefficient positive externalities is deserved.  
The normative dilemma presented by this setting can therefore be phrased as follows—
if a defendant takes one step beyond the optimal and legally required level of care, can she be 
obliged to take two?  
Lastly, notice that both approaches fail to create efficient short-run incentives in section 
!!.  In section !!, the defendant can efficiently increase her investment in precaution by 
moving to ! .178  The aggregated approach does not incentivize such efficient additional 
investment as the socially optimal level of care (!∗) has been surpassed; and the marginal 
approach does not incentivize such additional investment, as it is not incrementally cost-
justified (as the slope of the social costs curve in section !! is positive).  Thus, the marginal 
approach falls short of offering efficient short-run incentives even under its own terms and 
logic, and does not give adequate weight to the possibility of non-incremental efficient changes 
(“jumps”).  As before, this failure of the marginal approach can perhaps be mended, though not 
without cost. 
To summarize our results here, both the aggregated and marginal approaches operate as 
double-edged swords.  The aggregated approach is instrumental in preventing inefficient 
                                                
178  Or even by moving to section γ, depending on the defendant’s precaution level (though movement to section 






strategic behaviors in cases where a local minimum precedes the global optimum, but might 
create inefficient short-run incentives in scenarios involving sunk costs, and when the global 
optimum precedes a local minimum.  The marginal approach, on the other hand, fails to create 
efficient long-run incentives in cases where a local minimum precedes the global optimum, but 
might create efficient short-run incentives in scenarios involving sunk costs, and when a the 
global optimum precedes a local minimum. 
Whether or not the marginal or aggregated approach should be determinative is 
therefore case sensitive and highly fact contingent.  The difference in outcomes arrived by the 
two forms of analysis does, however, exemplify a paradigmatic normative concern—an innate 
tension between short and long-run review, and between constrained and unconstrained 
optimization processes.  This tension manifests in many of the critical models developed in this 
thesis.  The same tension underlies the contention, advanced in Part V, that no single 
optimization method is perfectly suited for all real-world settings.  
Perhaps not unexpectedly, this tension has largely gone unnoticed in conventional 
scholarship with regards to negligence standards and adjudication.179  The reason for this 
lacking goes back, as before, to the underlying assumptions of the conventional model.  When 
the orthodox economic presuppositions are assumed, the theoretical distinction between local 
minima and global optimum is devoid of all practical meaning, and the normative implications 
and associated difficulties of the disparity between them is easily missed. 
 
                                                
179  For a related piece, discussing a similar tension in the context of bilateral settings, and specifically sequential 
actors, activity levels and causation see Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable Selection, supra note 22, at p. 263 
(“The general problem is that we want tort law to induce a social optimum under multiple sets of constraints: both when 







F. THE ANNA KARENINA PRINCIPLE 
 “Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”180  
Lev Tolstoy’s phenomenal opening to his masterpiece ANNA KARENINA encapsulates a general 
wisdom worth noting—predictable homogeneous settings are fragile and rare, highly 
contingent on the simultaneous existence of multiple factors.  When a particular model’s 
preconditions are not explicitly met, even to a small degree, it might break into inimitable 
fragments and present with unexpected singular outcomes. 
The Anna Karenina Principle is applicable to an array of natural and social schemas and 
endeavors.  It instructs that minor deficiencies, flaws and idiosyncrasies in any complex system 
may radically alter their function, and render attempts of generalization or uniform evaluation 
extraneous.  Put differently, when slight changes occur in the underlying foundations of any 
structure, drastic alterations and fluctuations in behavior might follow.  More importantly, the 
outcome of these alterations is often unique, unforeseeable and highly case-specific.   
For our purposes here, the principle illustrates the fragility and limitations of the 
conventional model.  The conventional model requires that all of its particular underlying 
assumptions subsist, and is only applicable when they are all met.  Such alignment is, arguably, 
rather infrequent, as slight idiosyncrasies and particularities commonly present in most 
systems.  Therefore, the principle predicts that the conventional model will only apply in 
limited circumstances, and that reality present with a vast array of exceptional, non-orthodox 
settings and challenges.  Continuous, single-dimensional and monotonically convex functions 
are therefore all alike; but every other social cost function is unique in its own way. Part IV 
continues to demonstrate how and why.  
                                                







THE ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CONVENTIONAL MODEL RELAXED AND THE 
FAILINGS OF THE MARGINAL APPROACH: 
MULTIDIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND INTERACTING PRECAUTIONS  
 
A. INTRODUCTION AND CHAPTER PROGRESSION 
In Part III, we demonstrated that the marginal approach hinges entirely on narrowly 
construed prerequisites, and began to systematically define the parameters and boundaries of 
these prerequisites.  We then moved to explore in further depth the convexity, monotonicity 
and continuity assumptions, and the possible inefficiencies and detrimental outcomes that 
might transpire from the application of the marginal approach to setting where these 
assumptions are not met.  
In Part IV, we turn our attention to two additional underlying assumptions of the 
conventional model: (i) single dimensionality, and (ii) orthogonality and predetermincy.  
According to the single dimensionality assumption, precautions are one-dimensional, and can 
be fully and accurately commensurated along a single axis.  According to the orthogonality and 
predetermincy assumption, precautions are uncorrelated, so that the marginal efficiency of any 
given precaution is not affected by taking other precautions. 
Part IV unfolds as follows.  We begin by discussing the single dimensionality 
assumption, and demonstrate the multidimensional nature of precautions in most real-world 
negligence settings.  In doing so, show that different precautions are often substitutable, and 
explore the ramifications of that quality in the negligence context.  We then move to model a 
supply side theory of negligence, using tools and terms laid out in production theory in 






manufacturers of care, and that terms such as isoquants of care, marginal rate of technical 
substitution and production hills can significantly and meaningfully expand our understanding 
of the precaution side (or “!-side”) of the Hand Formula.  From this point, we explore the key 
normative difficulties resulting from multidimensional negligence frameworks, and illustrate 
these normative exertions thorough a review of The Jerusalem Municipality v. Mimoni.181  We 
conclude this section by noting the ways in which the single-dimensional paradigm might 
obscure both the actual characteristics of negligence puzzles and the optimization process 
required to solving them, and reflect upon such impediments as variable selection, specific 
versus general regulation and short-run versus long-run optimization.  
After completing our discussion of multidimensional frameworks, we move to explore 
the orthogonality and predetermincy assumption, delving deeper into the prevalent case of 
interacting (correlated) precautions.  In doing so, we attempt to systematically categorize the 
possible relationships between precautions, and model them to include: (i) independent 
(uncorrelated) precautions; (ii) complementary precautions; (iii) mutually exclusive 
precautions; and (iv) interacting precautions, which are further divided between: (a) negatively 
synergetic precautions; (b) overlapping precautions; and (c) positively synergic precautions.  
For each type of interaction, assorted suboptimal equilibria, foreseeable strategic behaviors and 
expected inefficiencies from a misguided application of the marginal approach are uncovered 
and illustrated.  As in other parts of this thesis, the Hendricks Case182 will be used as the 
principal example in this section.  
                                                
181 C.A. 1068/05 The Jerusalem Municipality v. Mimoni, (14.12.2006) (my translation; hereinafter: “Mimoni,” 
“The Mimoni Case” or “The Jerusalem Municipality v. Mimoni”).  By way of disclosure, the writer clerked for the 
presiding judge, Chief Justice Aharon Barak, at the time this judgment was issued. 






Throughout the normative analysis in this part, we revolve around two notions 
embedded in the innate logic of the marginal approach: (i) the sufficiency and equivalency of a 
short-run (“myopic”) analysis; and (ii) the sufficiency and equivalency of a constrained 
(“memoryless”) analysis.  The first notion assumes that an incremental short-run review is 
necessary and sufficient from optimal results to be reached in all negligence settings.  The 
second assumes that a constrained (or ex-post) review is necessary and sufficient for optimal 
results to be reached in all negligence settings.183  Our discussion demonstrates why and when 
these notions are untrue, and further explores the impact of interacting precautions, path-
dependencies, sequential settings and switching costs on negligence puzzles.  We conclude Part 
IV by discussing the conditions for commensurating multidimensional precautions to a single 
axis.  
 
B. THE SINGLE DIMENSIONALITY ASSUMPTION AND MULTIDIMENSIONAL SETTINGS 
a. THE GENERAL FRAMEWORK 
The conventional model critically assumes that precautions are “one dimensional.” 
What this means in practice is that precautions are understood to be either (i) of one continuous 
“type”, such as the speed of a car, the strength of a bridge’s foundations or the length and 
frequency of safety trainings; or at the very least (ii) can be fully and accurately 
commensurated along a single axis, denoting a general precaution level or level of investment 
in precaution.    
                                                
183 But see Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, supra note 12, at pp. 77-79, 91-93 (discussing 






This assumption is pivotal to the fundamental design of the conventional model.  For 
unilateral precautions (where only the tortfeasor can take precautions), the conventional model 
is designed to solve a single variable problem—“was the defendant’s level of care (!) sufficient 
or insufficient.”  The method employed by the marginal approach to answer this question—
“could the defendant have taken a single, additional, cost-justified precaution”—also smacks of 
single dimensionality, and does not provide room for multidimensional solutions.  Single 
dimensionality is, indeed, coded in the DNA of the conventional model.  
In reality, however, precautions appear in different types, shapes and sizes, and as the 
following sections will soon reveal are often irreducible to a single variable or continuum; at 
least not if the model is to reach efficient outcomes.  To “take care” in a particular setting 
usually means exercising different types of precautionary care measures.  Each type of 
precaution can, in turn, be continuous or discontinuous, and may present with individually 
convex or non-convex functions.  Importantly, as we shall soon explore, different precautions 
are often substitutional, in the sense that the same level of care or safety output can be achieved 
by trades-off between different precautions.184  Recognizing the diversity of different types of 
precautions is a crucial first step to solving negligence puzzles.185  
                                                
184 The possibility of substituting precautions is generally unexplored in legal economic scholarship.  For a 
related idea, see Robert D. Cooter and Arial Porat, Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents, 15 
THEO. INQ. L. 329 (2014) (hereinafter: “Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents”) (discussing 
substitutional effects between variables in the context of players’ incentives to reduce prospective liability for lapses, and 
different probabilistic distribution scheme of labor and capital).  Additionally, Gilo and Guttel’s model regarding the risk 
of insufficient activity coupled with suboptimal care (discussed hereinafter, in Part V.F.) may be viewed as a product of 
an interplay between these two factors, allowing for identical levels of care (safety) to be achieved through different 
bundles of precautions.  See David Gilo and Ehud Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in 
Torts, 108 MICH. L. REV. 277 (2009) (Hereinafter: “Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in 
Torts”).  
185 To the extent the conventional model recognizes the multidimensional nature of precautions, it does so by 
excluding certain types of precautions from negligence analysis, deeming them “activity level” variables.  As Section 
V.F. shows, this confusing term facilitates further obscuring the true nature of negligence puzzles, and the critical 






Different types of precautions emanate different types of challenges to negligence cost-
benefit analysis.  Such challenges include: (i) normative and distributional dilemmas and 
restraints; (ii) informational and decision-making costs; (iii) court-institutional limitations;           
(iv) timeframe definition and long-run versus short-run conflicts; (v) difficulties pertaining to 
the observability and verifiability of variables; (vi) difficulties pertaining to care versus 
“activity level” classifications; (vii) difficulties pertaining to care versus lapses, or “first order” 
versus “second order” classifications; (viii) difficulties pertaining to care versus “self-risk” 
definitions; and more.  Many of these complications have been addressed, at least to some 
extent, in economic scholarship, and are therefore not an object of an in-depth exploration here.  
To illustrate the workings of multidimensional precautions in real world settings, and 
the intrinsic multivariable complexity of most negligence puzzles, consider the run-of-the-mill 
example of car accidents.  The expected harm from car accidents is a function of myriad 
precautions, each of which entails specific challenges to cost-benefit analysis (mentioned and 
discussed in footnotes): 
(i) The speed of the car at the time of the accident (precaution !): a continuous and 
likely monotonically convex precaution, which might involve timeframe 
definition and short-term over long-term difficulties.186   
(ii) The type and quality of brakes and wheel-tires (precautions ! and !): discrete or 
continuous variables with a continuous or lumpy efficiency functions.187   
                                                                                                                                                              
conventional scholarship pertaining to bilateral precautions and strategic settings involving two or more players (see, for 
instance, Guttel, The (Hidden) Risk of Opportunistic Precautions, supra note 39, and the many sources listed there and in 
supra note 95).  The possibility of such multidimensional and interacting precautions within a unilateral setting has, 
however, generally eluded economic scholarship.  
186 For instance, it could be that the speed at the time of impact was low, but the average speed during the 
minute (or hour) before the accident was high.  See also Cooter and Porat, Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice 






(iii) Installation and type of Anti-Lock Braking System (ABS), seatbelts, and driver, 
passenger, knee and side airbags (precautions !, ! and !): binary or discrete 
durable variables,188 the last two broadly affecting only the driver’s self-risk.189 
(iv) The type of car driven, its design standards and crash-testing score (precaution 
!): a lumpy or continuous durable variable,190 often disregarded for normative or 
practical reasons.191 
                                                                                                                                                              
187  As discussed in Part III, many precautions can be alternatively conceptualized as continuous or 
discontinuous.  For instance, the quality and maintenance of wheel-tires and brakes can be thought of as continuous or 
discontinuous variables.  
188 On the distinction between durable and nondurable precautions, and its normative repercussions see Grady, 
Why Are People Negligent?, supra note 122, at p. 302; Grady, Response, Another Theory of Insufficient Activity Levels, 
supra note 163, at p. 32; and Steven Shavell, On Optimal Legal Change, Past Behavior, and Grandfathering, 37 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 37 (2008) (hereinafter: “On Optimal Legal Change”). 
189 These precautions can be conceptualized a binary, discrete or even continuous, much like precautions ! and ! 
in this example.  On self-risk versus joint risks see Cooter and Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to 
Others?, supra note 24. 
190 Classification as continuous or lumpy hinges on, for instance, whether the variable denotes crash-testing 
scores (a continuous variable) or a vector ranking of different cars (discontinuous variable).   
191 The reason why the type of car variable is usually not taken into account in applying the Hand Formula is a 
matter for a separate discussion, and has only been loosely addressed in literature.  In a nutshell, the reasons for this 
avoidance can be, for instance, (i) reliance on regulatory standards and enforcements, applying a judicial fiction that all 
regulatory-approved cars are equally safe; (ii) policy and distributive considerations.  For instance, it might be socially 
unacceptable to allow a claim implying that a tortfeasor may drive faster when he or she owns a safer—and more 
expensive—car; (iii) The type of car might be thought to affect only the self-risk to the tortfeasor, which is often not 
taken into account by courts (see Cooter and Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others?, supra note 
24); (iv) reliance on market deterrence, the efficiency of the market and consumer choice to best incentivize car 
manufacturers; (v) limitations on judicial knowledge, resulting from the complexity of the field; (vi) different normative 
approach applicable to durable precautions, making the applicable legal standard closer to strict liability (see Grady, 
Response, Another Theory of Insufficient Activity Levels, supra note 163, at p. 32; Grady, Why Are People Negligent?, 
supra note 122; and more.  See generally on this discussion, Porat, Misalignments, supra note 24; Anderson, The Missing 
Theory of Variable Selection, supra note 22, at pp. 256, 267, 282 (focusing on the empirical data required for making this 
decision: “[s]hould a court consider the choice of automobile in determining whether or not a driver was negligent?  The 
conventional economic model of tort law provides no answer to this question… the right answer might depend on 
context-and industry-specific questions: Would failing to incorporate this variable encourage drivers to purchase unsafe 
automobiles? If so, how many more accident would result?  Would potentially finding drivers negligent for the choice of 
automobile lead to take fewer precautions?  Are there other accident-affecting variables that the decision to include or 
exclude the choice of automobile would affect?”). 
As we shall soon explore, this avoidance might also be a expression of a highly constrained and short-run 
application of the marginal approach to multidimensional settings, where one observable and verifiable variable (such as 
the speed of the car at the time of the accident) is optimized irrespective of other precautions, de-facto assuming all other 






(v) The route chosen by the driver (precaution ! ): a lumpy variable, often 
disregarded for normative and practical reasons.192 
(vi) The frequency of looking in the rearview mirror and speedometer 
(precautions !! ): commonly considered non-observable and non-verifiable 
continuous and monotonically convex variables.193 
(vii) The level of driving-proficiency and training of the driver (precautions! ): 
continuous or discrete “second order” variables, likely monotonically convex.194  
Driving proficiency might be non-observable or non-verifiable in some cases, 
disallowed for reasons of practicality, secondary effects,195 court institutional 
limitations and decision-making costs, precluded in order to enhance a 
judgment’s precedential value,196 or even viewed as part of the exogenous 
setting of risks.197 
                                                
192 Amongst other reasons, a driver’s choice of route is often ignored in light of the short-run view of the 
conventional model (see Anderson, ibid, at p. 271).  However, it is entirely possible for courts to take note of this variable 
in conducting negligence inquiry and apply a broader view the negligence optimization puzzle, as we discuss in Part V.  
The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §297 (1965) also addresses this issue, within the confines of a single-
dimensional view, noting that “There are many mountain roads which may properly be regarded as dangerous no matter 
how careful… the driver may be… there is an inescapable risk in driving down a narrow and ill-kept mountain road… 
particularly if… snow, or ice, has rendered the road slippery… Mere use of such route… may be negligent unless the 
utility of the route is very great.”  
193 For a discussion of such variables, in the context of activity levels see in Part V.F. hereinafter.   
194 On second order variables see Cooter and Porat, Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road 
Accidents, supra note 184, at p. 4.  
195 On secondary effects see, for instance, Posner, Cases and Economic Analysis, supra note 16, at p. 231 
(positing that applying standards based on individual cost functions might incentivize people not to improve their skills, 
as any improvement would also increase their duty of care).   
196 These arguments were invoked in the known case of Fredericks v. Castora, 241 Pa. Super. 211, 360 A.2d 
696 (1976), noting:  
“On appeal, plaintiff argued that the [two drivers] should be held to a higher 
standard of care than is usually applied to the operator of a motor vehicle.... In support 
of this position, reference is made to the evidence that both defendants were 
professionals who drove trucks for a living and had done so for over 20 years…  
…A requirement that experienced truck drivers be subject to a higher 






(viii) Use of alcohol, drugs, hand-held mobile devices, driver’s fatigue and alert and 
other elements affecting the driver’s responsiveness and concentration 
(precautions!!): continuous or discrete “second order” variables.198 
(ix) The number of miles driven over a particular time period (precaution !): a 
continuous and innately “activity level” (or frequency claim) variable, 
presenting with timeframe definition and short-term over long-term 
difficulties.199 
                                                                                                                                                              
vehicle negligence. An understanding of the ordinary standard of due care applicable 
to the average motorists under the multitude of changing circumstances likely to 
confront today’s driver is already difficult to grasp and apply justly. To begin to vary 
the standard according to the driver’s experience would render the application of any 
reasonably uniform standard impossible…” (ibid, emphasis added).  
197 We address the issue of variable selection and the distinction between past constraints and variables in further 
detail hereinafter, in Section IV.B.g.  
198 For a discussion viewing frequency claims (affecting driver’s fatigue) as second order variables see John J. 
Donohue III, The Law And Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1047, 1062 (1989).   
199 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Simple Economics of Tort Law: An Organizing Framework, 2 EUR. J. POL. 
ECON. 91, 96-97 (1986); and Steven Shavell, Strict Liability vs. Negligence, 9. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1980).  The number 
of miles driven is a classic example of activity level, which affects the overall risk of accidents, yet is generally not taken 
into account by the negligence standard.  See A. Mitchell Polinsky, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 53 (3d 
ed. 2003) (“In practice . . . it often is not feasible to include the level of participation in the activity as an aspect of the 
standard of care. For example, it would be virtually impossible for a court to determine how many miles a particular 
person drives each year”); and Gilo and Guttel, Negligence and Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, 
supra note 184 (“courts usually explore the extent to which the defendant–driver took reasonable precautions (level of 
care).  They do not, however, investigate whether the defendant’s mileage (level of activity) corresponds to the socially 
desirable level.”).  We address the issue of activity level separately in Part V. 
Alongside the issue of activity levels, this variable might also be normatively difficult to quantify and define.  
For instance, it could be that the average frequency of driving over a certain time-period would be low, while changing 
the timeframe would reveal a high average frequency of use.  In other words, the variable presents with a problem 
timeframe definition, and might manifest differently over a short-run versus a long-run review.  The timeframe definition 
problem manifests and multiple settings and forms, and relates to both substantive and evidentiary issues. For instance, 
even in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., Judge Hand noted that:   
“In the case at bar the bargee left at five o’clock in the afternoon of January 
3rd, and the flotilla broke away at about two o’clock in the afternoon of the following 
day, twenty-one hours afterwards. The bargee had been away all the time… In such 
circumstances we hold—and it is all that we do hold—that it was a fair requirement 
that the Conners Company should have a bargee aboard (unless he had some excuse 
for his absence), during the working hours of daylight.” (United States v. Carroll 






The above is not an exhaustive list.  To the itemized variables, we can add additional 
safety measures, such as: (i) Automatic Braking; (ii) Adoptive Headlamps; (iii) Reverse 
Backup Sensors; (iv) Backup Camera; (v) Lane Departure Warning System; (vi) Adaptive 
Cruise Control; (vii) Tire Pressure Monitoring and Deflation Detection Systems; (viii) Traction 
Control Systems; (ix) Electronic Stability Control; (x) Electronic Brakeforce Distribution;     
(xi) Emergency Brake Assistance; (xii) Cornering Brake Control; (xiii) Precrash Systems;    
(xiv) Laminated Windshields; (xv) Crumple Zone, Anti-Intrusion Bar and Safety Cell Designs; 
(xvi) Vehicle Color; (xvii) Child Seats, and many others.  Furthermore, the risk and expected 
harm of accidents is (obviously) also contingent upon exogenous variables, beyond the control 
of the players, such as road conditions, density of traffic, visibility and weather.200 
Our discussion here is by no means exhaustive, nor is it intended to provide a full 
account of the working of car accidents.  The point to take from here is that the expected harm 
from car accidents is an outcome of multiple variables, and that no one variable is 
singlehandedly responsible for determining the overall level of risk.  The level of care taken by 
a driver is a product of different safety measures working together; of combinations or bundles 
of safety devices, procedures, behaviors and outside settings.  Failure to take this diversity of 
precautions into account is detrimental to any descriptive or normative economic model of 
negligence.  As we shall soon see, the ramifications of such errors can be grave indeed, and 
manifest in a substantial portion of conventional economic scholarship.  
                                                
200 In some cases, these exogenous settings can be reconceptualized as endogenous variables.  That is the case, 
for instance, when players are allowed to alter their route or time of driving, so as to optimize road conditions, traffic 
density and visibility.  We touch upon this point in a following section. 
For more on the overall risk of car accidents see: Injury Prevention and Control: Motor Vehicle Safety, CENTER 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION; in URL: 
http://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/Pedestrian_Safety/factsheet.html and World Health Organization: World Report 







Our car accidents example does more, however, than demonstrate the multidimensional 
structure of negligence puzzles.  It also illustrates an important principle—precautionary 
measures are often substitutional.  When that is the case, equal levels of care can be achieved 
by substituting one precaution, or bundles of precautions, for another, or by increasing the 
intensity (speed, frequency, quality) of one or more precautions to counter a change in the 
intensity of others.201  Within the premise of our example, a combination of driving at 30 miles 
per hour in a 2003 Mazda 6 without airbags or ABS, in a residential zone while talking on the 
phone on a rainy day might create the exact same expected harm as driving at 45 miles per hour 
in a 2013 BMW 3 series convertible with ABS, front, side and knee airbags, electronic stability 
control and ABS, on a highway, on a bright day and after the driver had a vodka gimlet.202 
A famous empirical example of such substitution effect goes back to the 1970’s, with 
the early introduction of seatbelts safety legislation.  Not surprisingly (at least from an 
economic perspective), once the use of seatbelts was mandated, the number of car accidents 
actually—increased, and the drop in expected harm incentivized drivers to drive faster.  What 
is interesting in this example for our purposes here is that, according to one study, the overall 
social harm from car accidents before and after seatbelts were made mandatory was 
approximately the same.  In other words, the anticipated harm resulting from a combination of 
                                                
201 A similar idea is implicit in Cooter and Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others?, 
supra note 24 (binding together the overall risk reduction resulting from seatbelts and the speed of the car).  Note 
however that Cooter and Porat apply a highly constrained analysis, which considered past actions and omissions as 
constraints, and do not discuss the normative implications of optimal and suboptimal combinations of precautions along 
the same isoquant of care, as discussed hereinafter in this part.  
202 To be clear, we make no argument, and one should not be inferred, that the two cases should be adjudicated 
similarly on a normative level.  Nor do we claim that all these variables should be taken into account by a court of law.  







driving with seatbelts at high speed was roughly equal to the harm from driving slow without 
seatbelts.203 
Negligence puzzles are indeed multidimensional and complex.  They do not abide by or 
prescribe to a single dimensionality view.  The conventional single dimensionality paradigm 
therefore fundamentally obscures the true nature and characteristics of most tort problems, and 
more importantly the normative challenges they present and the optimization processes 
required to unlock them.204  As Dari-Mattiacci notes, in a rare recognition of this reality:  
“[E]conomic analyses have disregarded the multidimensional 
nature of precaution and thus have not studied the optimal composition 
of the bundle of precautionary measures that, if taken, amount to 
negligent behavior.”205 
 
Solving negligence puzzles, i.e. setting the legally required level of care or adjudicating 
whether it has been breached, requires multidimensional frameworks and tools.  While this 
does not mean that courts should always take all possible variables into account, it does mean 
that lawmakers must think multidimensionally if they aim to bring about efficient deterrence.206  
We turn our attention now to discuss the basic economic foundations of these frameworks.  
 
                                                
203 Meaning that after seatbelts were made mandatory, there were more accidents, but fewer driver deaths (but 
an increase in pedestrian death rates).  See Sam Peltzman, The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation, 83 J. POL. 
ECON. 677 (1975), noted also in Cooter and Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others?, supra note 
24, at p. 21; and Steven E. Landsburg, THE ARMCHAIR ECONOMIST—ECONOMICS AND EVERYDAY LIFE 3-5 (1993). 
204 The complexities of multidimensionality obviously presents with difficult questions regarding causation, 
which are outside the scope of this work. 
205 Dari-Mattiacci, On the Optimal Scope of Negligence, supra note 22 (Developing a multidimensional 
precaution model, but confining it to the assumptions of orthodox scholarship, such as that the expected accident loss is a 
decreasing and strictly convex function of each of the parties’ precautionary measures and that functions are assumed to 
be continuous and continuously differentiable to any desired order.  Dari-Mattiacci’s model is focused on providing an 
economic rationale to the distinction between “care” and “activity level”, rather than modeling the optimal composition 
of care measures itself).  
206 In some cases, multidimensional thinking would also mean deciding which variables should not be taken into 






b. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION: SUPPLY SIDE THEORY AND 
PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
Care is a product.  It is the outcome of a multiple-input production function.  There is 
perhaps no better way to conceive and model the precaution or “!-side” of the Hand Formula 
than using microeconomic production and cost minimization theory.  Indeed, negligence is 
partially a supply side problem, where tortfeasors can be thought of as manufacturers of care, 
and care levels can be contemplated in terms of precautionary inputs and safety outputs.207  
Oddly enough, existing economic scholarship has largely failed to make this connection, and 
often ignores the innate intricacies of the supply (or precaution) side of the Hand Formula.208  
From this point, our review will follow the footsteps of classic microeconomic 
production theory, and can therefore be discussed with reference to economic literature.  Since 
economic analysis of torts has generally overlooked this aspect of negligence adjudication, and 
specifically the need to look more deeply into how care is produced, our discussion here is also 
intended to lay the foundations for more targeted future research projects.  Such future projects 
ought to focus, for instance, on specific markets, technologies or optimization algorithms.209  
How is microeconomic production theory applicable to negligence law?  To easily 
answer this question, let us take a closer look at the abovementioned car accident example.  For 
                                                
207 In this thesis, we generally view precautions as inputs, precaution levels as the level at which of each 
precaution is taken, care levels outputs as the of taking precautions, which can be represented as isoquant lines of safety 
and due care as a legal standard denoting the line between liability and exemption from liability.  None of these terms 
should be confused with “activity level”, which denotes a distinction between those factors that are taken into account in 
negligence analysis and those that are not, as discussed hereinafter in Part V.  
208 Notable exceptions include, Grady, Response, Another Theory of Insufficient Activity Levels, supra note 163, 
at p. 31 (reviewing the Gilo-Guttel model referenced in supra note 184, while addressing the conventional assumptions 
of “standard production theory”); and Cooter and Porat, Lapses of Attention in Medical Malpractice and Road Accidents, 
supra note 184 (modeling second order precautions using conventional production theory). 
209 For more on cost on optimization calculus and algorithms see Geoffrey A. Jehle and Philip J. Reny 






simplicity, we will limit this early discussion and assume that the expected harm from car 
accidents is a function of only two continuous and likely monotonically convex variables:        
(i) the speed of the car (precaution !), and (ii) the quality or strength of the car brakes 
(precaution !).210  We can use these two variables broadly to represent the technological 
possibilities available to prospective tortfeasors, in a similar way to the use of capital and labor 
in classical economic theory. 
Figure IV.1 illustrates the overall safety output from taking the two input variables, 
using a three-dimensional graph.  It therefore shows the total production function, or hill, of 
care, under certain assumptions soon to be explicated.  
 
                                                
210 As we have already demonstrated, many precautions can be alternatively conceptualized as continuous or 
discontinuous.  For instance, the quality of the car brakes might in fact mean different types of brakes or the product of 
different manufacturers.  For this example, however, we purposefully use continuous variables, so as to specifically 






Figure IV.1: Total Production of Safety Hill211 
 
 
The height of the hill at any point represents the total level of safety produced, as a 
product of ! and !.  Moving at any direction along the hill changes the elevation of the total 
production, or overall safety.212  Starting at any combination of speed and brake quality, we can 
move northward and decrease the speed of the car,213 move eastward and increase the quality of 
brakes or alter both variables and choose a preferred path to traverse. 
Notice that we can use the total production function to examine how the overall output 
would change as a result of alternating only one variable, by holding all other variables 
constant.  Thus, for instance, holding the speed constant at 24 allows us to study the effect of 
                                                
211 Original chart taken from David Besanko and Ronald R. Braeutigam, MICROECONOMICS 192 (2nd ed., 2005) 
(hereinafter: “Microeconomics”).  The economic review in this chapter is largely based on Besanko and Braeutigam, 
Microeconomics, at p. 183-259; Varian Intermediate Microeconomics – A Modern Approach, supra note 108, at pp. 322-
381; and Jehle and Reny, Advanced Microeconomic Theory, supra note 209, at pp. 117-145.   
212 In this example, each precaution abides by the rule of diminishing marginal returns, and at extreme levels 
presents with diminishing total returns.  For instance, it is not unlikely that reducing the speed of a car past a certain 
speed on a highway might actually increase the chances of an accident, and that brakes acceding a certain strength would 
become less safe.  








changes in the quality of brakes on the expected harm at that speed.  Path ABC illustrates this, 
by outlining the effect of changes in the quality of the brakes, assuming a speed of 24. 
The slope of the ABC curve represents the marginal rate of at which care changes as a 
result of altering brake quality while holding the speed constant at 24.  In much the same way, 
we can slice different cross sections of the total production function to perform a constrained 
short-run analysis of the efficiency function of any variable.  More generally, the cross partial 
derivative of any particular variable allows us to represent the rate of changes in safety 
resulting from altering that variable while holding all other variables constant.  It therefore 
allows us to describe the function of one variable under a particular constrained setting.  
We should emphasis, especially at this early stage, that the general layout of a 
production hill is not limited to the shape and figure of the hill we just illustrated.  The layout in 
Figure IV.1 is characteristic to very unique and “clean” settings.  For instance, the shape of this 
total production function is contingent upon the two variables being continuous and 
monotonically concave,214 and on a particular type of relationship between them.  When that is 
not the case, the shape of the production function might vary, and might manifest with 
fluctuating elevations, local gorges and peaks, sudden cliffs and discontinuities, etc.  
We have already explored the results of relaxing the notions of continuity and convexity 
in a single dimensional model in Part III.  As this part will soon reveal, relaxing the 
orthogonality assumption also drastically changes the nature of the production function or hill 
(which might no longer be a “hill” at all), and with it the processes required to perform 
                                                






negligence cost benefit optimization.  At this stage, however, we discuss precautions that are 
generally uncorrelated, and assume different combinations of precautions are not synergetic.215  
 
c. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION: ISOQUANTS, MARGINAL 
RATE OF TECHNICAL SUBSTITUTION AND ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION 
Total production functions can also be represented by isoquants (meaning “same 
quantity” or equal product curves).  Isoquant curves mark all combinations of variables that 
produce a given output or quantity of care.  To go back to our above example, isoquant lines 
will represent the same elevation levels on the production hill, which results from certain 
combinations of car speed and brake efficiency.  Thus, moving along the hill at the same 
elevation (or isoquant) allows us to outline all combinations of precautions that will produce 
the same expected harm from car accidents.  Figure IV.2 illustrates this idea: 
                                                










Figure IV.2 is based on the same total production hill shown in Figure IV.1, but adds 
isoquant lines, signifying identical levels of care.  Thus, points A, B, C, D and E represent 
identical safety levels, produced by different bundles of ! and !.  Much like a topographic map, 
moving along the ABCDE line will not change the elevation or expect harm from car accidents.  
Practically speaking, in our example, a prospective tortfeasor can produce a given level 
of safety by driving fast with excellent brakes, driving slow with low-grade brakes or different 
combination in a continuum between them.  The possibility of such substitutions is 
demonstrated by the fact that the isoquant lines in Figure IV.2 are downward sloping,217 
meaning that the tortfeasor can trade-off one variable for another.  We will discuss alternative 
                                                
216 Original chart taken from Besanko and Braeutigam, Microeconomics, supra note 211, at p. 194. 










cases, where the isoquant lines are upward sloping and backward bending (i.e. lead to 
diminishing total returns) hereinafter, within the context of negative synergies.  
The “steepness” of the isoquant lines illustrates the rate at which substitutions between 
different variables can be achieved.  Just as in classic economic theory, we can call this 
steepness the marginal rate of technical substitution of ! for !, or !"#$!,! (and vice versa).  
This term expresses the rate at which ! can be decreased for every increase in !, holding the 
level of care constant, or, alternatively, the rate at which ! ought to be increased for every 
decrease in !, for the level of care to remain constant.  The !"#$!,! is the (negative) of the 
slop of the isoquant (i.e. the slope of a tangent line to the isoquant) at any particular point.  
Convex isoquant lines, such as the ABCDE line, display a diminishing marginal rate of 
technical substitution.  As we move down along the isoquant line, the marginal rate of technical 
substitution becomes smaller, and the slope of the isoquant becomes less negative.  What this 
means in practicality is that with every decrease in one variable (for instance, an increase in car 
speed), more and more of the opposite variable (brake quality) would be required to maintain 
the same overall level of safety.  We further address this quality and its normative implications 
when discussing different relationships or interactions between variables, specifically in the 
context of overlapping precautions. 
This feature of the marginal rate of technical substitution holds a close relationship to 
the conventional underlying assumption of convexity of efficiency functions, or diminishing 
marginal returns of individual precautions.  The marginal rate of technical substitution of ! for 
!!is equal to the ratio of the marginal efficiency of ! to the marginal efficiency of !.  The 
significance of this ratio is obvious; it allows a player or adjudicator to consider, at any point 






the variables would have a higher impact on overall safety (of course, the efficient short-run 
choice would depend on the relative costs of precautions).  For instance, assuming individual 
precautions yield a diminishing marginal return, upgrading a car’s brakes would have a 
stronger effect on safety for a car driving at high speeds than for a car traveling at low speeds, 
and the marginal rate of technical substitution would be lower at low speeds than for high 
speeds.  
The last term we should define at this stage is elasticity of substitution, usually donated 
! , ! ≥ ! .  Elasticity of substitution marks how quickly the marginal rate of technical 
substitution of ! for ! changes along the isoquant line, or how easily a player can substitute one 
variable for the other.  More specifically, it measures the percentage change in the ! to ! ratio 
for each percent change in !"#$!,! along the isoquant.  If the elasticity of substitution is close 
to zero, there is little opportunity to substitute precautions.  If the elasticity of substitution is 
high, the prospects of substituting precautions are also high.  Thus, elasticity of substitution can 
be utilized by prospective tortfeasors or lawmakers to better understand and analyze 
substitution opportunities in setting the level of due care or devising ways to meet it.  Under 
classic economic assumptions, as one variable is substituted for the second, both the ratio of ! 
to ! and the marginal rate of technical substitution should fall. 
 
d. FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION: COST MINIMIZATION 
PROBLEMS 
Our discussion so far was centered on production functions, and did not address the 






production and costs function together.  Naturally, however, the aim of efficient negligence 
rules is to minimize social costs.  It might therefore be useful to pause here and note a few 
important aspects of substitutions in the context of cost-optimization, and the relations between 
our above discussion and the cost of accidents: 
First, and this is rather obvious, not all combinations of precautions along a particular 
isoquant cost the same.  The overall cost of care is always contingent on the particular cost 
functions of the different precautions, and on the levels or quantities of precautions taken.218  
We can therefore use isocosts to denote the sets of combinations of precautions yielding equal 
costs to the tortfeasor.  While isoquants indicate identical quantities of care, isocost signify 
identical costs.  
Second, and slightly subtler, not all combinations along a particular isoquant are 
necessarily cost-efficient, in the sense that their benefit outweighs their cost.  It is entirely 
possible—indeed common—for one combination of precautions along a certain isoquant to be 
cost-justified, while another combination of precautions along the same isoquant is not.  
Conversely, it is possible for all combinations of precautions along a specific isoquant to be 
cost-justified or not cost-justified.  
Third, when conventional economic assumptions apply, usually only one point along a 
particular isoquant to be optimal, i.e. marks the least expensive combination of precautions 
required to attain a specific level of care.  Under these assumptions, the optimal solution to a 
defendant’s cost-minimization problem occurs at a point where an isoquant is tangent to the 
isocost line (an interior optima), i.e. where the slope of the isocost is equal to the marginal rate 
of technical substitution, or at corner solutions (where taking only one precautions is optimal).  
                                                






Forth, and more generally, it is likely that only a discrete point (or points) along the 
entire production function will be socially optimal, i.e. minimize the total costs of accidents and 
maximize social utility.  That point represents the optimal level of care and the optimal 
combination of care measures that will produce it.  The legally required standard of care might 
diverge from this point, and mandate that the defendant take an overall (minimal) care level on 
a different isoquant, or containing different elements than optimal for the individual 
defendant.219  When the legal standard of care states that a defendant must meet at least a 
specific isoquant of care, and does not derive from an inquiry of a defendant’s individual cost 
functions, technological opportunities and constraints, we can refer to it as exogenous and 
abstract.  
To illustrate these features, consider Figure IV.3, depicting different isoquants along the 
total production function of care (in red) and isocost line (in blue): 
 
                                                
219 Many reasons can contribute to such a discrepancy.  For instance, the various limitations on cost-benefit 
analysis in court settings, discussed above, differences between the defendant’s individual cost function and those of the 
“reasonable man” and specific constraints and opportunities, altering the defendants short-run cost-benefit analysis to 







Figure IV.3: Isoquants and Isocosts of Safety Production220 
  
 
Figure IV. demonstrates the above features we just discussed: 
First, Points !, ! and ! represent different combinations of precautions along the same 
isoquant, resulting in identical levels of expected harm.  They do not, however, share the same 
overall cost.  As the isocosts lines make clear, the overall cost of combination ! is higher than 
the cost of combination !, which in turn is higher than the cost of combination !.  Second, 
while each point along the !"# isoquant represents the maximum level of care a defendant can 
achieve by using the two precautions at their assigned levels, it is possible for only certain 
combinations of precautions along the isoquant (for instance points ! and !) to be cost-
justified, while others (for instance point !) to cost more than the benefit they create (in terms 
                                                









of harm prevention).  Third, only one combination of precautions along the !"# isoquant is 
cost-optimal, in the sense that it minimizes the cost of precautions for that level of care.  That 
combination is denoted by point !, where the marginal rate of technical substitution is tangent 
to the isocost line.  Forth, the different cost-optimal combinations of precautions for each 
isoquant are not necessarily socially optimal.  When the level of socially mandated care is not 
exogenous, it is likely that only discrete points along the entire production function would 
minimize the overall costs of accidents.  For instance, if point ! in Figure IV.3 represents the 
socially optimal level of care, point ! would likely not be socially optimal,221 even though it 
minimizes the cost of precaution along the !"# isoquant.  
The possibility of producing identical levels of care by taking different combinations of 
precautions, at different costs, along a same isoquant creates a decoupling effect between a 
defendant’s overall investment level and his overall level of care.  While the conventional 
model assumes that a defendant’s overall investment level in precaution is synonymous to his 
overall level of care, that correlation dissolves once the prospect of substitutions between 
precautions is introduced.  For this correlation to hold, the defendant must, at the very least, 
take only those combinations of precautions that are cost-optimal for each isoquant, and move 
along the optimal expansion path from one isoquant to the next.222  
As a result, it is entirely possible for a defendant to overinvest in precautions while 
falling short of the socially mandated exogenous level of care.  For instance, assume that the 
socially optimal level of care is represented by point ! on Figure IV.3, and that isoquant !" 
stands at a higher elevation than isoquant !"#.  The defendant now takes the combination of 
                                                
221 But for the unlikely scenario where combinations ! and ! result in identical social costs. 
222 This condition is insufficient against the backdrop of path-dependencies, as address in further length in Part 






precautions marked !.  As the isocost lines illustrate, combination ! is more costly than 
combination !, yet it yields a lower return in terms of safety.  Therefore, if isoquant !" were to 
denote an exogenous level of due care, the defendant would fall short of meeting it (as isoquant 
!"#  is lower than isoquant !"), even though he invested more on care measures than 
optimally required.  
Importantly, Figure IV.3 illustrated that it is entirely possible for a defendant to meet or 
exceed an exogenous duty of care without taking certain (marginally or ex-post) cost-justified 
precautions.  For instance, if the defendant takes the combination of precautions marked !, he 
would (i) meet the exogenous duty of care, as he would take a precaution on the !" isoquant; 
(ii) overinvest in precaution, as the cost of combination ! is higher than the socially optimal 
combination !; and (iii) might still be able to take additional cost-justified precautions, by 
moving north from point !.  We reflect on these issues and the dilemmas they present in detail 
throughout the normative discussions in Part IV. 
 
e. ISOQUANTS AND SUBSTITUTIONS IN CASELAW: THE MIMONI CASE  
Are the abovementioned economic notions and principles exemplified in caselaw?  Are 
they applicable to real-world settings? The answer to that is clearly in the affirmative.  The 
above are more than theoretical reflections—they reflect law in action.   
Substitutable precautionary bundles are omnipresent in negligence law.  In various 
scenarios, prospective tortfeasors may meet or exceed an exogenous and abstract duty of care 
by employing different combinations of precautions.  In various settings, different possible 






it is sometimes impossible, unwise or inefficient for lawmakers to require prospective 
tortfeasors to take specific precautionary measures or specific levels of precautionary means, 
irrespective of other care measures they might take or have taken.223   Whether courts conceive 
the duty of care in abstract or concrete (specific) terms, or endorse a marginal approach, the 
multidimensional nature of care measures cannot be ignored or circumvented if efficient results 
are to be reached.224 
To illustrate these notions, consider the Israeli case of The Jerusalem Municipality v. 
Mimoni.  In this case, a 17 year old boy (Plaintiff) traveled with five of his friends to the 
defendants’ riding ranch, which provided “wild” horse riding experiences, and was severely 
injured when he fell of his horse.  The trial court noted that it was the plaintiff’s first time 
riding a horse, that the horse provided to him was “hot tempered,” and that the riding 
instructions delivered were “short and laconic.”225  The court also found that no helmets were 
issued to the riders, no first aid kit was within reach, no safety instructions were posted on 
warning signs and that the path elected was treacherous, and included “extremely steep 
descents, involving stairs…ending with a scramble designed for galloping.”226  
All in all, the court contemplated the following possible precautions-variables:              
(i) issuing helmets; (ii) posting warning signs; (iii) the length and depth of instruction provided; 
(iv) the riders’ experience; (v) the training and temperament of the horses; (vi) the presence of 
trained medics and a first aid kit; and (vii) the path's degree of difficulty.  Eventually, the 
                                                
223 Our discussion here hints at a hidden divergence between setting the level of care in the abstract (by setting a 
general investment or safety level) and listing specific measures that must be taken at particular levels.  Both approaches, 
in fact, entail specific advantages and disadvantages, which are addressed hereinafter.   
224 Possible interactions between precautions also play a major part here, and are addressed in the following 
section.   
225 Ibid, at paragraph 2. 






Supreme Court found the defendant negligent, and in a decision issued by Chief Justice Barak 
on his last day on the bench, held that:  
“…[A]n operator and instructor of a riding ranch, which does 
not insist on his riders using helmets, and takes them riding without a 
first aid kid which he is trained to use at hand—breaches his duty of 
care towards the riders. An operator and instructor of a riding ranch, 
which matches an untrained rider to a hot-tempered horse, at a 
challenging route, and does not post warning signs that list rules of 
behavior and riding instructions—breaches his duty of care towards the 
riders. An operator and instructor of a riding ranch, which does not 
provide adequate guidance under the circumstances—breaches his duty 
of care.”227 
 
Additionally, the court seemed to have found that failure to provide helmets to riders 
should be considered a breach of duty in and of itself, noting with regards to riding without 
helmets that “[t]he expected harm for the victim is high… the costs of preventing the harm, or 
substantially reducing it, are low, and there is not much public interest in riding without 
helmets.“228 
Interestingly, as is evident from the above excerpt, the Mimoni court was able to rule 
only in the negative, holding that a defendant who fails to take any of the precautions listed in 
                                                
227 Ibid, at paragraph 5.  
228 Ibid, at paragraphs 6-7. The section reads: 
“…[W]e did not overlook the expert opinion provided by [the defendant]… 
according to which it is not customary to wear helmets during Western open-field 
riding, which is the kind of riding pertinent to this case…. 
In evaluating the reasonableness of a particular action, ‘the court ought to 
balance the victim’s interest in personal safety, and the injurer’s interest in freedom of 
action, in light of the public interest in the continuation or secession of that particular 
activity.’… At times, adjudicating the reasonableness of an action is hard. That is the 
case, for instance, when the cost (in terms of utility) of taking precautions is high, and 
the expected harm from the activity is also high. However, in this case, the balancing 
act is easy for us. The expected harm for the victim is high. It might, in some cases, 
present a risk to life itself. On the other hand, the costs of preventing the harm, or 
substantially reducing it, are low, and there is not much public interest in riding 
without helmets. In this state of affairs, we find it easy to rule that the behavior that 






three separate bundles of precautions would be found in breach of duty.  Thus, defendants 
would be found negligent if they: (i) send their customers riding without helmets or a first aid 
kit aid they are trained to use; or (ii) pair an untrained rider with a hot-tempered horse on a 
challenging route without posting warning signs; or (iii) fail to provide adequate guidance 
“under the circumstances.” 
With the possible exception of helmets, discussed in a separate passage, no single 
precaution was found by the Mimoni court to be categorically necessary or sufficient to meet 
the duty of care.  The multidimensional and substitutable nature of the settings rendered Chief 
Justice Barak unable to set a comprehensive (aggregated) list of precautions that future 
tortfeasors would have to apply in order to meet the standard of care, or set an overall duty of 
care in the abstract.229  The same multidimensional feature rendered the court unable to point to 
any single (marginal) precaution, with the possible exception of helmets, defendants must 
always take in order to abide by the duty of care. 
The Mimoni Case therefore illustrates the idea that precautions are characteristically 
multidimensional and substitutable: different variables are frequently intertwined and 
interchangeable in ways that necessitate courts to study and evaluate the nature of negligence 
puzzles far more sincerely than assumed by conventional models.  More technically, Mimoni 
illustrates that different combinations of precautions can be on the same isoquant line, and there 
might be multiple alternative ways to meet an exogenous and abstract duty of care.  Riding a 
hot-tempered horse might be reasonable when the rider is experienced and the route is simple 
to traverse.  Riding on a challenging path might be reasonable after detailed instructions are 
provided, the riders are well trained and medical equipment is nearby, and so forth.  To be 
                                                






effective and convey prescriptive and precedential meaning, a court must often resort to 
discussing bundles of precautions, as the Mimoni court chose to do. 
The coined phrase “under the circumstances”—so often used in caselaw230—is also a 
strong “tell” of a court’s inability to rule on individual precautions, irrespective of others.  The 
Mimoni court could only hold that instructions must be adequate “under the circumstances,” 
because it could not prescribe an a priori level of instruction that would not be contingent upon 
other precautions and settings.231  Similarly, in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., the court 
resorted to find the defendant in breach of duty “[i]n such circumstances,” noting “there is no 
general rule to determine when the absence of a bargee or other attendant will make the owner 
of the barge liable for injuries to other vessels if she breaks away from her morning.”232  
Therefore, through our perspective here, “under the circumstances” should simply be regarded 
as code for a singular piece of a puzzle, a non-demonstrative variable within a multivariable 
framework.  For multidimensional frameworks, definitive duties pertaining only to specific 
precautions are difficult, if not impossible to determine.  
 
f. NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS: EX-ANTE VERSUS EX-POST OPTIMIZATION 
Multidimensional settings also bring a distinctive and chronic normative difficulty to 
surface, which has been generally ignored in tort scholarship.  Due to the substitutable quality 
of different precautions, it is entirely possible—indeed prevalent—for a defendant to meet or 
                                                
230 For a canonical example see Brown v. Kendall, supra note 10 (“In using this term, ordinary care, it may be 
proper to state, that what constitutes ordinary care will vary with the circumstances of the cases.”). 
231 Naturally, the term “circumstances” also includes the risks involved.  Note, however, that whether something 
is considered an exogenous risk or a variable is not always predetermined, and most often reflects policy considerations.  






exceed the socially required level of overall safety while failing to take a specific cost-justified 
(marginal) precaution.233  To use a simple example, a tortfeasor might take one precaution at a 
higher than otherwise optimal level (for instance, in Mimoni, post more warning and guidance 
signs) and offset the effect of taking another precaution at a suboptimal level (for instance, 
providing a shorter than optimal face-to-face instruction).234  The normative question can 
therefore be phrased as follows: should a defendant be found negligent if he fails to take a 
marginally cost-justified precaution on the one hand, but meets or exceeds the otherwise 
socially required (optimal) level of care on the other?235  
In Mimoni, Chief Justice Barak provided two ambiguous and to some extent 
contradictory (or arguably complimentary) answers to this question.236  One ostensible take 
away from this case is that failure to issue helmets to riders always constitutes negligence, 
irrespective of other variables.  Therefore, helmets are always regarded as marginally cost-
justified, notwithstanding any other precautions already taken, and must always be issued 
regardless of the overall expected harm created by the defendant.  Alternatively, Mimoni 
implies that defendants can meet the duty of care by employing alternative combinations of 
precautions, and offset suboptimal variables through increasing the level of others.  This 
suggests that no single precaution (other than perhaps helmets) can be considered marginally 
                                                
233 For our purposes here, assume that the marginal precaution not-taken is cost-justified after other precautions 
have already been taken.  
234 Assume that even after this tradeoff, additional instructions are marginally cost-justified.  As we will soon 
clarify, the ex-ante socially optimal number of signs is a result of a multidimensional optimization process, and cannot be 
performed separately for each variable.  Notice also that the resulting composition of precautions from this offset might 
not be globally optimal in terms of costs, but might reduce the overall expected harm by the same extent nonetheless.  
Finally, sunk costs and past taken actions sometimes render ex-ante suboptimal combinations of precautions 
economically justified from an ex-post perspective.  
235 We assume, for purposes of our discussion here, that the duty of care is exogenous, and simply denotes the 
minimal expected harm deemed socially acceptable and cost-justified while engaging in a certain activity.  
236 The issue of substitution was not explicitly pleaded in Mimoni, but is nonetheless pivotal, I believe, to the 






demonstrative in adjudicating negligence.  We revisit the Mimoni case hereinafter, in the 
context of interacting precautions.237 
Was Mimoni decided correctly?  Is there a more definitive and rigorous answer to this 
normative dilemma?  Recall that we have already discussed a similar notional difficulty in Part 
III, section III.E.b., in the context of non-convex single dimensional social costs functions. 
There, we contemplated whether, and if so when, it would be justified to require a defendant 
who has taken precautions beyond the socially optimal level of care, to “go the extra mile” and 
take an additional marginally cost-justified precaution.  Our answer both there and here is that 
this dilemma has no easy answer, and reflects an innate and unsolvable tension within 
negligence law: 
On the one hand, finding a defendant negligent for failing to take additional cost-
justified precautions creates efficient short-run incentives for the defendant.  After precautions 
have already been taken, conventional economic wisdom would consider them sunk costs, and 
exclude them from future cost-benefit analysis.  When existing conditions are viewed as 
constraints, the socially efficient policy is to require tortfeasors to take ex-post marginally cost-
justified (bundles of) precautions, regardless of their past-taken actions.  Indeed, if a defendant 
had an opportunity to take a cost-beneficial precaution at the time of the accident, and did not 
seize that opportunity, it would seem logical, even commonsensical, to consider him negligent.  
Put figuratively, if a driver is driving at a higher than optimal speed, why should we care that 
he installed superior brakes six months before?238 
                                                
237 This result can also be explained through the workings of overlapping precautions, as explained and 
discussed in Part IV.C.C.ii.    
238 Assume for this example that no statutory speed limit is set, and that driving at a slower speed than actually 
driven is ex-post cost justified.  Assume also that the aggregated risk resulting from the combination of superior brakes 






On the other hand, applying a constrained marginal analysis in a foreseeable manner 
might create inefficient long-run incentives for the defendant, and go against common notions 
of justice.  From a justice perspective, as we have already observed in Part III, a constrained 
approach would make it possible for one defendant to take more precautions than another, 
creating an overall reduced risk of harm, and yet be found liable for not taking a marginally 
cost-justified precaution, while the other defendant is exempt from liability.  Furthermore, it is 
also possible for precautions to become marginally cost-justified solely because the defendant 
has exceeded the socially optimal level of care by his past actions, further exacerbating the 
apparent injustice of placing liability on the defendant in such cases.  
From an efficiency perspective, a purely ex-post approach might distort the defendant’s 
incentive framework by creating an unwanted deterrence against taking extra precautions, 
coupled with a strategic incentive to detrimentally exploit judicial “memoryless” or path-
dependent decision-making algorithms.239  Finally, from the perspective of injured parties, an 
ex-post approach might result in compensating a plaintiff who was subjected to less of a risk 
than an uncompensated plaintiff.240  Such a policy would therefore have some plaintiffs enjoy 
the fruits of a marginal analysis, in a manner that undermines the fabric of our common 
understanding of corrective justice and Aristotelian equality.241  If bilateral precautions are 
assumed, such a policy might also distort the ex-ante incentive framework facing plaintiffs.242  
                                                                                                                                                              
speed.    
239 We further discuss these distorted incentives hereinafter. 
240 Actually compensation would also depend on causation and the manner at which damages are calculated, 
both issues beyond the scope of this work.  
241 On the foundations of corrective justice, see E. J. Weinrib, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (Cambridge, Mass., 
1995). See also Jules Coleman, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL 
THEORY 3-54 (Oxford, 2001). 
242 As already noted, our discussion in this thesis is limited to unilateral precautions, and posits that tort 






Lastly, the possibility of substitutions between different (bundles of) precautions might 
create interesting challenges in the context of joint risk precautions243 and self-risk.  As Cooter 
and Porat eloquently argue, and the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS acknowledged, the 
application of the Hand Formula might be flawed if the self-risk to the defendant is not taken 
into account.244  For instance, in some cases, the “risk-side” of the Hand Formula should 
include not only the risks to others created by driving, but also the possible risks to the driver 
himself.  Thus, if a driver was unable to buckle his seatbelt, he ought to be required to drive 
slower as a result, and not imposing such a duty on him might lead to inefficient deterrence and 
possibly avoidable harm to others.  
Yet, when the possibility of substituting some precautions for others is recognized, and 
the duty of care is thought of as exogenous and abstract, inefficient incentives on the defendant 
might result.  For instance, assume that a driver has two alternatives: (i) reduce the risk to 
others by 30 at a cost of 10; or (ii) take a joint risk precaution that reduces the risk to others by 
20 and the risk to self by 10, at an overall cost of 15.  While the first alternative is socially 
optimal (as it results in social gain of 20 compared to 15 in the second option), setting the duty 
of care in the abstract would induce the driver to choose the suboptimal second option, as it 
would minimize his overall expected expenditure and loss.  More generally, if the duty of care 
is set from an ex-ante perspective in general and abstract terms, and self-risk is “part of the 
game,” a rational defendant might inefficiently minimize self-risk and shift his composition of 
                                                                                                                                                              
the prolific writing regarding bilateral precautions, and the possible inefficient incentives manifested there, see also supra 
note 95.  
243 Meaning precautions that reduce both the risk to others and the self-risk to the defendant.  
244 Cooter and Porat, Does Risk to Oneself Increase the Care Owed to Others?, supra note 24. See also  אריאל







care measures to include more joint risk precautions, at the expense of third parties.  For risk 
averse defendants,245 that possibility is more than likely, and might exacerbate incentives to 
take inefficient (rather than simply suboptimal) precautions.  Additionally, once a defendant 
has overinvested in joint care measures, he might be induced to inefficiently decrease his 
investment in non-verifiable precautions.  For instance, he might be tempted to inefficiently 
search of an object in a car with an automatic braking system and anti-intrusion bar, increasing 
the risk to pedestrians. 
 
g. NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS: VARIABLE SELECTION  
The above tension between short and long-run (or constrained and unconstrained) 
optimization is also closely related to the challenge of variable selection.246  Negligence law 
generally lacks an overarching methodology to distinguish between variables and constraints, 
i.e. adjudicate when a particular action, behavior or omission should be considered a 
“precaution” (variable) or an exogenous setting.  Such a methodology is, however—crucial. 
Anderson accurately captured this lapse by noting: 
 “[T]he economic analysis of tort law has yet to satisfactorily 
answer a critical threshold question: which of the many inputs that 
leads to an accident should be included in a court’s liability 
analysis?”247 
 
                                                
245 For instance, with regards to their bodily integrity. 
246 For a unique piece on variable selection in negligence law see Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable 
Selection, supra note 22.  See also Feldman and Kim, The Hand Rule and United States v. Carrol Towing Co. 
Reconsidered, supra note 20.  For a related discussion regarding the distinction between activity level and care measure 
see Part V.F.  
247 Anderson, ibid, at pp. 255, 282 (similarly stating, “Surprisingly, there has been relatively little effort to 
address the general issue of accident input inclusion in the literature” and “Without an answer to this question, the 
economic analysis of tort law yields indeterminate prescriptions.”).  See also Dari-Mattiacci, On the Optimal Scope of 






To make things concrete, consider the gratis dictum from the famous case of Brown v. 
Kendall: “A man, who should have occasion to discharge a gun, on an open and extensive 
marsh, or in a forest, would be required to use less circumspection and care, than if he were to 
do the same thing in an inhabited town, village, or city.”248  When should a man’s surroundings 
be considered exogenous setting, and when should they be viewed as a variable under his 
control?  Similarly, to go back to the facts of Mimoni, reflect on a rider’s experience, the 
temperament of a horse or a riding path’s degree of difficulty—should they be considered as 
variables under the control of the tortfeasor, or should they be regarded constraints in the 
optimization process?  Is a car’s model or type of airbags an exogenous risk to balance, or a 
precaution to be efficiently adjusted?  
This deconstructive distinction bears great practical importance, and manifests in almost 
every negligence case.249  Sadly, the difficulties associated with making this determination 
cannot be universally and conclusively resolved by answering any single question, such as 
whether sufficient time has pass since an action has been taken (for something to transition 
from an exogenous to endogenous variable), is a past action changeable or what are the costs of 
changing it.  To elucidate the impact of variable selection in real world settings, consider a 
simple example loosely based on the facts of Mimoni:  
A global ex-ante optimal combination of precautions consists 
of, among others, posting 4 signs and providing a 20 minute instruction 
session. A riding ranch posted 6 signs in the past, instead of only 4, 
each including rules of behavior usually delivered during instruction. 
                                                
248 Brown v. Kendall, supra note 10. 
249 For yet another famous case tacitly contemplating this issue, see Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Adams v. 
Bullock, 227 N.Y. 208, 125 N.E. 93 (1919) (de-facto considering whether an overhead trolley was an exogenous 
circumstance under the defendant’s franchise, or was it an endogenous risk, noting that “neither [the defendant’s] power 






An accident occurs the following month. What should be the standard 
of care at the time of the accident? 
 
 One possible answer is to consider the 6 signs posted by the ranch as constraints, and 
apply an ex-post cost benefit analysis.  In this case, it could be that only a 15-minute face-to-
face instruction session (rather than 20) would be sufficient to meet the duty of care.  The other 
option is to consider the number of signs as a variable.  In that case, the judicial ruling would 
depend on the optimization process applied by the court, and be contingent on questions such 
as: are variables optimized separately or in conjunction?  Are individual variables optimized 
assuming all other variables are taken at the ex-ante socially optimal level, or does the court 
measure only of the overall safety outcome?  We address these issues in further depth 
hereinafter, in Part V.  For now, it will suffice to say that each choice entails unique gains and 
shortcomings, once again reflecting conflicting values and an innate tension between 
constrained and unconstrained optimization in torts.  
Notice also that the distinction between variables and constraints might also affect other 
legal aspects of negligence adjudication.  For instance, while endogenous variables are subject 
to the statute of limitations and the statute of repose—exogenous settings are not.  Therefore, 
when something is classified as an endogenous variable, the plaintiff is able to argue breach of 
duty with regards to it, but such a claim might be subject to the statute of limitations.  Thus, for 
instance, if a defendant has made a suboptimal choice in the far past,250 and additional 
precautions cannot be presently added, the defendant would be exempted from liability for his 
suboptimal past choice in light of the statute of limitations, and no cause would be found for 
placing blame on him in the present.  Alternatively, when a past action or omission is classified 
                                                






as exogenous, the plaintiff will not be able to claim negligence with regards to it, and the 
defendant might not able to invoke the statute of limitations with regards to it.251  The 
defendant in this case would be subject to a constrained analysis, which might in some cases 
prove detrimental to his position.  For example, if the defendant has overinvested in precautions 
in the far past, and as a result his current setting allows for an additional precaution to be 
efficiently added, he might be found in breach of duty.   
  
h. NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS: RULES VERSUS STANDARDS REGULATION 
Our discussion above also reveals an additional hidden dilemma pertaining to 
negligence standards, which can be defined as follows: to what extent should courts prescribe 
specific precautionary measures, and to what extent should they set the minimal level of care in 
the abstract.  Assuming the expected harm from an activity is exogenous and known,252 when 
should negligence law regulate parties’ behavior by directly stipulating specific precautions 
that must be taken, not-taken or be taken at particular levels, and when should law provide 
room for the market to decide how to meet the duty of care? 
The dilemma in this case resonates with a known divide between rules and standards in 
the context of regulation.253  On the one hand, directly prescribing specific and concrete rules 
of behavior introduces certainty to the market, reduces judicial costs and enables efficient 
                                                
251 The actual application of the statutes of limitations in negligence substantially differs between jurisdictions, 
based on such issues as whether the time the damages accrued, the breach of duty occurred or any of them or the 
causation between them becomes known or reasonably accessible to the plaintiff.  
252 This assumption is not trivial, and we use it for it for limited purposes here.  
253 For a related discussion of the merits of regulation versus tort law see Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm 
Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357 (1984); Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation Versus Post Liability: 
The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 193 (1977); and Susan Rose-Ackerman, 
Regulation and the Law of Torts, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 54 (1991).  See also Issacharoff and Witt, The Inevitability of 






enforcement.  It may also lead to efficient market standardization, induce technological 
development to meet said standardization and reduce the costs of individual information 
seeking and of performing cost-benefit analyses. 
On the other hand, regulating through prescribing abstract duties allows for greater 
flexibility in judicial decision-making, is better adapted to adjudication in an environment of 
technological changes and provides room for judges to tailor judgments to specific conditions.  
Importantly, regulating in general terms recognizes the market’s superior ability to take 
individual cost functions, efficiency functions and constraints into account, and allows parties 
to choose between substitutable precautions and alternative bundles of precautions. 254  
Moreover, and directly related to this thesis, it can grant courts more leeway to address 
inefficient strategic behaviors taken by players.  
Finally, and this is indeed a pivotal part of our discussion, the above difficulties might 
render the current formulation of the marginal approach naïve at best, and harmful at worst.  
The marginal approach’s reputation as a golden standard in economic scholarship largely 
results from an equivalency assumption, that routinely applying the marginal approach will 
lead to socially optimal solutions, identical to the ones reached by an aggregated analysis.  Yet, 
as we have just illustrated, the marginal approach cannot guarantee socially optimal results 
against the backdrop of multidimensional and substitutable precautions.  At the very least, 
therefore, one should cast doubt on the applicability of the marginal approach to all settings, 
and its ability to generate efficient incentives in myriad scenarios.  Our next section further 
explores why and how.   
                                                
254 There is a middle ground between the two.  For instance, a court may consider some precautions substitutable 
(such as in our above example, providing face-to-face instructions and warning signs) while declining to consider others 






C. THE ORTHOGONATLITY AND PREDETERMINCY ASSUMPTION  
 
a. GENERAL FRAMEWORK AND TAXONOMY 
Our discussion so far neglected to address a crucial element.  Simply adopting a 
multidimensional view of the precaution side of the Hand Formula is not enough.  Once 
precautions are understood to be multidimensional, the relationship between different 
precautions (or dimensions) must also be explored.  
Under the conventional model, precautions are assumed to be single dimensional.  To 
the extent a variety of precautions is recognized (for instance, when they are commensurated 
along a single !  axis), 255  the conventional model tacitly assumes that precautions are 
orthogonal, and that the (i) possible scope of precautions; (ii) overall efficiency of care; and 
(iii) marginal efficiency of each precaution, are not path-dependent.256  When that is the case, 
precautions can be ranked and sorted in perfect order based on predetermined qualities, and 
represented as if they were of one type or dimension.  Our above discussion, however, never 
made any of these assumptions. 
In reality, taking one precaution almost always impacts the marginal efficiency of 
others.  Precautions are correlated.  Their marginal efficiency is contingent on one another.257  
                                                
255 As already noted, that is the case when a general “precaution level” or “investment in precautions level” is 
modeled.  
256 As we shall see, these assumptions are critical for the orthodox application of the marginal approach and the 
conventional model.  Interestingly, Grady’s original analysis of the Hendricks Case also hides this notion (see Grady, 
Discontinuities and Information Burdens, supra note 1 and Table 1 above).  To see this, notice that the precautions 
already taken by the defendant in Hendricks were termed “actual” by Grady, and considered sunk costs and preexisting 
constraints.  It is possible, however, that that marginal efficiency of the fence, barricades, lifeguards and signs would 
have been different if the prior (“actual”) precautions were not taken, or even that the long-run social optimum would 
have been different under if preexisting precautions were not viewed as constraints.  
257 Though not as common, it is also possible for cost-functions to be codependent.  This is the case when the 
cost of taking one precaution is linked to the level of other precautions.  The resulting effects are similar to various 
effects of interactions between precautions discussed hereinafter.  For a related example in the nuisance context, see 






Once a particular precaution is taken, it inevitably affects the efficiency, desirability and 
normative necessity of taking an additional (marginal) precaution.  When that is the case, and it 
nearly always is, the principal question of negligence law ought not be “what is the optimal 
level of different precautions?” but rather “what is the optimal combination of different 
precautions?”258  
Indeed, the optimal level of each precaution within a multidimensional framework is 
rarely axiomatic or independently attainable, and cannot be predetermined irrespective of other 
precautions.  Predetermincy is a quality found only in the rare occasions where the marginal 
efficiency of a precaution does not change with any and all alterations of other precautions.  
More technically, it requires that the cross partial derivative of a certain variable be identical 
under any and all conditions and under all degrees of freedom employed in the analysis.259  The 
conventional predetermincy assumption, which lays the foundations for the constrained 
marginal approach by undertaking that the marginal efficiency of precautions is not path-
dependent—is therefore hardly ever factually true.  
Interactions between precautions are conceivably the most prevalent reason why so 
many tort cases resist easily applicable marginal solutions, and perhaps the principal hurdle to a 
constrained optimization of real-life tort puzzles.  Understanding the different types and ways 
precautions may interact is therefore normatively and practically imperative.  Yet, faced with 
                                                                                                                                                              
Sewer Service District, 965 P.2d 433 (Or. Ct. App. 1998), where the court took notice of defendant’s past strategic 
investment aimed to augment prevention costs, and subsequently ruled for the plaintiff despite short-run considerations to 
the contrary). 
258 This conclusion is generally true for both constrained and unconstrained analyses method.  
259 Notice that it is insufficient for an efficiency function of one variable to be unaffected by isolated changes in 
other variables.  For the predetermincy assumption to hold, the efficiency function of any variable must not be affected 
by changes in any and all combinations of all other variables.  It is possible for the marginal efficiency of a particular 
variable (!) to be unaffected by changes in variable ! and unaffected by changes in variable !, yet react to cumulative 






this challenge, legal theory has thus far failed to develop an adequate vocabulary to describe 
and categorize such interactions. Indeed, it never truly conceded they exist.260  
The dissertation suggests such a taxonomy of relationships between variables on the “B-
side” of the Hand Formula, and distinguishes between the following:  
(i) Independent (orthogonal or uncorrelated) precautions: precautions with marginal 
efficiency functions that are unaffected by changes in the other precautions.  
Perfectly substitutive precautions, discussed hereinafter, are a subset of this 
category, where the elasticity of substitution is infinite (! = ∞); 
(ii) Complementary precautions: precautions that require a fixed ratio between them 
for each care level, and do not allow for substitutions (! = !);  
(iii) Mutually exclusive precautions: precautions that exclude one another, so that 
taking one precaution prevents the application of another.  Exclusion might also 
exhibit only in certain ranges or be contingent on exogenous conditions; and 
(iv) Interacting precautions, which are further divided between: 
a.  Negatively synergetic interactions (precautions): a type of interaction 
between precautions that results in a decrease in total returns; i.e. where the 
total product of safety for a particular combination of precautions is smaller 
than that of a subset of the same combination.  
b. Overlapping interactions (precautions): a type of interaction between 
precautions that results in a reduction of marginal returns, i.e. where the total 
product of safety for a particular combination of precautions is smaller than 
                                                
260 The conventional literature extensively deliberates, however, interacting precautions in the context of multi-







the aggregated benefits of the same precautions, had they been taken 
individually; and 
c.  Positively synergic interactions (precautions): a type of interaction between 
precautions that results in an increase of marginal returns, i.e. where the total 
product of safety of a particular combination of precautions is higher than 
the aggregated benefits of its subparts, had they been taken individually; 
When the world is seen, as it is—a convoluted tapestry of multidimensional 
interactions—negligence law presents new and unanticipated challenges.  For most of these 
challenges, defaulting to a constrained and myopic marginal analysis is ill advised and 
frequently harmful.  More specifically, each type of interaction might lead to different 
inefficiencies, suboptimal results and strategic behaviors as a consequence of the misguided 
application of the marginal approach.  The following sections address these consequences in 
detail, and provide further examples. 
 
b. INDEPENDENT, COMPLEMENTARY AND MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE 
PRECAUTIONS 
The first three types of relationships between precautions—independent, 
complementary and mutually exclusive—can be discussed here in brief, as they are not all that 
frequent, and present with few normative difficulties compared to other types of interactions.  
The effects and workings of these relationships are similar to the results derived by the 






i. INDEPENDENT PRECAUTIONS 
Independent precautions, which can also be termed orthogonal or uncorrelated 
precautions, are characterized by marginal efficiency functions that are not affected by changes 
in the level of other precautions.  To give a concrete example, the marginal efficiency of knee 
airbags is probably unaffected by the installation of head or side airbags.261  The individual 
efficiency function of each precaution can be of any type, and may display decreasing, 
increasing, constant or fluctuating marginal returns—so long as that function is unaffected by 
changes in the other variables.  Under the conventional model, precautions are assumed to be 
convex and independent, which allows for the predetermincy assumption.  
Orthogonal precautions can be substitutable, in the sense that increasing the level of one 
precaution can offset a decrease in the level of the other, and display altering technical rates of 
marginal substitution (again so long as the marginal efficiency of each precaution is not 
affected by another).  Furthermore, a particular precaution can be orthogonal with respect to 
one precaution, and interact with (or be affected by) changes in another precaution.  For 
example, while the marginal efficiency of knee airbags might not be affected by the installation 
of other types of airbags, it might be very responsive to changes in the speed of the car. 
Perfect substitutions are a special case of independent precautions.  Perfectly 
substitutable precautions are characterized by a constant marginal rate of technical substitution 
of one precaution for another, and therefore result in linear downward-sloping isoquant lines 
(since the !"#$!,!  reflects the slope of the isoquant).  When they occur, the marginal 
                                                
261 For instance, if we assume that any particular accident can thrust the driver in either a front-and-upward 
trajectory (towards the windshield, where the front airbag is located), a front-and-downward trajectory (towards the 
pedals, where the knee airbag is located) or a side trajectory (towards the door, where the side airbag is located).  In this 






efficiency of each precaution is not affected by changes in other precautions.  Because the 
marginal rate of technical substitution does not change along the isoquant, the elasticity of 
substitution for perfect substitutions is infinite (! = ∞),262 so that different inputs (precautions) 
are infinitely (perfectly) substitutable.   
 
ii. COMPLEMENTARY PRECAUTIONS 
Complementary precautions illustrate a dramatically different case than perfect 
substitutions, and offer no possibility of substitution.  To give a concrete example, medical 
personnel and first aid kits, mentioned in Mimoni, can be considered complementary, if we 
assume that only medics can work first aid kits, but that they cannot offer medical help without 
them (meaning that a 1:1 ratio between first aid kits and medics is required).  Similarly, as each 
horse rider requires exactly one helmet and two elbow pads, a riding ranch would not be able to 
substitute helmets for elbow pads.  The ratio between the two precautions would have to be 
constant (in this case, 1:2), and additional helmets or elbow pads beyond that ratio would not 
create any additional care.  Complementary precautions exhibit a fixed-proportion production 
function, where the overall production of safety is set by !"#!(!", !").263  
For complementary precautions, isoquant lines are parallel to the ! and ! axes, with the 
“knee” or corner of the isoquants marking the optimal (fixed) ratio of precautions.  The 
elasticity of substitution for complementary precautions is zero (! = !), because the marginal 
rate of technical substitution of ! for ! changes from ∞ to 0 at the corner (“knee”) of the 
                                                
262 Because the percentage of change in !"#$!,!  is in the denominator of the definition of elasticity of 
substitution.  






isoquant, and the tortfeasor has no flexibility to substitute amongst precautions.   
Complementary precautions may analytically be viewed as a special case of positively 
synergetic precautions, as (at certain rations) an increase in the level of one precaution would 
positively affect the marginal efficiency of the other.  We discuss positive synergies in a 
subsequent section.  
 
iii. MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE PRECAUTIONS 
Mutually exclusive precautions, our final category here, are characterized by mutual 
rejection, where taking one precaution precludes the tortfeasor from taking another.264   For 
instance, if different kinds of wheel-tiers are conceived as different types of precautions (rather 
than one vector precaution), than once a particular brand and making of tier is chosen, it 
precludes all other kinds of tiers from being installed on the same car. 
Analytically, mutually exclusive precautions can be considered a special case of 
overlapping precautions, where taking one precaution reduces the marginal efficiency of the 
other to zero.  They are not a subset of complementary precautions, as exclusive precautions 
offer the possibility of substitution between variables—they simply cannot be taken in 
conjunction.  Mutual exclusions may present only for certain ranges or levels of individual 
precautions, or be contingent on exogenous conditions. 
 
                                                
264 Mutually exclusive precautions sometimes present interesting challenges in determining causation, which are 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  The normative complexities associated with them are reviewed within the context of 






c. “NO PRECAUTION IS AN ISLAND”: INTERACTING PRECAUTIONS  
Precautions interact.  Their efficiency is nearly always correlated.  This is an almost 
self-evident fact of life.  Taking one precaution usually changes the marginal efficiency of 
another.265  When interactions occur, two plus two will not necessarily equal four.  It could 
equal three or five or even one.266 
While our above discussion regarding the multidimensionality and predetermincy 
assumptions tacitly assumed precautions are orthogonal and substitutable (in the simple sense 
that isoquant lines are downward-sloping), the discussion here relaxes that assumption in favor 
of a more realistic one.  The following will review three basic categories of interactions 
between different precautions: negative synergies, overlaps and positive synergies.  As we 
show, each category manifests with distinctive characteristics, explicated by differences in their 
impact on the overall shape of the production function, the shape of the isoquant lines, the 
marginal rate of technical substitution and the elasticity of substitution.  
What is common to all interaction categories is this—applying the marginal approach is 
generally inadequate or of limited value.  In the everyday scenario of interacting precautions, a 
marginal constrained analysis might lead to false positive and vise versa—finding no liability 
where one should exist, and finding liability where it should not be found.267  Worse still, 
following the marginal approach might incentivize assorted inefficient or suboptimal behaviors 
                                                
265 These interactions can affect the expect risk (!), expected damage (!) or both. 
266 To use our terminology, an outcome of three would reflect overlaps, an outcome of five would reflect 
positive synergies and an outcome of one would reflect negative synergies.  When precautions are orthogonal, the 
outcome in this example would be four.  
267 The later cases, where the marginal approach will err in favor of the plaintiff, might result from temporal 
changes and interactions between different players in bilateral precaution settings, as discussed by Guttel, The (Hidden) 
Risk of Opportunistic Precautions, supra note 39.  Guttel’s model only addresses strategic scenarios between two or 






by strategic players.  In those cases, the golden standard of negligence fails on a fundamental 
level.  
In a nutshell, when parties know at the ex-ante stage that they will only be subjected to 
a short-run review in the future, so that a future trier would likely consider their current actions 
constraints, their ex-ante incentives scheme changes dramatically.  Specifically, prospective 
defendants might be tempted to make socially suboptimal or even inefficient choices, designed 
to best situate them to face a future marginal review.  From a social policy perspective, this 
distorted incentive structure might be highly harmful.  Repeatedly applying a short-run 
analysis, and making strategic choices designed to “outsmart” a constrained and myopic 
judicial review, is likely to increase long-run social costs.  When tortfeasors repeatedly fail to 
make necessary long-run plans, and constantly attempt to maneuver their way into a more 
favorable ex-post position, society as a whole is likely to incur higher costs than if a more 
sensitive (and sensible) approach was applied by courts.  Consider the following simple 
vignette:  
A doctor deliberates between two tests for a patient, a CT and 
an MRI.  Both tests are cost-efficient when taken alone, i.e. their costs 
are smaller than their respective expected benefits.  However, sending 
the patient to both tests is inefficient, in the sense that the marginal 
benefit of a second test, be it CT or MRI, will not justify its cost.268  
Assume also that the CT test is cheaper, but an MRI test is more 
effective to that patient and will yield a higher social benefit.269 
Under these circumstances, which test would the doctor choose?  
 
                                                
268 In this example, the depreciation in the marginal benefit of the second test, CT or MRI, is a result of an 
overlap with the first test, as discussed hereinafter.  






While the MRI is clearly the socially preferable choice, applying the marginal approach 
to this example is likely to incentivize the doctor to opt for the less desirable yet cheaper CT 
test.  To see this, recall that the marginal approach does not review past taken actions anew, 
and considers them sunk costs.  It only examines whether, under a preexisting state of 
constraints, the defendant could have taken a single additional cost-justified precaution.  
Knowing this, the doctor should realize that no liability would follow from choosing one test 
over the other, as long as one of the tests is eventually performed.  Having been left with a de-
facto choice between performing a CT or an MRI, a rational doctor should choose the least 
expensive test, in this case the socially suboptimal CT.270 
If the doctor in this vignette was faced with an additional (third) course of action, for 
example an X-ray test, the number of possible alternative bundles of precautions would more 
than double, with each additional possible test exponentially increasing the number of possible 
permutations of tests.271  As more and more possible combinations of tests are introduced, 
discovering the unconstrained ex-ante (or long-run) optimal solution will become progressively 
more difficult, and require more elaborate optimization methods.  As Part VI will explain, such 
optimization methods inevitably necessitate multiple factors and degrees of freedom to be 
taken into account.  For instance, they may require comparing various combinations of 
precautions the defendant could have taken and for sunk costs and omissions that occurred in 
the past to be contemplated or ignored.  As this thesis claims, “perfect” optimization is 
                                                
270 In reality, courts have found ways to impose liability in such cases, and in the above example might find the 
choice of a CT test over an MRI in breach of duty.  However, such a ruling does not derive from a strict application of 
the marginal approach, and supports the claim that the marginal approach is unfit to optimize most real-life cases.  
271 When only two alternatives are possible, the possible courses of actions are: MRI, CT and MRI and CT.  
When an X-ray test is also available, the possible sets of alternatives are: MRI, CT, X-ray, MRI and CT, MRI and X-ray, 
CT and X-ray and CT, MRI and X-ray separately (assuming no test can be taken more than once and that the order of 
tests is inconsequential with respect to the resulting overall care).  When the order of tests is significant, and tests can be 






practically impossible even under an everyday level of complexity, and will inevitably involve 
conflicting restraints between short-run and long-run incentives.  The marginal approach, with 
its short-termed focus and limited review, will almost surely fall short of achieving efficient 
results in most scenarios. The following sections address why in more detail.  
 
i. NEGATIVE SYNERGIES  
1) ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 
Negative synergies reduce the overall benefit derived from a specific set of precautions 
when compared to a subset of the same precautions.  When they occur, taking certain 
precautions has a detrimental impact on the overall efficiency of care measures.  Economically 
speaking, negative synergies denote a case where adding a particular precaution (or increasing 
its level) results in a negative marginal return, or diminishing total return.  
Looking at a three-dimensional production space, negative synergies between 
precautions can manifest in inversions from upward-sloping to downward-sloping statures (or 
local “gorges” in a production “hill”), increases in the steepness of a downward-sloping 
segment of the production hill or a cross-section of it, and an increase in the distance between 
isoquant lines.  The exact manner and boundaries of these presentations naturally depends on 
the terms and constraints of each production function.  
When isoquants are drawn based on an overall production function, negative synergies 
can be indicated by upward-sloping and backward-bending isoquant lines.  When isoquants 
lines are upward-sloping and backward-bending, an increase in the level of one precaution will 
decrease the overall level of safety, holding other variables constant.  Conversely, decreasing 






of safety production constant would require an increase of one or more variables in order to 
compensate for the diminishing total return resulting for the increase of the other variable.  We 
can call this type of negative synergies “one directional,” as they allow for the detrimental 
effect of increasing one variable to be countered by an increase in other variables.  
The regions on the total production function with upward-sloping and backward-
bending isoquants can be defined as uneconomic regions of production.  A tortfeasor operating 
in uneconomic regions of care production will always produce safety at a suboptimal cost, and 
as we shall soon demonstrate will be found in breach of duty by a marginal adjudication 
process, despite possibly overinvesting in precaution.272  Figure IV.4 illustrates this case, 
marking uneconomic regions of safety in yellow.   
                                                
272 Recall that substitutions between precautions often result in a decoupling between investment and precaution 







Figure IV.4: Uneconomic Regions along a Total Production of Safety Function273 
  
The scenario illustrated in Figure IV.4 is common for precautions exhibiting 
monotonically diminishing marginal returns.  As marginal returns diminish, their contribution 
to care might turn negative, and have a detrimental effect on overall safety.  The upward-
sloping or backward-bending section of the isoquant lines represent exactly that case, where an 
increase in the level of one variable past a particular point becomes harmful.  
Alternatively, some negative synergies do not allow for any increase in the level of one 
variable to be countered by an incremental increase in the other, so that taking a certain 
precaution (or an increase in its level) would generally mark a diminution of the total output of 
care.274  We can call this type of negative synergies “two directional,” as they do not allow for 
the detrimental effect of increasing one variable to be countered by an incremental change in 
                                                
273 Original chart taken from Besanko and Braeutigam, Microeconomics, supra note 211, at p. 198. 







other variables.  When such negative synergies occur, a particular level of care cannot be 
maintained as long as at least one of the precautions is not removed or decreased in level.275  
Such a presentation is usually unrelated to diminishing marginal returns, and derives from some 
adverse or conflicting interaction between two precautions.276  
Regardless of the type of negative synergy, it is important to note that negative 
synergies can manifest anywhere along the production surface, not only on the extremities of 
the isoquant lines.  Negatively synergies are often case-specific, and can be highly contingent 
on a particular alignment of variables.  Precautions that result in diminishing total returns when 
taken in conjunction may not be inefficient when taken alone, together with other precautions, 
at other levels or under different external circumstances.  It is perfectly possible—perhaps even 
common—for a precaution or set of precautions to be marginally efficient in one setting, yet 
harmful in another.  
 
2) NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS 
Negative synergies result in distinct normative challenges to negligence adjudication, 
and place considerable strain on the legal system’s ability to craft efficient solutions in myriad 
settings.  In the following, we address the normative implications of negative synergies in the 
negligence context.  For clarity, our discussion will be divided between two perspectives:         
(i) Production of care in uneconomic regions; and (ii) distorted ex-ante incentives on the 
tortfeasor.  
                                                
275 If the negative synergy is limited to a specific segment of cross sections, a non-incremental increase in the 
level of one precaution might increase the overall production of care, depending on the shape of the production function.  
For functions with more than two variables, this the result will obviously depend on all variables and their correlations.  
276 For instance, certain drugs can not only contradict each-others’ positive effects, but also come together in a 







Uneconomic Regions of Care Production  
Producing care in uneconomic regions of production might entail disconcerting 
implications.  Specifically, operating in these regions will necessarily result in the—by now 
familiar—normative tension between short-run and long-run optimization methods, and will 
always brands the defendant negligent from a marginal perspective.  Consider the following 
example, based on Figure IV.4: 
A defendant is operating at point ! , which is on the 
uneconomic region of production of isoquant !".  The socially optimal 
combination of precautions is !, which is on the !"# isoquant.  The 
level of care produced on isoquant !" is higher than the level of care 
produced on isoquant !"#.  The marginal cost of all precautions is 
assumed to be positive and constant or strictly increasing.  
How would the two basic approaches to negligence 
adjudication consider this case? 
 
From a marginal ex-post perspective, the defendant operating at point ! would be 
considered in breach of duty.  To easily see why, notice that the defendant can efficiently 
reduce the level of precaution ! from point ! to at least the beginning of the uneconomic region 
of production (marked level 24).  Since this change would have increased the overall level of 
care while decreasing its cost of precaution !, it would necessarily be marginally cost-justified.  
More generally, we can state, based on this example, that a defendant operating in uneconomic 
regions of production would always be found in breach of his duty of care if a marginal 
approach is applied, without need to specifically calculate the actual costs and benefits of all 
options.277  The normative implications of this finding, however, might be highly problematic.  
For instance, in our example, the defendant will be found negligent even though he 
                                                






overinvested in precaution and actually produced a higher level of overall safety than required 
by the exogenous duty of care (and more safety than produced by other defendants who would 
be found not negligent).  
From an aggregated ex-ante perspective, a defendant operating at point ! would not be 
found in breach of duty, as he exceeded the socially mandated level of care.  To see this, notice 
that isoquant !" marks a higher level of care than the socially mandated minimum, marked by 
isoquant !"# .  However, applying the aggregated approach to this case would produce 
inefficient short-run incentives on the defendant, and would not induce him to take marginally 
cost-justified precautions once the overall level of care exceeded the socially required 
minimum.  While that should not be too alarming in uneconomic regions of production (where 
a reduction in the level of one precaution would be Pareto efficient and should already be in the 
defendant’s interest), 278  recall that marginal ex-post improvements are often possible in 
economic regions of production, not only in non-economic ones, when suboptimal 
combinations of precautions are taken by the defendant.  Therefore, a defendant operating in 
non-economic regions of production or taking suboptimal combinations of precautions might 
not make cost-efficient alterations as a result of the application of an aggregated negligence 
standard  (as such alterations would require him to make Kaldor-Hicks efficient investments 
without internalizing their benefit).279  
 
                                                
278 In the sense that they increase both the defendant’s expected gain and social utility.   






Distorted ex-ante Incentives on the Tortfeasor 
Applying the marginal approach against the backdrop of negative synergies may also 
incentivize value destroying strategic behaviors, resulting from distorted ex-ante incentives on 
the defendant.  When this occurs, suboptimal and inefficient long-run results are highly likely.  
To illustrate, consider Table 2, based on the Hendricks Case discussed in Part I: 
 
Table 2: Negative Synergies and Distorted ex-ante Incentives on the Tortfeasor 
Precaution Level Cost Risk (PL) Risk Decrease  Social Cost 
Actual  10,000 50,000 -- 60,000 
Lifeguards  45,000 10,000 40,000 65,000 
Fence 14,000 20,000 30,000 44,000 
Barricades  10,000 30,000 20,000 50,000 
Fences + Barricades 24,000 22,000 28,000 56,000 
 
In this example, the table values remain exactly as they were in Grady’s original 
argument.  We assume, however, that placing signs is no longer possible, and that there is a 
negative synergy between the fence and the barricades.  To make this scenario more realistic, 
imagine—based on the Hendricks storyline—that teenagers wishing to enter the flooded mine 
move the barricades and use them to climb over the fence.  Placing barricades would therefore 
diminish the efficiency of the fence: while the fence alone reduces the risk by $30,000, adding 
barricades to it results in an overall risk reduction of only $28,000.  Although both the fence 






optimal, as it reduces the social cost to a minimum ($44,000).  Applying both precautions is not 
optimal.  
Under these conditions, once barricades have been set up, adding a fence to it is no 
longer cost-justified, as it will reduce the risk by $8,000 ($28,000-$20,000) at a cost of 
$14,000.  Conversely, once a fence is built, adding barricades will not be cost-justified, and in 
fact will increase the risk by $2,000 ($30,000-$28,000) at a social cost of $10,000.  As a result, 
if a marginal constrained analysis is employed, after barricades are in place a defendant will not 
be considered negligent for not adding a fence, and after a fence is built a defendant will not be 
considered negligent for not adding barricades.  Knowing this in the ex-ante stage, a 
prospective defendant would be left with a de-facto choice between building a fence or setting 
up barricades.  A strategically minded defendant is therefore likely to pick the least expensive 
precaution, and in this example set up barricades rather than building the socially optimal 
fence.  
Perhaps it would be helpful to further illustrate the tortfeasor’s options and incentive 
scheme using an extensive-form decision tree.  This decision tree shows all possible moves and 
choices a tortfeasor faces at each decision point.  The number of leaf-nodes represent the 
number of outcomes in which the game can end.  As we assume a complete and deterministic 
model, it is possible to “solve” the game using simple backward induction, or retrograde 
analysis.  Our implied contention here is that negligence models ought to regularly use 
extensive-form decision trees to describe and solve unilateral precaution puzzles, let alone 
bilateral precaution puzzles, and that not doing so reflects the conventional model’s misguided 
disregard of interacting precautions and path dependencies in sequential settings.280  
                                                






Figure IV.5 illustrates the basic ex-ante decision tree facing the defendant in this 
example. The numbers on non-leaf nodes represent the move number the defendant takes.  The 
first number in parentheses on leaf nodes represents the overall cost of precautions, and the 
second number in parenthesis represents the liability the defendant expects when taking the 
preceding tree-branch.  For simplicity, we assume that lifeguards are mutually exclusive, and 
cannot be taken in conjunction with other precautions.281  
Reflect first on the features 
of this puzzle.  Clearly, if a 
marginal approach is applied, the 
defendant in this example would 
not anticipate being found in 
breach of duty for taking any of 
the three possible precaution-
branches.  The only leaf node 
where the defendant anticipates 
liability under a marginal analysis 
is “Actual,” which in fact 
represents not taking any 
additional precaution beyond the base level (and therefore does not require any additional 
expenditure by the defendant beyond already-taken sunk costs).282   
                                                                                                                                                              
precautions.   
281 For instance, assume that barricades and fences make it so hard for lifeguards for enter the premise that they 
refuse to work as long as they are constructed.   
282 We assume, in this tree chart and the following, that the original investment in care (or “Actual” level of care 









Figures IV.6 and IV.7: Negative Synergies and Distorted ex-ante Incentives on the 
Tortfeasor, demonstrate a retrograde analysis of this setting:  
In Figure IV.6, we begin by folding the second level or tier of the tree.  As was our 
conclusion before, doing so illustrates that the defendant would prefer not to add a fence to 
already-constructed barricades (as       
-20,000 > -34,000) and not to add 
barricades to an already-built fence 
(as -24,000 > -34,000).  The paths 
of the dominant strategies at the 










Figure IV.7 completes the folding of the decision tree, and demonstrates that at the first 
decision point, the defendant would prefer to place barricades to building a fence (as,                 
-20,000 > -24,000), hiring lifeguard 
(as -20,000 >  -45,000) or 
maintaining his original level of 
care (as, -20,000 > -50,000).  The 
paths of the dominant strategies are 
again marked in red.   Thus, we can 
conclude, based on this example, 
that applying a marginal 
constrained approach against the 
background of negative synergies 
might induce a defendant to take 
socially suboptimal choices, 
exploiting the purely short-run 
perspective it employs.  
 
ii. OVERLAPS 
1) ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 
Precautions can also overlap.  Overlaps and negative synergies share many similarities 
between them, and in some contexts can be thought of as particular cases of one another.  
Negative synergies, as we have seen, occur when the overall benefit derived from a set of 









occur when the efficiency of a combination of precautions is simply lower than the sum of the 
same precautions’ individual benefits.  In reality, overlaps are extremely prevalent, and 
common to most real-world situations. 283   Given their prevalence and importance, our 
discussion in this subsection will take a more expansive form.  
Overlaps may be viewed as a type of interaction, where taking one precaution actually 
changes the function of another, and diminishes its marginal efficiency without rendering it 
negative. 284   Alternatively, some overlaps simply result from an exogenous quality of 
increasingly harder-to-prevent marginal risks, or “survival of the fittest risks”.  In most 
negligence cases, some risks are easier (or cheaper) to prevent than others, and the overall risk 
becomes harder and harder to eliminate with each additional precaution taken.  As a result, the 
marginal benefit of expenditure in precautions generally diminishes.  When that is the case, and 
it usually is, the order at which precautions are taken affects each precaution’s marginal 
efficiency, as more resistant risks are left standing for every additional precaution.  In other 
words, as precautions are taken at increasingly higher levels, the marginal efficiency of any 
additional precaution, or any increase in its level, would be lower than it would have been if 
previous precautions were not taken.  
To illustrate the reality of harder-to-prevent marginal risks, consider Gladwell’s 
description of a study for the treatment of heavy smoking, which compared the effect of 
                                                
283 It is worth noting that overlaps are even implicit in Grady’s own example.  To see this, notice that in Table 1, 
signs, lifeguards and the fence must at least overlap (or be mutually exclusive), as each precaution cannot maintain the 
same marginal efficiency once another precaution has been taken.  For instance, once lifeguard are employed and reduce 
the expected risk by $40,000, the marginal efficiency of signs, barricades and the fence would diminish from $20,000-
$30,000 to no more than $10,000, the remaining overall risk.  See supra note 256; and Grady, supra note 1. 






combining smoking counseling with (i) a placebo drug; (ii) nicotine patches; and (iii) Zyban, an 
antidepressant affecting the release of certain brain neurotransmitters: 
“[…] 23 percent of smokers given a course of anti-smoking 
counseling and a placebo quite after four weeks. Of those given 
counseling and the nicotine patch, 36 percent had quite after four 
weeks. The same figure for Zyban, though, was 49 percent, and of 
those heavily addicted smokers given both Zyban and the patch, 58 
percent had quite after a month.”285  
 
If we consider counseling a background constraint, the study shows that nicotine 
patches reduced smoking by 13 percent (36%-23%), Zyban by 26 percent (49%-23%) and the 
combination of nicotine patches and Zyban by 35 percent (58%-23%).  Thus, not surprisingly, 
nicotine patches and Zyban display with overlaps: When Zyban is administered as a sole 
treatment, its marginal efficiency is 26 percent.  When it is administered as a second treatment 
to nicotine patches, its marginal benefit is only 22 percent (58%-36%).  Similarly, when 
nicotine patches are administered as a sole treatment, their marginal efficiency is 13 percent, 
while as a second line of care they only yield a 9 percent marginal improvement (58%-49%).  
Comparable results are typical to most forms of therapeutically treatments, and more generally 
to most precautionary measures and negligence settings.  
It is not hard to think of overlaps in the caselaw context, where they exert unique 
normative difficulties.  For instant, reflect on two of the possible precautions listed in the 
Mimoni Case: posting warning signs and providing instructions.  We can assume that both 
precautions have diminishing marginal returns when taken alone.  Additionally, they very 
likely overlap, in the sense that once one unit of signs is posts, the marginal efficiency of the 
first quantity of instructions would be lower than if signs were not previously posted.  
                                                






Alternatively, the first unit of signs would not be as (marginally) efficient if instructions were 
already provided to the riders than if they were not.  Both cases reflect a simple truth—
precautions usually overlap, and marginal risks are typically harder to eliminate.  
To an extent, recognizing overlaps between some precautions can explicate the Mimoni 
court’s hesitation to set an a priori level of care for each precaution separately, while holding 
that helmets must be issued under all circumstances.  When the marginal efficiency of each 
precaution is contingent on another, attempting to optimize each type of precaution separately 
would be of little value.286  Therefore, if we assume that posting signs and providing 
instructions overlap, prescribing a separate duty of care to each of them might result in 
problematic outcomes.  When, on the other hand, precautions do not overlap, it might be easier 
to prescribe rules of thumb and more specific duties pertaining to their use, irrespective of other 
variables.287  Thus, if we assume that the marginal efficiency of helmets does not overlap with 
other precautions (for instance, because helmets reduce the risk of head injury, which no other 
precaution helps limit), or at least that they always yield a higher benefit than their cost 
irrespective of other variables and constraints, the holding of the Mimoni court would seem 
consistent with efficiency considerations.  Similarly, the binding of different precautions into 
three categories or groups might reflect the Mimoni court’s intuition that the precautions in 
each category overlap amongst themselves, but not with precautions on other groups.288  
                                                
286 As we already discussed, it might sometimes be efficient for courts to regulate behavior by prescribing 
specific levels of particular precautions, when a specific combination or precautions is the social optimum from a cost-
benefit analysis perspective.  However, recall that it is possible for suboptimal combinations of precautions to be on the 
same isoquant, or even a higher isoquant, than the social optimum.  The normative tension arising from these issues are 
discussed throughout this thesis.  
287 Doing so would also depend on the type and distribution of possible risks, which is outside the scope of this 
thesis.  In a nutshell, the “PL-side” of the Hand Formula requires, much like the precaution side of the Formula, an 
aggregation of materialized and non-materialized risks.  Some types of precautions can overlap with regards to 
preventing certain risks, while others will not.    







2) NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS: DISTORTED EX-ANTE 
INCENTIVES ON THE TORTFEASOR 
As in the case of negative synergies, the prospect of overlaps between precautions also 
entails opportunities for strategic behaviors and suboptimal results, which have generally 
eluded legal scholarship.  Consider the following:289 
Table 3: Overlapping Precautions and Distorted ex-ante Incentives on the Tortfeasor, a 
Constrained Analysis 
Precaution Level Cost Risk (PL) Risk Decrease  Social Cost 
Actual  10,000 50,000 -- 60,000 
Lifeguards  45,000 10,000 40,000 65,000 
Fence 14,000 20,000 30,000 44,000 
Barricades  10,000 30,000 20,000 50,000 
Fences + Barricades 24,000 18,000 32,000 52,000 
 
In this simple example, employing both a fence and barricades is cost-efficient, as is 
taking each of them separately.290  Unlike the case of negative synergies, the overall benefit 
derived from taking both precautions is higher than taking each of them individually.  
However, much like the case of negative synergies just discussed, adding a second precaution, 
be it a fence or barricades, is inefficient.  Once a fence is built, it is not longer cost-justified to 
                                                
289 Throughout the following examples, we assume that the specific order precautions are taken is immaterial, in 
the sense that the social cost of, or instance, erecting barricades and then building a fence is equal to building a fence and 
then erecting barricades. 







erect barricades, and vice versa.  As before, in these settings a prospective defendant will face a 
de-facto choice between precautions.  Knowing that no liability will follow from choosing one 
precaution over another, a rational defendant should take the cheapest precaution, and in this 
case erect barricades rather than building the socially optimal fence. 
As before, we can illustrate the tortfeasor’s available options and possible sequential 
strategies using an extensive-form decision tree.  These is no need to do so here, as Figures 
IV.5-IV.7 (based on the data pattern in Table 2) actually present an identical pattern to the 
decision tree facing the tortfeasor faced with on the data in Table 3.  Indeed, the only difference 
between the two tables lies in the overall social cost and risk decrease rubrics derived from 
building a fence and erecting barricades in conjunction.  As this difference does not alter the 
defendant’s expected liability or expenditure, his incentive scheme would not change in this 
case.  We can therefore rely on our analysis of Figures IV.5-IV.6 and conclude that applying a 
marginal constrained approach against the background of overlaps might induce a defendant to 
take socially suboptimal choices, exploiting the purely short-run perspective of the marginal 
approach.  
 
3) NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS: SEMI-CONSTRAINED ANALYSIS 
From this point, it is not difficult to conceive of increasingly complicated examples that, 
though far from amounting to real-life complexity, would baffle even more elaborate and 
expansive standards of review, that apply fewer and fewer constraints.  One example is a 
hypothetical “alternative precaution not-taken” standard.  This standard allows a court to look 
“one step” back into actions taken by the defendant in the past, and inquire whether he could 






actually taken.  In that, this hypothetical standard applies a broader review of past behaviors 
than prescribed by the marginal approach, and allows for a qualified evaluation of sunk costs.  
More technically, it allows for one degree of freedom to be added to an otherwise constrained 
short-run review.  We can therefore refer to this standard as semi-constrained.  Naturally, the 
number of constraints applied in negligence cost-benefit analysis can vary, and the alternative 
precaution not-taken represents one out of a vast range of possible semi-constrained methods.  
As Table 4 demonstrates, social inefficiencies and ex-ante strategic behavior might 
persist even if a court applies this hypothetical alternative precaution not-taken standard.  In 
fact, as we examine more and more complex scenarios, it becomes obvious that no single cost-
benefit analysis scheme can guarantee optimal results for every setting.291  Consider the 
following:  
Table 4: Overlapping Precautions and Distorted ex-ante Incentives on the Tortfeasor, a 
Semi-Constrained Analysis 
Precaution Level Cost Risk (PL) Risk Decrease  Social Cost 
Actual  10,000 50,000 -- 60,000 
Lifeguards  45,000 10,000 40,000 65,000 
Fence 10,000 28,000 22,000 48,000 
Barricades  12,000 30,000 20,000 52,000 
Signs 8,000 26,000 24,000 44,000 
Signs + Fence 18,000 18,000 32,000 46,000 
                                                
291 There is, however, a relationship between a scenario’s complexity and the maximum number of degrees of 
freedom that can be applied to it.  The reason why no single method would always induce optimal results to all settings 
goes back to the basic tension and conflicting incentive schemes between long-run and short-run optimization, discussed 






Signs + Barricades 20,000 15,000 35,000 45,000 
Fence + Barricades 22,000 10,000 40,000 42,000 
In this example, the socially optimal course of action is a combination of a fence and 
barricades, which would minimize the social cost to $42,000. Under a marginal review, neither 
the barricades nor the fence may be taken alone, as other precautions can be cost-justifiably 
added to both of them.  However, if signs are placed first, a defendant will not be considered 
negligent under a marginal analysis for not adding barricades or a fence, as adding the fence or 
barricades to signs is not cost-justified. 
Under the alternative precaution not-taken standard, the defendant will also not be 
considered negligent for only placing signs, as signs are marginally superior to both the fence 
and barricades (taken separately)292 and reduce the risk to the defendant at a higher rate.293  
Only the combination of barricades and the fence together is socially superior to placing signs 
in this case.  Thus, Table 4 predicts that a rational defendant would strategically choose the 
socially suboptimal yet cheaper option of placing signs to the optimal combination of building 
a fence and setting up barricades.  This inefficient incentive would not be negated even if the 
court applies the semi-constrained alternative precaution not-taken standard. 
Analyzing the defendant’s possible strategies using an extensive-form decision tree 
offers more insights into this example, and compliments our discussion throughout Part IV.  
                                                
292 As $44,000 (social cost of setting up signs) < $48,000 (social cost of building a fence) < $52,000 (social cost 
of erecting barricades). 
293 As $24,000 (risk reduction of setting up signs) > $22,000 (risk reduction of building a fence) > $20,000 (risk 






We begin this discussion 
with Figure IV.8: Overlapping 
Precautions and Distorted ex-ante 
Incentives on the Tortfeasor, a Semi-
Constrained Analysis, which is 
based on the data in Table 3.   
As before, the left number in 
parenthesis will denote the overall 
cost of precautions at the pertinent 
leaf node, and the right number 
indicates the expected liability 
foreseen by the tortfeasor, this time 
under an alternative precaution not-taken standard.  We assume that lifeguards are mutually 
exclusive, and cannot be taken in conjunction with other precautions. 
Before drawing overall conclusions from this example and revisiting our above 
solution, it would be useful to point to the key feature arising from Figure IV.8 with regards to 
the defendant’s liability and incentive scheme:  
First, unlike our previous example, notice that about half of the terminal nodes in 
Figure IV.8 result in the defendant being found liable.  This change is mostly a result of the 
heightened scrutiny brought by the alternative precaution not-taken standard.294  As the 
negligence standard becomes more expansive and elaborate, and allows for more degrees of 
                                                
294 In calculating the expected harm, we assumed that court do not offset risks. On that, see Ariel Porat, 








freedom and long-run consideration to be taken into account by adjudicators, the scope of 
possible liability would generally rise.  Distinctly, acts and omissions that would not be 
considered a breach of duty under a sternly constrained analysis might be viewed as a breach of 
duty once some constraints are removed.295  
Second, taking the combination of barricades and the fence will never be considered a 
negligent choice, as it reduces the overall risk of accidents to a minimum (and is socially 
optimal).  Hiring lifeguards, however inefficient, will also not be considered negligent for the 
same reason—it reduces the overall risk to the same minimum ($40,000), though at a higher 
cost.  Importantly, when signs are placed first, the defendant will not be found in breach of duty 
if not additional precautions is added to them in the second node.  As adding either the fence or 
barricades to already-placed signs is not cost-justified, the defendant will not be considered 
negligent for not adding either of them (and if one of them is added in the second node, the 
defendant would not be considered negligent for not choosing the other under the alternative 
precaution not-taken standard, as both options are not cost-justified at that node to begin 
with).296  
Third, placing only barricades or only the fence, without adding the other soon after, 
would result in finding the defendant negligent.  After barricades are erected, adding a fence to 
them would be cost-efficient and therefore mandated.  Adding signs to barricades would also 
be cost-efficient, but would not exempt the defendant from liability, as that addition would be 
                                                
295 Alternatively, however, as we already noted and will further explore in Part V, certain combinations of 
precautions might be considered negligent under a constrained analysis, but not when an ex-ante unconstrained approach 
is applied.  
296 For simplicity, we assume in this example that all three precautions—signs, barricades and the fence—cannot 






inferior when compared to adding a fence.297  The paths of raising barricades and then placing 
signs or doing nothing would therefore be considered negligent under the alternative precaution 
not-taken standard.  On the opposing limb, after a fence is built, adding barricades to it would 
be cost-justified and therefore mandated under the prevailing standard.  Adding signs to an 
already-built fence would be cost-justified but suboptimal when compared to adding barricades, 
and would therefore result in placing liability on the defendant under the alternative precaution 
not taken standard.298  The paths of building a fence and then placing signs or doing nothing 
would therefore be considered negligent under the alternative precaution not-taken standard.  
Figures IV.9 and IV.10: Overlapping Precautions and Distorted ex-ante Incentives on 
the Tortfeasor, a Semi-
Constrained Analysis, 
demonstrate the solution to this 
example using retrograde 
analysis technique: 
In Figure IV.9, we 
begin by folding the second 
level or tier of the tree.  On the 
top arm of the tree, as already 
described, the defendant would 
prefer to add a fence to 
                                                
297 Adding the fence would increase the social benefit by a higher margin than signs ($10,000 > $7,000) and the 
combination of barricades and fence is superior in terms of risk reduction ($40,000 > $35,000).  
298 Adding barricades to an already-built fence would result in a higher social gain than adding signs ($6,000 > 








already-raised barricades over doing nothing or adding signs, as that would minimize his 
expected costs in that arm (as, -22,000 > -35,000 > -42,000).  On the bottom arm, the 
defendant would prefer adding barricades to an already-built fence to doing nothing or adding 
signs (as, -22,000 > -36,000 > -38,000).  On the middle arm, the defendant would prefer not to 
add any precaution to already-placed signs (as, -8,000 > -18,000 > -20,000).  The paths of the 
dominant strategies are marked in red.  
Figure IV.10 completes 
the folding of the decision tree.  
It demonstrates that the 
defendant would prefer to post 
signs to any other option on 
the first decision node, as 
posing signs would be 
preferable to building a fence 
and barricades or barricades 
and fence, hiring lifeguards or 
maintaining the original level 
of care (as, -8,000 > -22,000 > 
-45,000 > -50,000).  The paths 
of the dominant strategies are again marked in red.  We can therefore conclude, based on this 
example, that the alternative precaution not-taken might also induce the defendant to take ex-
ante suboptimal or inefficient strategic choices, when such choices would enable him to 








More disturbingly, notice that for both negative synergies and overlaps, it can 
sometimes be in the prospective defendant’s interest to employ not only suboptimal 
precautions, but also inefficient ones, so long as the inefficient precautions are cheap and no 
additional cost-justified precaution can efficiently be added to them.  In this extreme scenario, a 
rational defendant will take inferior or inefficient actions in order avoid liability for not taking 
certain efficient (yet expensive) actions.  
 
4) NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS: THE PREDETERMINCY 
ASSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION THEORY REVISITED 
A closer examination of Table 4 and Figures IV.8-IV.10 allows us to draw additional 
insights, and reinforce some of our previous conclusions with regards to the predetermincy 
assumption and production theory: 
From the perspective of predetermincy assumption, our analysis illustrates that the 
outcome derived from applying a constrained or semi-constrained negligence review is highly 
path-dependent.  Interactions between precautions render the short-run optimal result at each 
stage, and the judicial outcome derived for the method employed, extremely contingent on 
past-taken actions and future available options.  The impact of posting signs in our previous 
example is a good example of that.  If signs are placed as a first precaution, not only are they on 
the defendant’s preferred path, but also no other precautions are required in addition to them for 
the defendant to avoid liability.  If, on the other hand, signs are posted as a second precaution, 
after barricades or the fence are built, not only are they no longer on the defendant’s preferred 
path, but also they result in placing liability on the defendant.  Thus, in this example, a 






constrained analysis, while a defendant who would build a fence or barricades and then post 
signs would be found liable.  The normative difficulties of this result are clear: while the first 
defendant would reduce the overall harm by $24,000 and be found not liable, the second would 
reduce the overall harm by $32,000-$35,000 and be found liable.  It would therefore be 
accurate to say that path dependencies further exacerbate the innate divide between constrained 
and unconstrained forms of optimization, and render any form of constrained analysis 
susceptible to assorted inefficiencies.  Against the backdrop of interactions, the conventional 
predetermincy assumption—is simply wrong. 
From a production theory perspective, the data shows little to no correlation between 
the overall production of care, the overall cost of taking precaution, the expected detriment to 
the plaintiff and social efficiency.  To facilitate a review of this discrepancy, Table 5 compares 
the ranking of the different precautionary bundles, assuming an alternative precaution not-taken 
standard is in effect, using the following columns-rankings: (i) social cost and desirability;       
(ii) defendant’s preference; (iii) plaintiff’s preference; and (iv) overall level of care, or 







Table 5: Social Cost, Defendant’s Preference, Plaintiff Preference and Over Level of 
Care Compared 
Precaution Bundle # Social Cost # Defendant Preference # Plaintiff Preference  # Isoquant 
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Compare the first-best social outcome, indicated in the first two rows (fence and 
barricades and barricades and fence) with the worse possible social outcome, indicated in the 
last row (lifeguards).  Both lifeguards and the combination of fence and barricades are equally 
effective,300 even though lifeguards require more than double the budget required to build the 
combination of the fence and barricades.  While lifeguards and the bundle of barricades and 
                                                
299 The plaintiff’s top preference is full compensation.  We assume the plaintiff is indifferent between monetary 
compensation and not being harmed. 






fence are both on the top isoquant in terms of harm prevention (40,000), the combination of 
barricades and fence is the optimal combination of precautions in that isoquant, and is actually 
the overall socially optimal solution, while lifeguards are not even cost-efficient,301 and would 
result in the worse possible social outcome.  Another way to look at this divide is this—while a 
plaintiff would be indifferent between the defendant hiring lifeguards or taking a combination 
of fence and barricades,302 there are no less than nine precautionary options the defendant 
would prefer to hiring lifeguards, and only one (doing nothing) that would offer the defendant a 
lower return under an alternative precaution not-taken standard.303  Table 5 therefore illustrates 
our basic contention that there is no necessary correlation between social costs, overall costs of 
precautions and the elevation of the isoquant lines.  
It is also useful to compare the first two rows (barricades and the fence and the fence 
and barricades) to the third (signs).  While the combination of fence and barricades is socially 
optimal, there are no less than three combinations of precautions (all starting with posting 
signs) the defendant would choose over it.  In other words, the misalignment between the social 
optimum and the incentive scheme facing the defendant runs deep, and would induce the 
defendant to take a number of strategic suboptimal choices rather than taking the socially 
desired one.  Furthermore, notice that the defendant’s likely choice of placing only signs is not 
                                                
301 As they reduce the overall harm by $40,000 at a cost of $45,000.  Lifeguards are the only precaution (or 
bundles of precautions) that is not cost-justified.  We assume no ex-ante bargaining is possible between prospective 
defendant and plaintiff.  
302 As the plaintiff’s expected harm under both options is identical ($40,000) and he would not receive damages 
whether the defendant hires lifeguards or builds a fence and barricades. 
303 The fact that the defendant would prefer to hire lifeguards to doing nothing is problematic in and of itself, as 
hiring lifeguards is socially inefficient.   
The combinations the defendant would prefer to hiring lifeguards are: posting signs (at an overall cost of 8,000 
to the defendant); signs and fence (18,000); signs and barricades (20,000); barricades and fence (22,000); fence and 
barricades (22,000); barricades and signs (35,000); fence and signs (36,000); a fence (38,000) and erecting barricades 
(42,000).  The only course of action inferior to hiring lifeguards, from the defendant’s perspective, is doing nothing and 






only socially suboptimal and placed on the fourth-ranked (out of seven) isoquants of harm 
prevention, but would also place the plaintiff in the worst possible state when compared to all 
other courses of action (as he will incur an expected harm of 26,000 without compensation).  If 
a purely marginal approach is applied, the divide between the preferences of both parties, the 
isoquants of harm reduction and the social ranking of precautionary bundles would naturally 
change, but the basic misalignment between them, and the inefficient incentives they bring, 
would persist.   
 
iii. POSITIVE SYNERGIES 
1) ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS 
Positive synergies increase the overall return of a set of precautions when compared to 
the aggregated efficiency of its components.  When only positive synergies occur, taking 
certain precautions has a beneficial impact on the marginal efficiency of others, so that the 
overall level of care produced is higher than the aggregated benefits of the individual subparts.  
As with negative synergies and overlaps, positive synergies can be highly case-specific, and 
limit themselves to designated precautions, precaution levels or exogenous circumstances.  A 
precaution might generate a positive synergy when the stars are aligned one way, but spawn 
other outcomes when the stars are aligned differently. 
Looking at a three-dimensional production hill, positive synergies between precautions 
can manifest in various ways.  For instance, they may transpire in inflections between concave 
and convex upward-sloping elevations, an increase in the steepness of the production hill (or a 






and boundaries of these presentations will obviously depend on the terms and constraints of 
each production function.   
When precautions come together to create a positive synergy, applying the marginal 
approach might lead to suboptimal judgments.  More disturbingly, in some cases, where taking 
certain precautions individually is not cost-effective but taking them in conjunction is cost-
justified, a marginal analysis is likely to lead to a finding of no liability where one should exist, 
and encourage strategic behaviors by potential tortfeasors.  Finally, the workings of positive 
synergies serve to exacerbate the innate tension between short-run and long-run optimization, 
and shed new light on this insoluble conflict.  
As will soon become clear, our analysis of positive synergies is also intended to 
elucidate a fundamental quality of the marginal approach—myopia, or shortsightedness with 
regards to the prospects and implications of taking possible future combinations of precautions.  
The discussion here is therefore also meant to illustrate the differences between reviewing 
combinations of precautions the defendant could have taken in the past (unconstrained or semi-
constrained analysis) and exploring different permutations of precautions the defendant would 
have been able to take in the future.  
 
2) NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS: SUBOPTIMAL PRECAUTIONS 
AND MYOPIC COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Our first example illustrates distorted defendant’s ex-ante incentives in the context of 







Table 6: Positive Synergies, Suboptimal Precautions and Myopic Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Precaution Level Cost Risk (PL) Risk Decrease  Social Cost 
Actual  10,000 50,000 -- 60,000 
Lifeguards  45,000 10,000 40,000 65,000 
Fence 14,000 30,000 20,000 54,000 
Barricades  10,000 30,000 20,000 50,000 
Signs 1,000 25,000 25,000 36,000 
Fence + Barricades 24,000 1,000 49,000 35,000 
Signs + Barricades 11,000 22,000 28,000 43,000 
Signs + Fence 15,000 22,000 28,000 47,000 
Fence + Barricades 
+ Signs 
25,000 900 49,100 35,900 
 
In this example, combining the fence with barricades generates a positive synergy, 
which increases their overall efficiency.  While the fence alone reduces the risk by $20,000, 
and barricades alone reduce the risk also by $20,000, applying both precautions reduces the 
total risk by $49,000, $9,000 more than the sum reduction of both precautions individually. 
It is not hard to think of reasons why such a positive synergy would occur in real life.  
For instance, it could be that some potential victims will only be willing to make the effort of 
walking by foot past barricades if they will not have to subsequently climb a fence, while other 
potential victims will only be willing to make the effort of climbing a fence if they will not 






to climb a fence or pass barricades, almost no one would be willing to traverse past both.304  
Thus, in this example, barricades alone will reduce the number of potential victims by 40%, the 
fence alone will also reduce the number of potential victims also by 40%,305 and the two 
positively synergetic precautions will reduce the number of potential victims by 98%.  
The social optimum in Table 6 lies in building a fence and setting up barricades, as the 
overall gain derived from this strategy is superior to any other available course of action, 
including only posting signs ($35,000 < $36,000).  Signs remain cost-beneficial when taken 
alone, but are no longer part of the socially optimal set of precautions.  In fact, if they are added 
to a combination of the fence and barricades, their addition is not cost-justified.306  Under these 
settings, applying a marginal analysis might lead to suboptimal solutions.  Specifically, it 
would incentivize potential defendants to post the socially suboptimal signs, as doing so would 
minimize their expected expenditure.  
Figure IV.11: Positive Synergies, Suboptimal Precautions and Myopic Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, illustrates the defendant’s ex-ante choices under a constrained marginal approach, 
using an extensive-form decision tree.  We assume that lifeguards are mutually exclusive, and 
cannot be taken in conjunction with other precautions. The key features of this example are as 
follows:  
                                                
304 This description reflects, in a sense, a threshold in the overall risk-reduction function. 
305 Obviously, these 40% of potential victims need not be the same 40% reduced by the barricades. 
306 Adding a benefit of $900 at a price of $1,000. The reduction in the marginal efficiency of signs can be 






First, taking the combination of a fence, barricades and signs would never result in 
finding the defendant negligent, as that combination reduces the expected harm to the 
defendant to a minimum.  
Applying the socially 
optimal combination of 
barricades and fence 
would also not result in 
finding the defendant 
negligent on any breach 
of the tree, as the only 
possible addition to this 
combination, posting 
signs, is not cost-justified 
when added as a third 
precaution.  Similarly, 
hiring lifeguards—
although inefficient—would not be considered negligent under a marginal approach, as no 
additional cost-justified precaution can be added to them.  
Second, erecting barricades without adding a fence, or building a fence without erecting 
barricades, would always result in finding the defendant negligent.  This conclusion is true for 
any stage of the game and at any arm of the decision tree.  Due to the positive synergy between 









the other precaution becomes marginally cost-justified, irrespective of other settings and 
precautions.  
Third, posting signs as a first precaution, without adding any successive precautions, 
would result in finding the defendant not liable, as no single precaution can be efficiently added 
to signs when taken as a first precaution.  Neither a fence nor barricades can be efficiently 
added to signs, as each of them would individually reduce the expected harm by 3,000 at a 
respective cost of $14,000 and $10,000.  However, posting signs after barricades have been 
erected or a fence has been built would not affect the defendant’s liability.  After a fence is 
built, the defendant will be found liable unless he adds barricades to the fence.  Conversely, 
after barricades are erected, the defendant will be found liable under a marginal analysis unless 
he adds a fence to the barricades.  Whether signs are posted or not after barricades or a fence 
are built is therefore inconsequential from a liability perspective.307 
The desirability and efficiency of signs is thus highly path-dependent: As a first 
precaution, they are marginally cost-justified, and would suffice for the defendant to avoid 
liability, in light of the limited forward-looking scope of the marginal approach.  As a second 
precaution to barricades or fence, signs are marginally cost-justified, but will have no effect on 
the defendant’s liability or the additional steps he would have to take in order to meet the 
standard of care.  As a third precaution, signs are no longer cost-justified, due to overlaps with 
the fence and barricades.308 
                                                
307 As the conditions of this example make it, a fence is marginally cost-justified after barricades and signs have 
been taken, and barricades are marginally cost-justified after a fence and signs have been taken.  For that reason, posting 
signs as a second precaution will have no impact on the defendant’s overall liability.  
308 When signs are taken alone, they reduce the overall harm by $25,000 at a cost of $1,000.  When they are 
posted as a second precaution after the fence or barricades, they reduce the overall harm by $8,000 at a cost of $1,000.  






Figures IV.12-IV.13: Positive Synergies, Suboptimal Precautions and Myopic Cost-
Benefit Analysis, demonstrate the solution to this setting, using retrograde analysis.  
Beginning by folding the third level of the tree, Figure IV.12 illustrates that the 
defendant would always 
prefer building a fence 
after barricades have 
been erected in the first 
or second node (-24,000 / 
-25,000 >  -33,000 >        
-40,000), and would 
always prefer erecting 
barricades after a fence 
has been build in the first 
of second node (-24,000/ 
-25,000 >  -37,000 >        
-44,000).  The defendant 
would also prefer not to add signs at any point after barricades or a fence have been built           









Figure IV.13 completes unfolding the last two tiers of the tree.  It demonstrates that the 
defendant’s dominant strategy would be to only post signs, and that that strategy would offer 
the defendant a higher 
return than hiring 
lifeguards (-1,000 >       
-45,000), doing nothing 
(-1,000 >  -50,000), 
building a fence as a 
first precaution (-1,000 
>  24,000) or erecting 
barricades as a first 
precaution (-1,000 >     
-24,000),  as building 
any of the last two 
would inevitably 
require the other to be 
added to it.  
We can therefore conclude, based on this example, that positive synergies might induce 
the defendant to take socially suboptimal strategic choices, designed to manipulate a 
constrained and highly myopic analysis employed by the courts.  
Notice that the defendant’s strategy and overall liability would not change in this 
example if courts employ the semi-constrained alternative precaution not-taken approach.  
Even under this more stringent standard, a defendant who would only post signs would be 
13Figure IV. 






exempted from liability, as signs are a superior course of action to both the fence and 
barricades individually,309 and no single cost-justified precaution can be added to them.  
The reason why both the marginal and alternative precaution not-taken approach fail to 
induce optimal results in this scenario goes back to a fundamental feature they share—
myopathy.  Both approaches are unable to consider hypothetical future permutations of 
precautions the defendant would be able to take, and focus instead only on a single (additional 
or alternative) change in current settings.  Thus, while in previous examples we emphasized the 
tension between viewing short and long run analysis of previously taken actions, this example 
illustrates that a similar tension exists between a long and short run view of future options.  
Efficient incentive schemes might require not only an examination of multiple alternative 
combinations of precautions the defendant could have taken in the past, but also an exploration 
of multiple combinations he would be able to take in the future.  In both cases, cost-benefit 
analysis in law must consciously adjust the number of degrees of freedom used in the analysis 
to accommodate for specific needs and problems.  Indeed, legal investigation and review must 
be as sensitive, flexible and smart in gazing towards the future as in looking into the past.  
 
3) NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS: INEFFICIENT PRECAUTIONS 
AND MYOPIC COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Positive synergies may result in even more disturbing outcomes when myopic cost-
benefit algorithms are applied.  This is especially true for settings where precautions are neither 
optimal nor cost-efficient when taken alone (such as lifeguards in Table 6), but are on the 
efficient or even optimal set when taken in conjunction with other precautions.  The 
                                                
309  Signs are more effective in reducing harm than barricades or the fence ($25,000 > $20,000), and do so at a 






repercussions of applying the marginal approach in these settings can include not only errors by 
courts in misstating the optimal set of precautions, but also in denying claims where the 
defendant could have efficiently prevented the harm, and has done nothing instead.  
To see this, imagine a case where no precaution is cost-justified when taken alone, but 
taking a number of precautions in conjunction is efficient.  In such a case, a myopic marginal 
analysis would lead to a judgment of no liability, even though the defendant could have 
efficiently reduced the risk by taking a combination of precautions.  Table 7 illustrates such a 
case:   
Table 7: Positive Synergies, Inefficient Precautions and Myopic Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Precaution Level Cost Risk (PL) Risk Decrease  Social Cost 
Actual  10,000 50,000 -- 60,000 
Lifeguards  45,000 10,000 40,000 65,000 
Fence 14,000 40,000 10,000 64,000 
Barricades  10,000 45,000 5,000 65,000 
Signs 1,000 49,500 500 60,500 
Fence + Barricades 24,000 12,000 38,000 46,000 
Fence + Signs 15,000 39,600 10,400 64,600 
Barricades + Signs 11,000 44,600 5,4000 65,600 
Fence + Barricades 
+ Signs 
25,000 11,900 38,100 46,900 
 
In Table 7, none of the possible precautions is cost-efficient on its own.  However, a 






the socially optimal solution to this puzzle.  As a result, if a court only compares the marginal 
efficiency of different precautions individually, it will arrive at the erroneous conclusion that no 
cost-efficient option was available to the defendant, and deny liability.  When the marginal 
approach is applied in this highly myopic fashion to this case, not only will the prospective 
tortfeasor prefer to do nothing, but he will also attribute a negative value to taking either the 
fence or barricades, and would actually be willing to pay (“bribe”) third parties not be build one 
precaution without the other.  
Figure IV.14: Positive Synergies, Inefficient Precautions and Myopic Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, illustrate the defendant’s ex-ante set of choices under Table 7, assuming the marginal 
approach is applied. As 
with the above examples, 
the “actual” or previously 
taken level of care is 
considered sunk, and 
lifeguards are regarded 
mutually exclusive.  To 
briefly summarize the key 
features of Figure IV.14:  
First, taking the 
combination of barricades, 
fence and signs will not be 
regarded negligent, as no cost-justified precaution can be added to it, and this combination 







socially optimal combination of barricades and the fence would also not result in negligence on 
any arm of the tree, as adding signs to this combination is not cost-justified.  Additionally, 
hiring lifeguards would not result in a finding of negligence, as no additional cost-justified 
precaution can be added to them, and they produce the minimal risk to the plaintiff when 
compared to all other possible outcomes.   
Second, as with our previous example, erecting barricades without adding a fence, or 
building a fence without adding barricades, would always result in finding the defendant 
negligent, due to the positive synergy between the fence and the barricades.  
Third, posting signs as a first precaution, without adding a subsequent precaution, 
would absolve the defendant from liability, as no single cost-justified precaution can be added 
to signs.  As with our previous example, if signs are added as a second or third precaution, they 
will have no impact on the defendant’s liability, and their effect on the defendant’s expected 




Precautions and Myopic 
Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
demonstrate the 









Figure IV.15 begins by folding the first level of the tree, and demonstrates the 
defendant’s preference to build a fence if barricades have been erected in the past, and erect 
barricades if a fence has previously been build (as, -24,000 / -25,000 > -54,600 > -55,600).  It 
also demonstrates the defendant’s preference not to add signs after either a fence or barricades 
are in place. The paths of the dominant strategies are marked in red.  
Figure IV.16 completes folding the last two tiers of the tree, and demonstrate that the 
defendant’s dominant strategy would be to do nothing, i.e. maintain his previous (sunk) level of 
care, as that strategy 
would minimize his 
expected expenditure to 
zero.  Knowing that the 
marginal approach would 
not sanction him for not 
taking any precaution (as 
no single precaution is 
cost-justified on it own), 
the defendant will have 
no incentive to invest in 
precautions, and would 
actually place a negative value on barricades or the fence, as each would impose a duty to build 
the other.  We can therefore conclude that applying a myopic marginal approach against the 
background of positive synergies might result in a finding of no liability, even when the 







As with our previous example, the defendant’s strategy would not change even if the 
court applied the semi-constrained alternative precaution not-taken approach, as none of the 
possible precautions in this example is cost-justified on its own.  This result should not be 
surprising at this stage, as we have already noted that the root cause of inefficiency in the 
settings illustrated by Tables 6-7 is myopathy, not memoryless algorithms.  Altering the set of 
constraints regarding past actions would not, therefore, have the desired effect in this case.  To 
achieve efficient outcomes, let alone optimal incentives, lawmakers would have to review 
multiple degrees of freedom not only with regards to past taken actions, but also concerning 
future options.  
 
4) NORMATIVE REFLECTIONS: PAST OVERINVESTMENT IN 
INEFFICIENT PRECAUTIONS AND MEMORYLESS COST-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
Our final discussion of positive synergies revisits the basic tension between constrained 
and unconstrained cost-benefit analyses in the context of past-taken precautions.  Specifically, 
it illustrates conflicting incentives between short-run and long-run optimization when past 
miscalculations have been made and positive synergies take place.  As we show, both the 
marginal and aggregated approaches might reach unsatisfactory and contradictory results in 
these settings, and bring a seemingly insoluble normative dilemma to surface.  
Imagine a scenario where no cost-efficient precautions or sets of precautions are 
available to the defendant at time zero (T0).  This is a simple case of unavoidable harm, where 
the defendant should not be considered in breach of duty for not taking any precautions or 






precaution, not mandated by the duty of care, and as a result a subsequent or additional 
investment in precautions becomes cost-justified at time one (T1).  Such a setup can occur often 
and for various reasons.  Primarily, it may result from a positive synergy between the 
previously taken (inefficient) precaution and an untaken (also ex-ante inefficient) precaution.  
Additionally, as we have already explored in Part III, this setup may result from a threshold 
effect, particularly when an additional small investment can put a non-operational precaution 
into use, or is required to fix a malfunction in its operation.310 
The reasons for taking the inefficient action at T0 are inconsequential.  For our purposes 
here, we can simply assume that it was the result of an unexpected occurrence or a 
miscalculation. Miscalculations, all would agree, happen all the time.  Table 8 illustrates such a 
case: 
Table 8: Positive Synergies, Inefficient Precautions and Memoryless Cost-Benefit 
Analysis 
Precaution Level Cost Risk (PL) Risk Decrease  Social Cost 
Actual  10,000 50,000 -- 60,000 
Lifeguards  55,000 10,000 40,000 75,000 
Fence 34,000 30,000 20,000 74,000 
Barricades  10,000 45,000 5,000 65,000 
Fence + Barricades 44,000 7,000 43,000 61,000 
 
                                                
310 To use our ongoing example, and as discussed in Part III, imagine a case where building a fence is inefficient 






In Table 8, both the fence and barricades are inefficient on their own as well as in 
conjunction with one another, and their costs always exceeds their benefit.  However, once a 
fence is built, adding barricades to it becomes incrementally cost-justified.  To see this, notice 
that after a fence is built, investing an additional $10,000 in setting up barricades will yield a 
benefit of $23,000 ($43,000-$20,000).  Similarly, once barricades are erected, adding a fence 
becomes cost-justified, as it will generate an additional benefit of $38,000 ($43,000-$5,000) at 
a cost of $34,000.  This outcome results, in this case, from a positive synergy between the 
barricades and the fence. 
The ex-ante social optimum for Table 8 lies in not taking any precaution, i.e. 
maintaining the “actual” level of care, as the social cost derived from this strategy is superior to 
any other available action, including the combination of building a fence and placing barricades 
($60,000 < $61,000).  At T0, therefore, both the marginal and aggregated approach would find 
the defendant not liable if he chooses to only maintain the preexisting level of care and not add 
additional precautions, as that strategy conforms with the (aggregated) duty of care, and no 
additional cost-justified marginal precaution can be added to it.  However, if the defendant 
(erroneously and inefficiently) builds a fence, the marginal and aggregated approach will arrive 
at conflicting outcome at T1.  While the marginal approach would hold the defendant liable if 
he does not supplement the construction of the fence with barricades (as adding barricades to 
an already-constructed fence is incrementally cost-justified), the aggregated approach would 
not place such liability on a defendant, as owners of flooded mines are not required under the 
ex-ante duty of care to build a fence, set up barricades or do both in the first place.  The fact 
that the defendant has already exceeded the prescribed and optimal ex-ante duty of care would 






Figure IV.17: Positive Synergies, Inefficient Precautions and Memoryless Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, illustrates the defendant’s ex-ante (T0) set of choices for Table 8, assuming the 
marginal approach is applied.  
As with the above examples, the 
“actual” or previously taken 
level of care is considered sunk, 
and lifeguards are regarded 
mutually exclusive.  The key 
features of Figure IV.17 are 
simple, and can be summarized 
as follows:  
First, building a fence 
and setting up barricades will not 
result in finding the defendant 
negligent, as that combination reduces the expect harm to the defendant to a minimum.  
Similarly, maintaining the preexisting (“actual”) level of care would net result in a liability 
finding, as doing so is the ex-ante social optimal strategy, and no precaution or set of 
precautions can be efficiently taken.  Additionally, hiring lifeguards—although inefficient—
would not be considered negligent, as it will reduce the expected risk by more than the socially 
optimal behavior, and no additional precaution can be added to them.  
Second, erecting barricades without building a fence, and building a fence without 
erecting barricades, would result in finding the defendant negligent under a marginal analysis.  







subsequently considered a constraint, the other precaution would become marginally cost-
justified and therefore mandated.  
Figure IV.18: Positive Synergies, Inefficient Precautions and Memoryless Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, demonstrates and completes a retrograde analysis of this simple setting.  Beginning 
with folding the second tier, 
Figure IV.18 illustrates that the 
defendant would rather add a 
fence to existing barricades (as    
-44,000 >  -55,000 >  -64,000).  
At the first decision point, the 
defendant would prefer to 
maintain the preexisting 
(“actual”) level of care, as that 
would minimize his expenditure 
to zero, and would not result in 
liability for the plaintiff’s harm 
(0 > -44,000 > -55,000).  The paths of the dominant strategies are again market in red.  
Notice, that whether a marginal or aggregated approach is applied, the defendant should 
not reach node 2, which is not a subgame perfect equilibrium (or part of the ex-ante optimal 
set).  If, however, the defendant finds himself in node 2, i.e. builds a fence or sets up barricades 
due to a miscalculation, he would prefer to add the second precaution if a marginal approach is 








Which is the preferable outcome or approach here?  Recall that we have encountered 
almost the exact same setting before, in Section III.E.b.ii (discussion local minima postliminar 
to the global optimum in a single dimensional framework) and Section IV.B.f (discussing 
short-run versus long-run optimization in multidimensional frameworks).  There, we explored 
whether it would be justified and efficient to require a defendant who has taken precautions 
beyond the socially optimal point to “go the extra mile” and increase his investment in care 
measures to the subsequent local minimum. 311   Our conclusion there, as in here, was 
indeterminate, and pointed to conflicted considerations associated with making this balance.  
To quickly recap our discussion: On the one hand, the marginal approach seems 
justified here, at least from a short-run perspective, as it will induce efficient marginal 
investments (adding barricades to an already built fence, and vise versa).  It would also follow 
conventional economic wisdom by excluding sunk-costs from cost-benefit analysis.  Applying 
the aggregated approach would not achieve this result, and would therefore fail to induce 
efficient ex-post incentives.  On the other hand, applying the marginal approach would place 
liability on a defendant who has gone above and beyond the socially accepted level of due care, 
might create an over-deterrence against taking certain precautions, and change the defendant’s 
ex-ante incentive scheme and decision-making patterns.  The aggregated approach, however, 
does not suffer from theses impediments.  As we can see, therefore, the classic tension between 
short-run and long-run optimization in microeconomics is omnipresent in negligence law, and 
is a fundamental feature of the Hand Formula when applied outside the premise of the 
conventional model 
 
                                                






D. COMMENSURABILITY OF MULTIDIMENSIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
Is it at all possible, in light of our discussion in this part, to commensurate the range of 
achievable care as a function of investment in precaution along a single axis, as assumed by the 
conventional model?  What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for doing so?  Is such 
representation at all useful against the backdrop of multidimensional and interacting 
frameworks?  The short answer to these questions is that commensuration to a single axis is 
generally possible, and can be made to mark the ex-ante technically efficient zone of possible 
(maximal) care, i.e. the limits of long-run safety production as a function of investment in 
precautions.312  However, such a move would be little use for a system intently designed to 
apply an ex-post and myopic cost-benefit analysis, and at most can be used to set an abstract 
level of care in an aggregated context. 
For any particular investment level (!!), the optimal ex-ante set of precautions can be of 
one composition {Pa, Pb, Pc}, while at the nearest incremental investment level (!!) the optimal 
ex-ante set of precautions can be unrelated, {Pd, Pe, Pf} or {Pg}, rather than {Pa, Pb, Pc, Pd}.313  
Stated differently, the optimal long-run set of precautions for investment level !! does not 
necessarily have to consist of the same precautions optimal for investment level !! plus an 
additional precaution.314  Rather, the optimal set of precautions for investment level !! can 
have little to nothing in common with the optimal set for investment level !!, even though the 
two are extremely close.  To give a concrete example, imagine a case where the optimal set of 
                                                
312 For this term, in the context of conventional economic production theory see Besanko and Braeutigam, 
Microeconomics, supra note 211, at p. 186.  
313 Where P is a vector of all possible precautions, !!×! = !! , ! = 1,… ,!, and ! is a continuous variable 
representing the overall investment level in precaution.  In this example, {Pd, Pe, Pf} might be the optimal solution for 
investment level !! as a result of interactions, while {Pg} might be the optimal result due to a threshold effect. 






precautions for an investment of $99,999 (!!) is a fence and barricades, while the optimal set of 
precautions for an investment of $100,000 (!!or !!+ε) is lifeguards or another combination of 
precautions; rather than a fence, barricades and signs, or some other additional precaution. 
Under these circumstances, a memoryless and myopic cost-benefit analysis obviously 
cannot guarantee long-run efficient solutions to optimization puzzles.  This conclusion is true 
even if the marginal benefit from investing in ex-ante optimal bundles of precautions is 
decreasing and strictly convex.315  To see the implications of this conclusion more clearly, 
consider a case where the defendant has already taken the optimal set of precautions for 
investment level !!, and no additional precautions can efficiently be added to the already-taken 
bundle of precautions.  In such a case, a memoryless marginal analysis would find that the 
defendant acted reasonably for not increasing his investment level to !!, as no additional cost-
justified precaution can be added.  However, a broad-scope ex-ante analysis, unconfined by 
past constraints and sunk costs, might conclude that the defendant could have taken a superior 
and cost-justified set of different precautions at an investment level of !!, and accordingly find 
the defendant negligent.  
The probability of a memoryless short-run algorithm to optimally allocate precautions 
over the long-run seems, in fact, low, and is contingent on multiple assumptions and conditions.  
These conditions include, for instance, that, (i) the marginal efficiency of precautions is 
independent of and uncorrelated with past actions and omissions;316 (ii) precautions are 
allocated based on their marginal efficiency, so that the most efficient marginal precaution is 
                                                
315 In other words, (i) precautions are optimally allocated for each investment level, so that the costs of accidents 
cannot be reduced without increasing the overall investment level; (ii) the marginal benefit derived from investment in 
precautions is a strictly diminishing convex function.  
316 Or at least that such interactions do not take certain precautions out from the optimal set with any increase in 






added at each point; (iii) optimal precautions sets along the efficient zone of care production 
are perfectly encompassing; 317  (iv) the marginal efficiency of precaution is a strictly 
downward-sloping function of investment in care; (v) the overall efficiency and cost functions 
do not manifest with threshold effects; (vi) lack of distortions associated with lumpiness; and 
more.  In other words, commensurability along a single “investment level” axis, and 
equivalency of long and short-run analyses, are contingent upon the underlying assumptions of 
the conventional model, and must assume that precautions are taken in a manner conforming 






                                                
317 Meaning that the optimal set of precautions for each investment level [!!, !!,... !!] includes the optimal set 
of precautions for the previous investment levels, plus an additional one.  Thus, for example, if the optimal set of 
precautions at investment level !! is {!!}, the optimal set of precautions at investment level !! would be {!! , !!} and 







ROADMAP TO A NEW MODEL OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN 
NEGLIGENCE LAW: REFLECTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES  
 
A. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES  
In previous parts, we attempted to rigorously outline the underlying assumptions of the 
conventional model, and unravel the various flaws and imperfections associated with the 
application of the marginal approach to setting where these assumptions are not met.  
Throughout our discussion, we demonstrated that the marginal approach might fail to create 
efficient incentives due to its fundamental features—past actions are always viewed as 
constraints, and the full extent of future possibilities are hardily considered at all.  Additionally, 
we illustrated that the aggregated approach might also fail to induce efficient outcomes due to 
its own features—past actions are hardly ever viewed as constraints, and future options are 
contemplated in their totality.  We further argued that these opposite failures reflect an 
irresoluble tension between short-run and long-run optimization processes, and found both 
approaches unfit as theoretical concepts, unsuitable as normative ideals and inapplicable in 
practice. 
Our conclusion is therefore that the credence afforded to the marginal approach in 
conventional law and economic scholarship is unfounded, and cannot be earnestly defended.  If 
we are to achieve efficient results in negligence adjudication, we cannot simply close our eyes, 
click our heels three times and whisper “marginal approach” or “diminishing marginal returns.”  
Faced with the inadequacies of both the marginal and aggregated analyses, a novel, realistic, 






upon the general principles for such a new approach.  While not intended as an overarching or 
exhaustive scheme, it devises a roadmap for its application.  
In a nutshell, our claim is that the marginal and aggregated approaches merely represent 
two extreme ends of a wide spectrum, and a multitude of hybrid approaches to the application 
of the Hand Formula lie in between them.  By altering various features of each approach, 
lawmakers can perform cost-benefit analysis in torts using different degrees of freedom, in a 
manner suited for the challenges presented by each case.  While no single catchall or “cookie 
cutter” algorithm can efficiently optimize all real-world scenarios, specifically tailoring 
adjudication methods to the characteristics of each case, market and technology can 
substantially reduce the risks of strategic behavior and inefficiencies.  
 
B. THE MANY FACES OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS  
In any field, project, choice and human endeavor, from medicine to finance and from 
business to international relations, rational cost-benefit analyses can be performed using a 
variety of alternatives and methods. Some methods aim to optimize long-run over short-run 
benefits.  Others assume that players are selfish, altruistic or employ a particular strategy.  
Some presuppose players act rationally, while others are designed to face behavioral biases.  
Some methods assume dynamic or stochastic settings, while others assume statistic and 
predictable environments.  Yet additional methods attempt to maximize certain types of 
benefits, or optimize results on different plains of reference, while others assume all benefits 
are commensurable.  Some methods are tailored to perfectly optimize scenarios characterized 






others are best suited to evaluate interacting, discontinuous, multidimensional or threshold 
settings.  
Cost-benefit analysis in law is no different.  In many legal fields, parties and lawmakers 
constantly face intricate optimization puzzles, and must choose a particular balancing or 
optimization method to resolve them.  Such choices—even made unknowingly—necessarily 
reflect and vindicate certain values and preferences over others.318  In other words, value 
judgments in law are made not only by assigning weights to different claims, but also by 
choosing between different types of scales and optimization methods, and by deciding which 
variables would be considered probative.  The type of cost-benefit analysis algorithm used by 
lawmakers is as meaningful, demonstrative and values-driven—indeed often more so—as 
assigning numerical values to claims, risks and harms.  
Evaluation methods differ not only with respect to the values they reflect; they also differ 
from an efficiency perspective.  No one cost-benefit method is perfectly suited to optimize all 
real-life scenarios.  Just as in medicine, there are no miracle drugs guaranteeing optimal results 
or cures for all diseases; and every prescription has possible adverse side effects.  A particular 
cost-benefit algorithm may lead to efficient results in one type of case, but fail to do so in 
another.  Legal cost-benefit analysis must therefore be tailored to the specific characteristics of 
each case type.  Consistently and predictably utilizing one algorithm or cost-benefit method for 
every circumstance is likely to lead to inefficient or suboptimal results, and incentivize value-
destroying strategic behavior by sophisticated players.   
                                                
318 See Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 278-280 (1977).  See also Stephen R. Perry, Responsibility 
for Outcomes, Risks, and the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS (Gerald Postema ed., 2001); and 






C. MIXED APPROACHES IN NEGLIGENCE LAW 
In negligence law, cost benefit analysis may be conducted using multiple variants of the 
Hand Formula.  By changing such factors as the past and future timespan considered or the 
type and number of conjunctive alternative hypotheticals to be taken into account, lawmakers 
can alter the way in which negligence analysis is performed and adjust it to relevant needs, 
circumstances, markets and cost and efficiency functions. I refer to these variants of the Hand  
Formula as “mixed approaches”, as they incorporate elements of both the aggregated and 
marginal approaches on a temporal scale. 
The marginal and aggregated approaches are, if fact, merely extreme ends of a broad 
spectrum, and a multitude of mixed approaches lie between them.  For instance, instead of a 
entirely-constrained marginal analysis, a court may employ the abovementioned semi-
constrained alternative precaution not-taken method, which considers not only marginal 
omissions, but also one possible alternative the defendant could have taken instead of an action 
actually taken.  The court may also resolve to review two alternative changes, and consider 
hypothetical outcomes that could have resulted had the defendant altered two past actions or 
omissions.  By the same logic, any number of precautionary “bundles” or conjunctive 
alternative hypotheticals can be compared and reviewed. 
The number of possible alternatives or steps jointly contemplated can be expanded or 
limited not only with regards to past actions or omissions, but also with respect to future 
possibilities.  For instance, a court may limit itself to explore the possible effect of adding a 
single precaution not-taken (as prescribed by the marginal approach), an unlimited number of 
additional precautions (as the aggregated approach purports to do) or any number between 






future additions or past alterations reviewed, and replace the marginal incremental method for 
an expansive exploration of non-marginal additions or changes in precaution levels.319 
We can refer to the number of alterations and future additions contemplated in the 
application of Hand Formula as the number of “degrees of freedom.”  Thus, for example, the 
marginal approach does not allow for any freedom in its review of the past (i.e. it is wholly 
constrained, or memoryless), and permits a review of only a single additional precaution not-
taken (i.e., it is myopic).  The alternative precaution not-taken approach, by contrast, allows for 
one degree of freedom with regards to past-action. In much the same way, the number of 
degrees of freedom with regards to past and future precautionary bundles can be set at any 
number, creating an endless variety of possible cost-benefit algorithms.  As negligence analysis 
is performed using more and more degrees of freedom, the number of permutations comprising 
of future additions and past alterations naturally increases, and the level of complexity and 
possible hypothetical scenarios grows exponentially.   
Mixed approaches differ, however, not only with respect to the number of degrees of 
freedom they permit—they can vary in assorted other manners as well.  In addition to altering 
the number of degrees of freedom, different cost-benefit analysis methods can be crafted by     
(i) limiting or expanding the timespan in which a plaintiff is allowed to claim the defendant 
acted negligently;320 (ii) limiting or expanding the number of precautionary “step-backs” 
                                                
319 Green made a somewhat related claim from the perspective of a marginal analysis, noting that “[h]aving 
made the comparison-at-the-margin point, we should understand that there is nothing inherent in risk-benefit about how 
wide the margins should be. We might employ rather narrow margin by employing a relatively modest additional 
precaution…. [or] [t]he margin might be wider… The ultimate marginal comparison entails a comparison of all the risks 
of the product with all of its benefits.”  (Green, Negligence = Economic Efficiency: Doubt >, supra note 15, at p. 1613).  
However, this rare note only pertains to the future scope of the marginal analysis is single-dimensional frameworks, and 
is highly limited in its nature.  Green’s analysis does not relax the underlying assumptions of the conventional model, not 
does it address the difficulties presented in this thesis.  
320 The statute of limitation and the statute of repose are prime examples of this, as discussed in Part IV.  On the 






allowed in the review of sequential settings;321 (iii) adjusting the measuring scales used to 
evaluate the defendant’s behavior;322 (iv) selecting which variables would be considered 
exogenous or endogenous to negligence analysis;323 (v) altering the level of generalization 
taken in performing negligence analysis;324 (vi) taking account of objective, subjective or 
objective-subjective costs and benefits in the implementation of the Hand Formula;               
(vii) prioritizing long-run or short-run incentive schemes; (viii) treating players as rational, 
irrational or recognizing certain behavioral biases;325 (ix) considering the defendant’s motives 
and strategic aims as pertinent to the analysis;326 and so forth.  Together with the number of 
degrees of freedom, these factors operate to set the overall level of complexity to be considered 
by the court, and define the particular mixed approach implemented.  
                                                                                                                                                              
Law Control of Strategic Behavior: Railroad Sparks and the Farmer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 15 (1988).  
321 By step-backs, we mean the maximum number of past-taken precautions that would be considered variables 
rather than constraints. The term is closely related to past timespan in sequential settings.  When the setting is not 
sequential, we can equate the number of step-backs to degrees of freedom.  For a suggestion to review past taken 
precautions in bilateral settings see Guttel, The (Hidden) Risk of Opportunistic Precautions, supra note 39, at p. 1415. 
322 The same behavior may or may not be considered negligent when reviewed through different scales and 
lenses.  For example, as we have already discussed, the average speed of a car over one timeframe might be considered 
negligent, while the average speed as measured against a different timeframe might not.  For temporal framing problems 
see also Douglas Husak and Brian P. McLaughlin, Time-Frames, Voluntary Acts, and Strict Liability, 12 LAW & PHIL. 95 
(1993); and Shawn J. Bayern, The Limits of Formal Economics in Tort Law: The Puzzle of Negligence, supra note 21.  
323 As discussed in Part IV.  For a similar notion regarding variable selection, in the context of temporal 
continuums and bilateral precautions see Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable Selection, supra note 22 (reflecting 
on the choice between liability regimes and different aspects of tort law, such as the division between negligence and 
strict liability, contributory negligence, causation, last clear chance, assumption of risk, mitigating damages and cheapest-
cost-avoider).  
324 On different levels of generalization, see Guido Calabresi and Jon T. Hirschoff, Towards a Test for Strict 
Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1054 (1972) (hereinafter: “Towards a Test for Strict Liability in Torts”) (discussing levels 
of generalization within the context of cheapest-cost-avoider); Gilles, Rule-based Negligence and the Regulation of 
Activity Levels, supra note 21, at 319; and Anderson, ibid, at pp. 272-274. 
325 See, for instance, Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really 
Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994); and Christine Jolls,  Cass R. Sunstein and Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach 
to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998).  
326 Considering individual motivations might entail both practical and normative difficulties, and is generally 
considered outside the scope of negligence inquiry.  For a claim that court have been able to “successfully prevent 
willful, inefficient costs shifting” bilateral precaution settings and nuisance cases see Guttel, The (Hidden) Risk of 
Opportunistic Precautions, supra note 39, at p. 1420, and the cases cited on footnote 68-75 there.  See also, Grady, 






The number of possible algorithms or mixed approaches resulting from these alterations 
is truly boundless.  For instance, reflect upon the different combinations ensuing from merely 
varying the number of degrees of freedom and the permitted number of step-backs in sequential 
settings (or length of past timespan).  If no step-backs are allowed (i.e. all sequential past-taken 
precautions are considered constraints), and the hypothetical impact of only one additional 
precaution is examined, the marginal approach is applied.  If one degree of freedom and one 
step-back are allowed, a (memoryless and myopic) alternative precaution not-taken approach is 
applied, which will only question whether the defendant could have taken a superior precaution 
on his last move in a sequential setting.  Similarly, lawmakers can apply an alternative 
precaution not-taken approach using any other number of step-backs.  For instance, an analysis 
providing for one degree of freedom and two step-backs would question whether the defendant 
could have taken a single superior alternative in any of his last two moves.  An analysis 
providing one degree of freedom and no limit on the number of step-backs would question 
whether the defendant could have taken a single superior precaution at any time or step in the 
past (“myopic precaution not-taken approach”), and so forth. 
When the number of degrees of freedom is also altered, additional algorithms can be 
crafted.  For instance, an approach allowing for two degrees of freedom and two step-backs 
would explore the hypothetical impact of altering or adding no more than two precautions, but 
would consider all past actions as constraints except for the last two (a “two square” approach).  
An analysis allowing for unlimited degrees of freedom and one step-back would question 
whether any additional or alternative precautionary bundles would have yielded a superior 
outcome, but would consider all but the last precaution taken as constraints (a “memoryless 






degrees of freedom and unlimited step-backs would question whether adding or altering any 
number of precautions would have yielded a superior outcome, de-facto applying an aggregated 
analysis, and so forth.  
As the number of degrees of freedom and permitted step-backs increases, the resulting 
cost-benefit analysis method would be better equipped to handle intricate and knotty settings 
characterized by multiple moving parts and sequential evolution, but will also become more 
complex and difficult to implement, and might prioritize long-run goals over short-run 
incentives.  Figure V.1 illustrates the various cost-benefit analysis methods resulting from 
altering the number of degrees of freedom and permitted step-backs, as well as the increasing 
complexity of these methods.  It point to the marginal approach on one end, and to the 
aggregated approach on the other.  Similar illustrations can be made to reflect methods 







Figure V.1: Overall Complexity of Different Types of Cost-Benefit Analysis Methods  
 
This richness of possibilities within negligence law has, generally speaking, eluded tort 
economic scholarship.  The conventional model’s focus on the marginal approach has, in this 
sense, done a great disservice to our understanding of the complexity of cost-benefit 
optimization methods, the innate limitations they presents, the values and aims they reflect and 
the various possibilities to strategically manipulate negligence adjudication in the courtroom.  
More than everything, the limited scope and confining assumptions adhered to in economic 
literature have obscured the need to tailor cost-benefit analysis methods to the specific 






perform targeted legal-empirical research on the specific cost and efficiency functions of each 
field.  
 
D. THE TAILORING PRINCIPLE AND THE IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM  
Our above discussion sought to lay the foundations for two general principles: First, that 
no single variant of the Hand Formula is perfectly suited to optimize all real-world scenarios, 
and all such variants might fail to achieve their goals as a result of interactions, threshold 
effects, discontinuities, non monotonically convex efficiency functions and the innate tension 
between long-run and short-run optimization.  We can refer to this as the impossibility theorem.  
Second, that the efficiency goals of negligence law can only be achieved—if at all—by 
specifically tailoring an adjudication method to the unique characteristics of each setting, 
market and technology, and relying on strong empirical footings. We can refer to this as the 
tailoring or adaptation principle.  
Each type of mixed approach is best suited to optimize a particular setting, and no one 
approach is suited to all circumstances.  For instance, as this dissertation demonstrated, the 
marginal approach is principally suited for single continuous precautions abiding by the rule of 
diminishing marginal returns.  When precautions interact, present with non monotonically 
convex efficiency functions or temporal changes occur, applying the marginal approach might 
lead to various inefficiencies.  Similarly, the alternative precaution not-taken approach is suited 
to optimize cases where a single alternative precaution is possible.  When multiple conjunctive 
alternatives exist, this method is also likely to fail.  The aggregated approach might avoid some 






inefficiencies associated with sunk costs, administrative costs and inefficient short-run 
incentives.  
This outcome presents with an intriguing puzzle, which accompanied our discussion 
throughout Parts III and IV.  On the one hand, the more deference is granted to marginal 
actions and omissions, the more the analysis might lead to inefficiencies and incentivize value-
destroying strategic behaviors, mended only by a broad-scope analysis of past actions and 
future options.  This is the case where, for example, considering previously taken precautions 
as constraints would induce a defendant to make suboptimal or even inefficient investments at 
T1, knowing that as a result no additional cost-justified precautions would be available to him at 
T2.  On the other hand, the more deference is given to broad-scope and long-run considerations, 
the more the analysis might induce inefficient short-run behaviors, and in any case the 
informational costs associated with it are might not be justified.  This is the case where, for 
example, not viewing previously taken actions as constraints would fail to induce a defendant 
who has overinvested or underinvested in precautions at T1 to take additional cost-justified 
precautions at T2.  
More generally, the marginal and aggregated approaches, and the various mixed 
approaches between them, reflect an innate and irreconcilable tension between short-run and 
long-run optimization, whereby inducing long-run efficient behavior might hinder short-run 
efficient incentives, and vice versa.  Taking any action—optimal, suboptimal, inefficient 
underinvestment or inefficient overinvestment—inherently transforms past variables into 
constants simultaneously with introducing new possible alternatives and options.  As a result, 






long run incentives and between ex-ante and ex-post motivations.  Anderson made a partially 
similar argument from the perspective of variable selection in bilateral settings, noting: 
 “…[T]ort law faces competing and sometimes irreconcilable 
goals to optimize in the short and in the long run. A liability test that 
includes every accident-reducing input might be efficient in the long 
run but will provide little incentive for subsequent actors to minimize 
accident costs once negligence has occurred.”327    
 
To some degree, all mixed approaches suffer from comparable weaknesses, and might 
fail to achieve optimal results due to misreading the nature of the relevant cost and efficiency 
functions or the double-edged sword of short-run versus long-run incentives.  No matter how 
many degrees of freedom are permitted and how complex the approach, the inescapable fact is 
that any alteration or movement on the scale between the marginal and aggregated approach 
would entail both favorable and unfavorable results.  Long-run mixed approaches are always 
prone to induce inefficient marginal actions, but are less likely to be manipulated by a 
defendant’s past strategic choices.  Short-run mixed approached are more likely to induce 
efficient marginal behaviors and ignore sunk costs, but are always prone to strategic 
manipulations.  These conflicting constraints cannot be perfectly and systematically 
accommodated.  In that respect, I believe Anderson correctly noted that “no satisfactory general 
theory is possible” to the applications of the Hand Formula, and that “the economic analysis of 
tort law provides indeterminate prescriptions” as a result.328 
The Hand Formula—or perhaps better phrased “Hand Formulas”—must therefore be 
reconceived as a general optimization framework, not a one-size-fits-all solution or algorithm.  
                                                
327 Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable Selection, supra note 22, at pp. 256, 264 (focusing on variable 
selection and choice between different liability regimes in bilateral precaution settings, without discussing the various 
concerns and possible inefficiencies contemplated in this thesis). 






It ought to be thought of as a general scheme for minimizing accident costs under a negligence 
regime, and applied in a manner specifically tailored to the characteristics the relevant markets, 
technologies and settings.329  As a central element, a court must be mindful of the type of 
interactions, cost and efficiency functions prevalent in each case, and give thought to the type 
of balancing formula that should be applied.  Additional relevant elements include the 
possibility of ex-ante strategic manipulations, whether the parties are repeated players and 
sophisticated, the prevalence of cases of the same sort,330 the stakes involved and more.  When 
no such tailoring takes place, and only one variant of the Hand Formula is consistently and 
predictably applied, inefficient results and strategic behaviors are likely to follow. 
Negligence adjudication therefore requires a flexible, sensitive approach, specifically 
tailored to the characteristics of every case.  It cannot exclusively rely on a single catchall or 
“cookie-cutter” approach if it is to reach efficient outcomes, and must remain attentive of 
changes in costs and efficiency functions.  Only by carefully applying tailored solutions, 
coupled with reliance on empirical information and theoretical projection, can negligence law 
come closer to providing efficient incentives and disable regulatory regimes.331 
 
                                                
329 Compare Richard W. Wright, The Standard of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
TORT LAW 249 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).  
330 Compare, Landes and Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, supra note 57; and 
Cooter, Kornhauser and Lane, Liability Rules, Limited Information, and the Role of Precedent, supra note 57. 
331 For the general claim that liability regimes should correspond with the specific economic structure of 
accident situation see Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents, supra note 9, at pp. 140-141.  See also our discussion of empirical 
settings in Part III above and in Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable Selection, supra note 22, at p. 258.  For a 
different classification of the negligence test, and related policy concerns see Ariel Porat, The Many Faces of Negligence, 






E. OPTIMIZATION COSTS AND THE PLEADING SYSTEM 
The decision of which optimization method to apply, and which variables to take into 
account, must also consider a second order condition—the costs of the optimization process 
itself, not only its impact on the efficiency of the outcome.332  Some methods are cheaper to 
implement than others.  Some are so expensive or complicated as to almost always make them 
unjustified.  Generally speaking, the cost of optimization is augmented as more degrees of 
freedom are used and a longer timespan is considered, as the underlying technology becomes 
more complex, as the level of generality explored increases and as actions or omission become 
less observable and verifiable.  
Deciding between different forms of negligence review therefore necessitates—in and of 
itself—a cost-benefit evaluation.  Such evaluation should take into account information or 
decision-making costs on the one hand, and the costs of inefficient and suboptimal judgments 
on the other.  The higher the stakes, rewards and risks of strategic behaviors, the more the court 
ought to go beyond a simple marginal analysis.  The higher the costs of information and 
judicial review, the more reasonable it would be for a court to limit the number of degrees of 
freedom and defer to a straightforward method.333 
In practice, the litigants themselves heavily influence the number of degrees of freedom 
the court is likely to consider through the common law pleading system.  As the adversarial 
                                                
332 Compare, Louis Kaplow, A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 111 J. L. ECON ORG. 150 
(1995). 
333 Anderson, following Calabresi and Hirschoff, viewed this dilemma somewhat differently, suggesting a 
general correlation between the level of generality applied by different legal regimes and the temporal scope of the 
analysis (“negligence tests in general are used at a low level of generality and in the short run. Courts have to learn an 
enormous amount about the possible range of precautions the defendant could have taken, in order to decide whether or 
not the precautions they did take were justified. This requires a great deal of information. Courts economize by taken 
many things as given, and ignoring long-run precautions, such as activity levels.”  Anderson, The Missing Theory of 
Variable Selection, supra note 22, at p. 274).  See also Calabresi and Hirschoff, Towards a Test for Strict Liability in 






process is predicated upon parties’ control over the claims argued before the court, the nature 
and complexity of negligence analysis is profoundly influenced by the wills and wants of the 
litigants.  As Grady phrased it: 
 “Events do not define what negligence analysis will be the 
case, and the court does not define it either. Instead, by selecting an 
untaken precaution on which to rely, the plaintiff defines the analysis 
that everyone else will use…”334 
 
Similarly, the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS states:  
 “At trial, the plaintiff who alleges the defendant’s negligence 
normally bears the burden, first, of describing the defendant’s conduct, 
and second, of identifying the precaution or precautions the defendant 
should have adopted.”335 
 
We can assume that plaintiffs’ willingness to plead in a manner requiring more elaborate 
forms of analysis is proportionate to the stakes involved.  When the expected rewards to 
plaintiffs are low, it is less likely that they will be willing to incur the costs associated with a 
complex in-depth analysis.  Conversely, when the expected rewards are high, the more likely it 
is that plaintiffs will invest in expensive measures and acquire the needed information to prove 
negligence by a more comprehensive inquiry.336  
Conceivably, therefore, negligence adjudication is fundamentally different between high 
and low-stake tort cases.  It is not only that deep-pocket litigants engaged in high-value 
                                                
334 Grady, Untaken Precautions, supra note 18.  Recall that Grady focuses only on single (marginal) untaken 
precautions, and adheres to the marginal approach.  
335 And continuing to state, “Assigning this second burden to the plaintiff is not always ideal, since the 
defendant may have better access to information about the relevant safety options and technology. Nevertheless, the 
assignment seems necessary, given the impracticality of requiring the defendant to prove a negative—the absence of any 
reasonable precautions.”  (RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMOT. HARM § 3 (2010), Comment h).  
336 Furthermore, litigants’ control over claims presented to court allows them, to some degree, to “reframe” 
events to fit their individual needs and claims.  Thus, they may alternate between a short and long run review or present 






disputes utilize more experienced lawyers or invest more in evidence gathering.  It is also that 
high-stake cases allow for more convoluted hypotheticals to be considered and a longer 
timespan to be taken into account in applying the reasonableness standard.  While a slip-and-
fall case is likely to be weighed based solely on a straightforward marginal analysis, a 
pharmaceutical drug recall is likely to be adjudicated utilizing far more degrees of freedom and 
an in-depth review of past-actions.  The complexity of negligence adjudication is, 
consequently, theoretically and practically correlated with the potential gains from any 
particular case.337  
This outcome, that high-stake defendants are subject to higher scrutiny than low-stake 
defendants, may seem problematic.  It certainly invites a debate from a wide perspective, 
particularly from a justice standpoint, and further serves to show the fragmented nature of the 
Hand Formula.  The notion that different standards of review are afforded to different types of 
litigants and cases certainly entails disturbing elements.  Yet, it should not be all that surprising. 
The legal system regularly handles low and high stake cases differently.  For instance, our rules 
of subject matter jurisdiction ordinarily grant higher, more experienced courts, jurisdiction over 
high-stake cases, while low-stake plaintiff argue their case before a lower court.  
Putting aside possible criticisms pertaining to justice and equality for a moment, 
differences in standards between litigants could be, I believe, efficient.  High stake cases are 
usually complicated, and involve multiple working-components and cutting-edge technology.  
Misjudging the adequate level of care in these cases might entail far more severe risks and 
adverse repercussions.  They are also often rather unique, and present new and unexplored 
                                                
337 This result bears a strong resembles to the different standards applied in ordinary negligence and product 
liability.  See, for instance, Guido Calabresi and Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 






changeless to the court.  As a result, high-stake cases innately require an in-depth adjudication 
process that is not merited in most other cases.  While adjudicating a deepwater oil spill in the 
Gulf of Mexico would require an extensive and creative review of past actions, alternative 
technologies, alternative bundles of care, policy considerations, regulation, procedures, 
different levels of generalization and so forth, a slip-and-fall case usually hinges on the 
defendant’s marginal and short-term omission, and can be decided based on the defendant’s 
answer to a few simple questions.  
More importantly, high-stake prospective defendants are more likely to be sophisticated, 
rational and strategic.  They are therefore far more likely to engage in strategic behaviors meant 
to exploit the shortcomings of a marginal or short-run mixed approach, and reap the benefits of 
a limited or narrowly construed cost-benefit analysis method.  For this kind of defendants, a 
tailored more expansive review is especially warranted, even at the expense of higher 
administrative costs, and even if multiple “Hand Formulas” are eventually applied as a result.  
In order to limit strategic behaviors, this thesis therefore advocates that an increase in the 
complexity of a system must often be met with a corresponding increase in the depth of 
negligence inquiry.  This, in opposite to conventional wisdom in law and economic literature, 
which holds that “an increase in the administrative cost of the system… curbs the number of 
precautionary measures that courts should consider relevant for finding of negligence.”338  A 
negligence regime that does not meet the challenge of technological complexity with an equally 
sophisticated adjudication process, even at the expense of high administrative costs, is likely to 
fall short of creating efficient incentives, and invite value-destroying strategic behavior.  
 
                                                






F. NOTE I: ON ACTIVITY LEVEL VARIABLES 
To some extent, the choice between mixed approaches and the number of degrees of 
freedom to be applied is associated with setting the boundary between care measures and 
“activity level” variables.339  “The distinction between the concepts of care and activity level is 
fundamental for the law and economics of tort liability.”340  It reflects the notion that only 
certain variables enter into negligence inquiry, while other factors—broadly labeled activity 
level—do not.  To use a previous example, the speed of a car at the time of an accident is 
usually a major factor in determining negligence, while assorted other factors, such as the 
average daily travel distance, average speed, frequency at which the rearview mirror is used, 
route chosen, purpose of the drive and the option to substituting a car for the train, are usually 
not considered.341  When that is the case, potential tortfeasors might exploit the limited scope of 
the negligence standard to take make socially suboptimal (yet personally-advantageous) 
choices, and “choose socially excessive activity levels.”342 
                                                
339 On the artificiality of this distinction see Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable Selection, supra note 22, 
at p. 262-263; Dari-Mattiacci, On the Optimal Scope of Negligence, supra note 22, at pp. 334-337; and Peter A. 
Diamond, Single Activity Accidents, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 110 (1974).  For the prolific debate on activity levels and in 
the negligence context see supra note 21, in Part I and our discussion of variable selection in Section IV.B.g.   
340 Dari-Mattiacci, On the Optimal Scope of Negligence, supra note 22, at p. 334. 
341 See Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, supra note 12, at pp. 5, 9, 17, 25, 50-57 (“The number of 
miles an individual drives, for instance, might be interpreted as his level of activity, and the precaution he takes when on 
the road (slowing for curves, paying attention to the presence of bicyclists) as his level of care. Similarly, how often a 
bicyclist rides where there is automobile traffic might be regarded as his level of activity, and his precaution when riding 
(staying close to the side of the road, using a brightly colored vest) as his level of care.”).  Several commentators pointed 
to the long-run inefficiencies associated with ignoring the choice between driving and other means of transportation and 
the purpose of the drive, see Anderson, The Missing Theory of Variable Selection, supra note 22, at pp. 270-271; Aaron 
S. Edlin and Pinar Karaca-Mandic, The Accident Externality from Driving, 114 POL. ECON. 931, 932 (2006); and Jerry 
Green, On the Optimal Structure of Liability Laws, 7 BELL J. ECON. 553, 559 (1976).  
342 Steven Shavell, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 196 (2004).  The general convention in 
scholarship is indeed that when the level of activity is not taken into account, potential tortfeasors might meet the 
standard of due care but operate at an inefficient (too high) activity level.  For instance, a driver who otherwise takes 
adequate care-measures might drive more hours or miles than optimal, assuming the frequency of driving will not be 
taken into account by courts.  See Cooter and Ulen, Law and Economics, supra note 4, at pp. 348–349; Steven Shavell, 
Economic Analysis of Accident Law, supra note 12, at p. 66–71; and Landes and Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort 






As discussed in Part IV, any system of negligence must constantly define which factors 
will be taken into account in its inquiry, and which will not.  Variables that enter the inquiry are 
termed precautions (or care measures), while those who do not are sometimes labeled “activity 
level”.343  This distinction is semantic and juristic, rather than ontological or descriptive.  As 
put by Shavell, “what is important about the variable ‘activity level’ is only that it is not 
included in the care standard,”344 and “the only crucial divide between care and activity level is 
the fact that negligence rules incorporate care but do not incorporate activity level.”345 
Frequency, repetition and intensity claims often do not enter into negligence cost-benefit 
analysis, as hinted by the term “activity level”, and are believed to implicate high 
administrative costs.  As Miceli notes, the decision “how frequently or intensively to engage in 
a risky activity” is generally excluded from the negligence criteria.346  However, empirically 
                                                                                                                                                              
Interestingly, Gilo and Guttel have demonstrated in a recent article the possibility of an opposite manipulation, 
i.e. suboptimal precautions coupled with suboptimal activity level (assuming both factors are taken into account), while 
otherwise adhering to the underlying assumptions of the conventional model; See Gilo and Guttel, Negligence and 
Insufficient Activity: The Missing Paradigm in Torts, supra note 184 (“Because negligence requires investments in only 
cost-justified care, parties might deliberately limit their activity so that the size of the ensuing risk would be lower than 
the cost of welfare-enhancing precautions”); but compare Grady, Response, Another Theory of Insufficient Activity 
Levels, supra note 163 (noting the Gilo-Guttel model as “important” while arguing that it reflects corner solutions, 
contingent on the assumption of nondifferentiable costs and assets in the long-run).  
343 This usage might be somewhat confusing in light of our view of care as an output, but are nonetheless used in 
this sense in literature.  Recall that generally in this thesis, we view precautions or care measures as variables or inputs of 
care, precaution levels simply as the level at which of each precaution is taken, care levels as various possible outputs of 
safety (or isoquant lines of safety), due care as a legal standard denoting the line between liability, and exemption from 
liability and activity level as a general term for factors that are not taken into account in negligence analysis.  
344 Shavell, Strict Liability versus Negligence, supra note 21.  See also Anderson, The Missing Theory of 
Variable Selection, supra note 22, at p. 262. 
345 Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, supra note 12, at pp. 9-46.  For a somewhat critical view, 
attributing immutable and realistic (rather than semantic) meanings to the term activity level, see John J. Donohue, The 
Law and Economics of Tort Law: The Profound Revolution (Book Review of William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, 
The Economic Structure of Tort Law and of Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law), 102 HARV. L. REV. 
1047, 1062 (1989); Howard Lantin, Activity Levels, Due Care, and Selective Realism in Economic Analysis of Tort Law, 
39 RUTGERS L. REV., 487, 503 (1986); Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, HANDBOOK OF 
PUBLIC ECONOMICS (Alan J. Hawerback and Martin S. Feldstein eds., Amsterdam); and Gilles, Rule-based Negligence 
and the Regulation of Activity Levels, supra note 21, at pp. 319, 329. 
346 Thomas J. Miceli, The Economic Approach To Law, supra note 91.  For a similar definition, see Cooter and 






and conceptually, courts consider some frequency claims in negligence analysis, and exclude 
certain non-frequency claims from it.347  The idiom “activity level” is therefore both “under-
inclusive and over-inclusive.”348  It should be understood as an artificial simplification, or 
concretization, of a broader idea—a demarcation between included and excluded variables in 
negligence analysis—not in a literarily sense.349 
From an economic perspective, the decision which variables will be considered is 
thought to entail a straightforward balance between the administrative costs of verifying and 
considering certain variables on the one hand, and the perceived benefits from regulating the 
underlying behaviors or the level of those precautions on the other.  When administrative costs 
are high and possible benefits from regulating behavior are low, the related variables should not 
be taken into account.  When administrative costs are low and the possible benefits of 
regulating behaviors are high, variables ought to be contemplated.  Dari-Mattiacci describes the 
division between care measures and activity level using an allegory to a school of fish: 
 “[T]he set of precautions may be analogized to a school of fish. 
When one employs a fishing net (the negligence criterion) some fish 
will be caught (care) while some will swim away (activity level). [The 
pertinent issue is] the optimal size of the fishing net (the optimal scope 
of negligence, which balances the (administrative) costs of having a 
                                                
347 On that see Gilles, Rule-based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity Levels, supra note 21, at p. 320 
(“Modern American negligence law regulates activity levels to a considerably greater scope than has previously been 
recognized); Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, supra note 12, at p. 26; and Landes and Posner, The Economic 
Structure of Tort Law, supra note 3, at pp. 70-71.  But see David Rosenberg, The Judicial Posner on Negligence Versus 
Strict Liability: Indiana Harbor Belt Railroad Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 120 HARV. L. REV. 1210, 1212 (2007) 
(“Indeed, courts often shy away from tackling this set of especially complex and elusive issues, thereby allowing actors 
to engage in excessive levels of risky activity.”).  For more on the theoretical need to include frequency claims into 
negligence analysis see Alan J. Meese, The Externality of Victim Care, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1201, 1206 (2001). 
348 Dari-Mattiacci, On the Optimal Scope of Negligence, supra note 22, at p. 336.   
349 The distinction between suitable and unsuitable variables for optimization under the Hand Formula also 
subject to technological changes.  In other words, certain behaviors can move in and out of negligence analysis pursuant 
to technological changes affecting their verifiability, observability or impact on expected harm.  For a related discussion, 






bigger net with the benefit of catching more fish (improved incentives 
to take precaution).”350  
 
The distinction between activity level and care measures is not, however, synonymous to 
degrees of freedom, and the two terms should not be confused.  The boundary between activity 
level and care measures determines the scope of variables that will be taken into account in 
negligence analysis.  Degrees of freedom and mixed approaches, on the other hand, are far 
broader terms, defining not only which variables will be considered, but also how negligence 
inquiry will be performed.  They define the temporal and sequential scope considered, the 
maximum number of variables to be weighted together and the nature of the variables 
reviewed, and may be tailored to the aims and values sought, the strategic behaviors and biases 
anticipated and the specific wills of the litigants.  Furthermore, the term activity level was 
conceived against the backdrop of the conventional model and the marginal approach.  If 
anything, it served to de-facto obscure the multidimensional nature of most tort puzzles, and 
allow them to be modeled using a single axis.  Our approach works to the contrary—it serves to 
expand our view of negligence, rather than reducing it.351  
 
G. NOTE II: ON OPTIMAL PAST-TAKEN PRECAUTIONS 
In an exceptional commentary, Shavell rightly notes that, in certain settings, “the level of 
due care used to determine negligence is that which is socially optimal provided that parties 
have taken optimal prior precautions.”352  In other words, courts sometimes “hold parties to the 
                                                
350 Meaning an economic test for which variables and claims should and should not be taken into account.  See 
Dari-Mattiacci, On the Optimal Scope of Negligence, supra note 22, at p. 333 (otherwise abiding by the traditional 
economic assumptions of the conventional model).  
351 Interestingly, some “frequency claims” or classic activity level variables are likely not to interact with other 
precautions, providing a further possible reason for their exclusion from negligence analysis in appropriate cases.  






level of due care that would be required if their prior behavior had been appropriate.”353  In 
those cases, negligence inquiry seems to take past alternatives into account, and does not 
consider all preexisting settings as constraints.  
For example, as argued by Shavell, courts hold drunk drivers “to the level of care that 
would be required of a sober individual,”354 and assume that drivers have “taken the prior 
precaution of keeping [their] brakes in good repair.”355  By that, courts hold drivers to a level of 
care that requires a combination of a past precaution (avoiding intoxication and maintaining 
adequate brakes) and a present one, and assume at the marginal moment that optimal past 
precautions have been taken.  Courts may also assume, for the purpose of setting the required 
level of care, that “parties have made reasonable efforts to apprise themselves of risk” in the 
past.356  Here also, courts set the level of care assuming injurers have taken certain (“optimal”) 
prior precautions. 
Shavell’s point on past optimal precautions is important, and uniquely touches upon the 
challenges of negligence adjudication against the backdrop of interacting, multidimensional 
and sequential precautions.  More specifically, Shavell seems to make two distinct arguments:         
(i) descriptive, according to which courts actually assume that past optimal precautions have 
been taken when applying the negligence standard, at least in some cases;357 and (ii) normative, 
                                                                                                                                                              
information and voluntary intoxication; emphasis in the original).  
353 Shavell, ibid, at p. 79.  
354 Ibid.  See also Susan Rose-Ackerman, supra note 199, at p. 91.  
355 Shavell, ibid.  
356 Ibid.  
357 I agree with Shavell that, in some cases, court do not adhere to the marginal approach.  However, that is a 
descriptive point, which is not examined in the thesis, and is closely linked to the broader question of whether, and to 
what extent, courts apply economic reasoning and the Hand Formula in deciding cases.  If anything, the fact that court to 
not rigorously apply the marginal approach serves to show it limitations, and in that sense supports the general claims 






according to which assuming past optimal precautions have been taken is a good policy, and 
will induce efficient incentives on prospective tortfeasors.  On this normative point, Shavell’s 
account merits further review.  
To the extent that courts actually verify “whether a party took due care”358 in the 
abstract, assuming hypothetical and unmaterialized conditions have been met, they do not apply 
the marginal approach.  If this account were actuate to all cases, it would mean that courts 
essentially attempt to conclusively determine what combination of precautions is required for 
any particular setting, and measure the defendant’s behavior against that standard of care.  In 
other words, Shavell points to the aggregated approach as a possible solution applied by court 
to the problem of long-run efficient incentives in settings characterized by multidimensional 
and interacting precautions, but ignores the many limitations of the aggregated approach.  He 
also disregards in that sense the general convention in legal scholarship that the marginal 
approach is normatively and descriptively accurate.359  
Consistently conducting a negligence inquiry under a judicial fiction that past optimal 
precautions have been taken, as advocated by Shavell, would entail considerable practical and 
normative difficulties.  For instance, finding the socially optimal precautions for the present, 
assuming optimal prior precautions have been taken in the past, would be exceedingly 
expensive, and is de-facto equivalent to setting the optimal level of due care (!∗) in the 
abstract.  It would require not only an inquiry into the costs and benefits of all possible 
precautions, but also an in-depth analysis of all possible contingencies, past decision points and 
unaccounted interactions.  If applied, it would compel adjudicators to construct an imaginary 
                                                
358 Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law, supra note 12, at p. 78. 






world consisting of the hypothetical precautions the defendant should have taken (or the 
different levels of precautions that could have been taken), and envision the effects of these 
hypothetical precautions on the choices the defendant faced between that time and the time of 
the accident.  It will also require an extraordinarily complex review of factual and legal 
causation.  Finally, it would require litigants to incur the costs of examining all possible 
combinations of precautions, and plead their case with the appropriate level of detail and 
complexity.  Even in the simplest of settings, therefore, applying Shavell’s suggestion would 
not be an easy feat.  
Furthermore, and importantly, Shavell does not specify when should untaken optimal 
past precisions be viewed as if they were taken, and when should existing conditions be 
considered constraints.  Apart from anecdotally pointing to such examples as intoxication and 
acquisition of information pertaining to future risks, Shavell therefore does not provide a 
general theory that helps solve the normative dilemmas associated with interacting sequential 
precautions.  His commentary does not provide guidelines for variable selection, does not 
reconcile the innate tension between short-run and long-run optimization and does not help 
ameliorates the costs associated with applying an aggregated analysis.360  All in all, the claim 
                                                
360 Additionally, any attempt to conduct a negligence inquiry under the assumption that optimal past precautions 
have been taken will have to answer a supplementary critical question—“optimal at what time”?  Cost and efficiency 
functions can change over time, so that an action might be optimal when taken yet suboptimal or even detrimental at later 
times.  Similarly, it is possible for an action to be inefficient or suboptimal in the past, yet enter the optimal set later on.  
These types of changes might render attempts to adjudicate the present while presuming optimal past precautions have 
been taken increasingly difficult.  
If the efficiency of past hypothetical actions is examined from the perspective of the past, problematic results 
might sometimes be reached from the standpoint if the present.  For example, if the defendant has taken an inefficient 
action in the past, and that action later entered into the optimal set (i.e. became efficient assuming the conditions of the 
present), a court might find the defendant acted negligently for taking an action that later turned out to be efficient.   
Similarly, if two defendants take the same precautions at different times, and a temporal change in costs and efficiency 
functions occurred in the interim, a court might find one defendant liable while holding that the other acted reasonably, 
even though the two defendants ended up taking the same precautions.  






that prior precautions are sometimes taken into account remains highly fact specific, and does 
not capture the full breadth and width of complexity associated with applying mixed 
approaches.  
If a general conclusion can be extracted from the examples brought by Shavell, it is that 
a comprehensive review of untaken past optimal precautions is appropriate only in unique 
circumstances, where conditions exist to limit the costs of judicial review.  Such conditions are 
more likely when, for instance, (i) the timespan between actions is short, i.e. the sequential 
actions or omissions are close in time; (ii) a later precaution is contingent upon a past 
precaution, rather than simply affected by or correlated with it; (iii) the past precaution is 
strictly beneficial in terms of reducing accident costs, and the uncertainties associated with it 
are limited; (iv) the beneficial effect of the prior precaution is easily observable and verifiable; 
and (v) no changes in costs and efficiency functions of the relevant precautions occur during 
the relevant timespan. 
Not surprisingly, these conditions are met in Shavell’s examples.  For instance, 
intoxication lasts for only a short time period, and is close in time to the accident, has a 
tremendous impact on the defendant’s capacity to drive with care, avoiding intoxication is 
always beneficial from a safety perspective, and its advantages can easily be asserted.  When 
these conditions are not met, however, at least in part, applying Shavell’s scheme would require 
courts to venture far astray from actual events, and conjure evermore-complicated hypothetical 
scenarios.  For each hypothetical assumption regarding an untaken optimal past behavior, the 
court might be bound to imagine subsequent hypothetical actions that should have followed.  
                                                                                                                                                              
i.e. based on hindsight evaluation, problematic and even illogical results might follow.  For example, a court might be 
required to find a defendant liable for taking an action that seemed reasonable at the time, and was later found to be 
inefficient.  Similarly, a court might find a defendant not liable for taking an unreasonable action in the past, when that 






Examined through this lens, the prevailing tendency of negligence law to limit the number of 
variables or degrees of freedom considered, and the scope of the analysis allowed, has merits, 







PART VI:  
CONCLUSION 
 
A. TWO LESSONS FROM ANCIENT GREECE: TRAGEDY, HEROES AND THE HEAVENS 
a. WE NEED A HERO! (OR DO WE?) 
In the classic Greek tragedy, the plot would sometimes thicken to a point of such 
convolution, that no organic resolution of the conflict seemed plausible.  An intricate web of 
wants, needs, wills, past actions, future hopes, moral imperatives and legal duties was weaved 
together into an entanglement that baffled even the most ingenious of Greek tragedians.  
Unable to steer the storyline away from total imbroglio, the ancient tragedians would resort to 
miracles—heroes, “racing on a thunder and rising with the heat”361 to save the day.   
The unanticipated hero or divine deity would appear from the heavens, lowered to 
center stage using a crane or lift, and proceed to craft a wondrous ending to the seemingly 
hopeless tale.362  This literarily ploy was hence termed dues ex machina—“god from the 
machine”—and became synonymous with a contrived and unexpected form of intervention, 
providing artificial resolutions to seemingly insoluble crises.  Deus ex machina solutions were 
detached from the general storyline, and held frail connection to its narrative and events.  Such 
solutions provided an ending ex-nihilo—“out of the blue”—indifferent to past occurrences, 
undaunted by future concerns and pervious only to the last scene.  This lack of coherence 
earned deus ex-machina great criticism, for good reason. 
                                                
361 Bonnie Tyler, Holding Out for a Hero, on SECRET DREAMS OF FORBIDDEN FIRE (CBS 1986). 






Millennia have come to pass, and highly intricate plots are now as common in modern 
life as they were in Greek theater.  With human knowledge continuing to expand exponentially, 
doubling its breadth at unimaginable rates, and our social systems more intricate than any point 
in history—simple explanations have become rare.  As laymen meanings fall out of favor, the 
same impetus that drove the Greeks to seek their dei ex machina—a yearning for simple 
resolutions and understanding—now sends us in search of new heroes.  Once more, we seek 
heroes to provide coherent meanings and clear-cut answers.  
In negligence law, the hero has a name—the marginal approach.  Yet, it is by no means a 
mighty dashing Apollo.  Memoryless, shortsighted, impatient, predictable, awkward and 
crippled by criticism—the marginal approach is more a postmodern anti-hero than “a white 
knight upon a fiery steed.”  It holds on to all of the flaws of the classic deus ex-machina, but 
does not profess to his imperfections and limitations.  While its ancient predecessor was never 
thought to be anything but an actor in a shiny suit, the marginal approach hides the crane from 
which it hangs high above, and the underlying assumptions from which it stems.  
The irony in our current search for legal heroes is that tort law in the 21st century does 
not need white paladins and herculean champions, with easy solutions and miracle scales.  
What it needs are people with foresight, imagination, prudence, critical thinking and careful 
discretion.  Where heroes offered strength and resolve, we need sophistications and in-depth 
reflection.  Where heroes offered immutable laws and unassailable truths, we need curiosity, 
insight and flexibility.  Where heroes offered brute force, maxims and angry determination, we 
need wit, empirical profoundness and clarity of mind.  Where heroes once offered fixed 







b. A VIEW OF THE HEAVENS 
The Ancient Greeks can provide us with an additional lesson from the past, in the form 
of the dangers associated with crafting a general model based on theoretical simplifications and 
lofty philosophical maxims.  This lesson originates from arguably the most renowned example 
of a paradigmatic shift363 and revolutionary science—the turn from the Aristotelian and 
Ptolemaic cosmology364 to the heliocentric worldview.  
Predicated upon the axioms that the earth is stationary at the center of the universe, and 
that the heavens move in perfect circular paths, the Aristotelian view of the heavens established 
one of the most elaborate, complicated and fascinating models of the cosmos.365  Exerting 
unparalleled influence over ancient and medieval astronomy, it was a model of true beauty and 
elegance.  This view was also, as is by now commonly accepted, fundamentally flawed.  
What is interesting about the story of the Aristotelian cosmology for our purposes here is 
not so much the process by which scientific paradigms shift (which has been the subject of 
considerable debated in philosophy of science), but rather its emergence, logic and 
preservation.  The Aristotelian model was a system built upon a series of simple and unyielding 
assumptions, fashioned for their grace and purity, derived from philosophical conjecture, and 
generally devoid of an empirical substantiation processes.  Confined by the truism that the 
supralunar region is one of eternally unchanging cycles, where all movement is uniform, 
                                                
363 For the originating use of these terms, see Thomas S. Kuhn, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 
(1962).  See also Thomas S. Kuhn, THE COPERNICAN REVOLUTION—PLANETARY ASTRONOMY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
WESTERN THOUGHT (1957). 
364 For simplicity, our discussion here does not distinguish between Aristotelian and Ptolemaic theory, or points 
to the notable refinements and adaptations made to these models going to the 16th century. 
365 For a comprehensive historic account see David C. Lindberg, THE BEGINNINGS OF WESTERN SCIENCE—THE 
EUROPEAN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION IN PHILOSOPHICAL, RELIGIOUS, AND INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT, PREHISTORY TO A.D. 






uncorrectable and immaculate, it commanded that the stars move in flawless continuous circles, 
and religiously rejected any view to the contrary.366  
In the negligence context, the conventional model risks an Aristotelian fallacy, and veers 
dangerously close to paradigmatic misconceptions.  Just like the Aristotelian model, the 
conventional economic theory of negligence is organized around a set of simplified 
assumptions, prized precisely for their elegance and “cleanness.”367  Just as the Aristotelian 
map, the conventional model stems from abstract ideals, rather than adherence to empirical 
observations.  Similar to the ancient view of the heavens, the conventional model of negligence 
is highly fragile, and while intended as a general theory, it is at best demonstrative of highly 
specific cases. Indeed, reasoning that the stars impeccably move in ethereal monotonic spheres 
or that precautions are orthogonal and monotonically convex does not make them so.  
 
B. NEGLIGENCE LAW FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 
Negligence law is best conceived as an exercise in solving optimization puzzles.  As this 
dissertation claims, this is one of the most elusive yet helpful ways to truly understand the law 
of negligence from an economic perspective.  Negligence analysis entails a constant effort to 
disentangle intricate multi-variable scenarios—to find efficient solutions to sometimes 
immensely complicated functions and settings.  Many of the problems facing negligence 
                                                
366  See Aristotle, On the Heavens, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE—A REVISED OXFORD 
TRANSLATION 451 (Jonathan Barnes, ed., 1984), complemented by the short yet influential passage in Aristotle, 
METAPHYSICS, XII.8 (Richard Hope trans., 1960) (“There is, then, something which is always moved with an unceasing 
motion, which is motion in a circle; and this is plain not in theory only but in fact. Therefore the first heaven must be 
eternal. There is therefore also something which moves it. And since that which moves and is moved is intermediate, 
there is something which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, and actuality.”). 
367 Recall Cooter and Ulen’s statement, “[i]t is usually best to build theory from clean results and then handle 






adjudication and theory today are plainly or tacitly related to the challenges posed by 
multidimensional and threshold optimization puzzles.  Surprisingly enough, these challenges 
have scarcely been considered by legal scholarship.  As a result, our most basic notional 
approach to negligence is theoretically impaired and practically unfitting. 
In the realities of modern technology, the risks and challenges associated with over-
simplifying negligence problems warrant special attention.  As human endeavors become more 
advanced and ambitious, adjudicating negligence becomes more difficult.  This is especially 
true for litigation involving high-tech and research-driven industries.  Pharmaceutical 
developments, financial derivatives, software innovations and deepwater drilling, to name a 
few, can be amazingly complex and involve highly compound dilemmas, far exceeding the 
intricacy level discussed here.368   In all these cases, interacting precautions, substitutable 
options, threshold effects and discontinuous outputs are the prevailing norm, not the exception.  
                                                
368 Financial derivatives are an interesting example of the difficulties of implementing the Hand Formula in a 
complex-variable environment.  Consider the case of residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS), or the type that 
underlie the 2008 financial crisis.  The overall performance of any individual RMBS bond (or tranche of an RMBS bond) 
is principally contingent upon the value of its supporting loan group (SLG), or the mortgage loans serving as collateral 
for the cash flow from the securitization (subject to a few structuring mechanisms, such as caps and cross-
collateralization).   To assess the value of such each loan within the loan-pool collateral, roughly 20 different parameters 
might be considered relevant and material—for instance, the ratio between the borrower’s debt and her income (DTI), the 
ratio between the size of the loan and the value of the property (LTV), the borrower’s FICO score, whether the property 
is owner-occupied, whether there is a second lien on the property in question, the geographical location of the property, 
the occupancy period, the existence of mortgage insurance, and more.   
What is interesting is that the effect of each parameter on the probability of default and on expected loss severity 
(and of course, the value of the loan), is highly correlated with the other parameters.  Thus, for example, a 5% increase in 
LTV ration might have little to no impact on the probability of default in some settings, but a dramatic impact in others. 
Also, each parameter often exhibits threshold effects.  For instance, a deterioration of FICO score from 700 to 690 might 
not impact the probability of default at all, whereas a drop from a 650 FICO score to 640 will have a dramatic impact.   
Similarly, an occupancy period of anywhere between 2 to 30 years can have no impact on the probability of mortgagor 
default; whereas an occupancy period of under a year would increase the chances of default dramatically.  On top of all 
these, the structure of the securities makes the characteristics of the overall loan pool—not only individual loans—
critical.  For instance, the distribution of different parameters over different loans greatly affects the value of each tranche 
or bond, so that two loan pools might have identical average collateral characteristics, yet very different values.  Under 
such conditions, assessing issuers’ conduct and diligence according to a quasi-negligence standard, as required in various 
defenses under securities laws, creates substantial difficulties, and illustrates the innate limitations of the marginal 
approach.  See, for instance, James R. Barth, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE U.S. MORTGAGE AND CREDIT MARKETS (2009); 
Michael Lewis, THE BIG SHORT (2010); and Bethany McLean and Joe Nocera, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE—THE HIDDEN 






Modern technology therefore exacerbates the normative and practical difficulties posed 
here, and reinforces the need to take a deeper look at the current cost-benefit analysis schemes 
in tort law.  An ever-advancing world of scientific and engineering revolution constantly 
transforms previously regarded reasonable actions into negligent behaviors,369  posing an 
incredible strain on the negligence system.  More importantly, 21st century technology creates 
ever more challenging optimization puzzles, and facilitates new forms of strategic 
manipulations by prospective tortfeasors.  Viewed from this perspective, the need to rethink our 
theoretical conception of negligence and craft “a new paradigm of tort liability”370 cannot be 
overstated.  
The discussion throughout this thesis should cast a somber shadow on the applicability 
and viability of the marginal approach as the golden standard of negligence, and foster doubt as 
to its sufficiency as a sine qua non adjudication method.  At the very least, the difficulties 
posed here should lead to considerable skepticism as to the aptness of current economic theory 
to achieve efficient outcomes, and encourage the development of new rubrics for negligence 
adjudication.  The same skepticism should be afforded to schemes outside of tort law that are 





                                                
369 Grady made a similar claim, stating that negligence is fundamentally a “creature of technology”; see Grady, 
Why are People Negligent?, supra note 122, at p. 293 (1988); and Grady, Response, Another Theory of Insufficient 
Activity Levels, supra note 163, at p. 33 (“This analysis reveals a deep paradox in the civil liability system… basic safety 
technology often increases the rate and amount of negligent behavior.”). 
370 Grady, Response, Another Theory of Insufficiency Activity Levels, supra note 163, at p. 36.   
